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1.  Introduction1 
Part and parcel of the history and development of the EU has been an opposition to that 
very institution or development – in the form of European integration in areas like fiscal 
and monetary policy, agricultural policy, foreign and defence policy, or on issues like a 
common understanding of the rule of law and democracy. Therefore, Euroscepticism is 
an inherent part of the EU project. When the idea of a United States of Europe was 
envisioned by people like Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, an intergovernmental 
Europe was a vision for Europe by others, notably President Charles de Gaulle. From the 
1960s onwards, Euroscepticism moved more towards the political margins. The silent 
acceptance that the EU integration is the only logical step forward for Europe is today all 
but an inevitability – the era of permissive consensus has come to an end, where European 
integration is no longer taken for granted (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). 
 What is more, Eurosceptic parties, some with a radical right ideology, have at 
times taken prominent positions in the politics of their respective countries. Some 
examples are: (1) the Danish People’s Party, a Eurosceptic party in Denmark that served 
as parliamentary supporter of the government (Christiansen, 2016), (2) the Austrian 
Freedom Party, a radical right party that ended up in the government in 2000 in Austria 
(Akkerman, 2012), (3) Front National in France, where Marine Le Pen made it to the 
second round of the presidential elections of 2017 (Mayer, 2018); to name just a few. It 
has been established that the presence of Eurosceptic parties on the political landscape 
has an impact on the political agenda, where parties can put forward previously untapped 
issues. For instance, Topaloff argues that Euroscepticism “has become a fundamental 
component of the political portfolios of the marginal parties”, which are tapping into the 
increased politicisation of the EU and “the ensuing death of permissive consensus”, 
thereby “carving out of a niche for themselves in the political spectrum” (Topaloff, 2012: 
74). Euroscepticism has rather become the mainstream than the exception, reflected by a 
process of politicisation and polarisation of parties on issues related to the EU (Leconte, 
2015; Meijers and Rauh, 2016). As Hooghe and Marks put it: the “giant has awakened in 
an era of constraining dissensus” (2017: 23).  
 
1 Any translations from Dutch or Hungarian to English were done by the author and meant to represent the 
original intention to closely as possible. 
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While a lot is by known about what Euroscepticism can mean (for an overview, 
see Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2018), and how it shapes public opinion (Abbarno and 
Zapryanova, 2013, Fuchs et al. 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2007; Williams and Spoon, 
2015; Verney, 2015), is divided between Eastern and Western Europe (Kopecký and 
Mudde 2002, Pytlas, 2016), what typologies there are of party-based Euroscepticism 
(Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Flood, 2002; Leconte, 2010; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002; 
Topaloff, 2012; Vollaard and Voerman, 2015 etc.) or the drivers of partisan 
Euroscepticism are (see for instance Leconte, 2010; Skinner, 2013; Vasilopoulou, 2011), 
how parties like the Danish People’s Party, the Austrian Freedom Party or Front National 
in France influence EU policies in those countries is largely unknown.  
Since much less is known about the consequences of Eurosceptic actors on policy, 
this research aims to contribute to narrowing the knowledge gap on the influence of 
Eurosceptic parties on EU policies. More specifically, it looks at how Eurosceptic parties 
influence government policies related to the EU2. The research question therefore is: What 
is the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states? Two case 
studies will be conducted to help answer this question.  
 The three answers to that question are derived from three kinds of literature, 
namely the literature on the contagion effect, on coalition bargaining and lastly on 
parliamentary oversight. These kinds of literature deal with different elements of the 
question. The contagion effect looks at the policy convergence from the niche party 
towards the mainstream party. Party strategic considerations for mainstream parties are 
the focal point here, and Meguid’s 2005 Policy Salience and Ownership theory is used to 
do so. If parties converge their policy position towards the Eurosceptic party, then the aim 
is to transfer the ownership from the niche (Eurosceptic) party to the mainstream party to 
take away voters’ incentives to vote for the niche party instead of the mainstream party.  
 Secondly, coalition bargaining looks at the bargaining strength of coalition 
parties, or in the case of minority governments also parliamentary supporters of the 
government, in their capacity to shape the positions that the government stands for. 
 
2 While the focus of this research is on party politics that does not mean that political parties are considered 
the only Eurosceptic actors that might play a role in shaping the EU policy of member states in one form 
or another. Saalfeld (2000) depicted the interaction between the different actors of the parliamentary 
delegation process, whereby influence is exerted by voters on parties, members of parliament, the 
(coalition) cabinet and vice versa, and parties, members of parliament and the prime minister and cabinet 
also exert influence upon each other. However, he also adds the role of courts, interest groups, sub-national 
government, executive agencies, and international actors to the equation (2000: 355). This complex network 




Bolleyer’s concepts of formation weight and coalition weight (2007) are used to 
operationalise the influence parties have in the policy drafting and policy-shaping 
process. Formation weight takes place during the writing of the coalition agreement, and 
measures how many party-specific positions of that party end up as part of the coalition 
agreement. Coalition weight then looks at how many party-specific positions become 
legislation.  
 For the third political stream, parliamentary oversight, the agent-principal theory 
(Strøm, 2000; Laver and Shepsle, 1999) will be used to explain the behaviour of 
parliament as principal and government as an agent in the influence parliamentary parties 
have on the legislative process. Parties in parliament might set the political agenda during 
question time (Müller and Sieberer, 2014) or try to influence government policy by 
proposing legislation or submitting motions that would add clauses to existing legislation, 
which the government can choose to respond to or not. While a lot is known about the 
role of national parliaments in terms of parliamentary scrutiny over the EU affairs of 
member states, Rozenberg and Hefftler highlighted (2015) that there is a gap in the 
literature as to whether and how parliament actually influences EU policy – a question 
the current research seeks to contribute in answering. 
 Hungary and the Netherlands both had interesting episodes where the influence 
of Eurosceptic parties on government policy was likely. Furthermore, these two member 
states are different on a variety of dimensions – consensus-based government versus 
majoritarian government, founding member states versus joining in 2004, West Europe 
versus Central Europe, with widely diverging historical trajectories – which will 
contribute to their generalisability. The Dutch case study will look at the influence of the 
PVV and SGP on the government’s – composed of the CDA and VVD – EU migration 
policy in the period when the PVV was the parliamentary supporter of the Rutte I coalition 
(2010-2012). For the Hungarian case study, the government’s migration policy from 2015 
to 2020 will be the period of analysis. During that period, the Fidesz-KDNP3 government 
has maintained a (close to) 2/3 majority in parliament, and during the 2015 migration 
crisis, the Hungarian government took a Eurosceptic and nationalist turn when dealing 
with migration policy. In this case study, the influence of Jobbik on the government’s 
policy will be analysed in detail.  
 
3 Here considered as one party, since Fidesz and KDNP has been in a permanent coalition since 2006.  
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 The Netherlands and Hungary are selected as case studies following Beach and 
Pedersen’s logic for theory-testing process-tracing: “when there are well-developed 
theoretical conjectures but we are unsure whether they have empirical support” (2013: 
146). However, since both case studies also are strong candidates following George and 
Bennett’s most-likely case study logic (2005) – in the period under consideration in both 
countries, there was a strong right-wing Eurosceptic presence at times when migration 
was a salient issue. Migration policy will serve as the EU policy area on which both case 
studies will focus. One of the reasons for this is that the (radical) right in Europe tends to 
have both an anti-immigration and anti-EU position, often combining, or reinforcing, one 
position with the other (Fennema, 1997; Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; De Vries, 2018). 
While migration policy is a domestic policy area, it has strong European dimensionality 
to it, which is the topic of analysis here. 
 In terms of the formal role of the parties under consideration, this research takes 
the government (parties) as the base, i.e. whose policies are influenced. That means that 
the Eurosceptic parties that are looked at can be either be in the government themselves 
or the opposition, which each have their own means and channels for influence to take 
place. Alternatively, a party may be a parliamentary supporter of the government, like the 
PVV in the case of the Netherlands. In that case, the party was part of the government 
formation process, but without ministerial responsibilities. As we will see, that might 
have its benefits. For the Dutch case, the VVD and CDA are the government parties, those 
to be influenced. PVV and SGP are then the influencers. For the Hungarian case, Fidesz-
KDNP is the government party, which is Eurosceptic itself but is still that to be influenced, 
while Jobbik is the influencer. 
 As for the empirical part of this research, Euroscepticism in the Netherlands and 
Hungary is mapped. The Dutch case study will look at the Rutte I coalition government, 
with the hard Eurosceptic PVV as the permanent supporter in the period 2010 to 2012. 
The specific policy items under investigation are derived from the Roadmap that the 
Dutch government drafted late 2010, which lists the six pieces of EU legislation which 
the Dutch government could imagine changing in the foreseeable future (Leers, 2010). 
Three of these items were open for negotiation in the short to medium term, namely the 
Dublin Regulation, and the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives. 
 In Hungary, the two policy developments are selected with a different logic. At 
the height of the migration crisis in the EU in 2015, the European Commission proposed 
a migrant quota scheme, which the European Council voted in favour of with a qualified 
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majority in September 2015 (EUR-Lex, 2015). However, the Hungarian government 
rejected the migrant quota scheme and developed an extensive anti-immigration 
campaign following this Council decision. In relation to the anti-immigration policies of 
the Hungarian government, the 2018 Stop Soros legislative bills, criminalising the aid to 
asylum seekers in Hungary will be the second policy item under investigation.  
 Lastly, the structure of the research is as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature 
on party-based Euroscepticism and puts forward a policy-level approach to the concept 
that will be used throughout the rest of the study. As mentioned above, chapter 3 
summarises the literature on the coalition effect, coalition bargaining, parliamentary 
oversight, and policy change. Chapter 4 deals with methodological issues, like the logic 
behind the case selection and the development of the causal mechanisms based on the 
literature in chapter 3. Chapters 5 and 6 zoom into party-based Euroscepticism in the 
Netherlands and the Dutch case study, respectively. Similarly, chapter 7 and 8 deal with 
party-based Euroscepticism and the Hungarian case study. Chapter 9 concludes the 
research and compares the results of the case studies and looks at the differences and 
similarities in the conditions that facilitated Eurosceptic parties to influence the domestic 




2. Party-based Euroscepticism 
The EU has become a politicised issue in the domestic political debate, although there is 
no consensus on this matter in the academic debate. According to Hooghe and Marks 
(2008), the EU has become more politicised since the Maastricht Treaty because of its 
increasing salience on the political agenda and the mobilisation of political entrepreneurs. 
Contrarily, Green-Pedersen argues that there is instead an incentive for mainstream 
parties to keep the European Union off the political agenda, because the EU is not salient 
enough to be put on the agenda. Therefore, two factors would facilitate the politicisation 
of the EU, namely in cases when that would lead to the prospect of electoral gains and 
when the issue can be integrated “into the left-right structure of party competition” (2012: 
126). However, Hooghe and Marks argue rather that the “giant has awakened in an era of 
constraining dissensus”, where the politicisation of the EU “escape[s] mainstream party 
control” (2017: 23). Note that these authors also argue that the positioning on the 
European Union does not fit into the traditional left-right distinction of political 
competition. 
 A definition of politicisation helps to clarify both the term means and how it 
conceptually links to Euroscepticism4. In its simplest form, De Wilde and Zürn define 
politicisation as “making a matter a subject of public regulation and/or a subject of public 
discussion” (2012: 139). Hutter and Grande (2014), Milkin (2014) and De Wilde (2011) 
also add polarisation as a necessary component of politicisation, where polarisation can 
refer to “the intensity of conflict related to an issue among the different actors”, which is 
maximised when two camps have entirely opposing views on a matter (Hutter and 
Grande, 2014: 1004). Of course, Eurosceptic parties will be on one side of this conflict 
related to the EU. These groups are not homogenous, and individual actors within those 
groups can have widely reasons for supporting or opposing the EU, be them economic, 
political, or cultural. However, to get a better grip as to what an opposition to the EU or 
European integration means, this chapter reviews the literature on party-based 
Euroscepticism.  
 
4 The concept politicisation will be discussed in somewhat more detail in chapter 3. 
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2.1. Defining party-based Euroscepticism 
In the academic literature, the term Euroscepticism was first coined by Taggart5, who was 
referring to political parties as the primary unit of analysis: “Euroscepticism expresses 
the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (1998: 366). Paul Taggart 
refined the concept in cooperation with Aleks Szczerbiak followed in 2002, where they 
decided to differentiate between soft and hard Euroscepticism; whereby hard 
Euroscepticism refers to “a principled opposition to the EU and European integration”, 
implying that parties wish to “withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the 
EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is 
currently conceived.” Soft Euroscepticism does not refer to principled opposition to 
European integration or membership, but opposition “where concerns on one (or a 
number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where 
there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.” (2002: 
4) 
 In the same year (2002) of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s publication on the 
differentiation between soft and hard Euroscepticism, Kopecký and Mudde criticised the 
authors on three fronts. They offered their categorisation of Euroscepticism (2002): The 
nature of their criticism referred to the loose definition of soft Euroscepticism and the 
conceptual vagueness of distinguishing between soft and hard Euroscepticism (Mudde, 
2012). Kopeczký and Mudde (2002) differentiate between two dimensions, namely the 
support for European integration and the general support for the EU. They argue that their 
categorisation enables the ideological differentiation between parties that support or reject 
the EU project as a whole while taking a pragmatic approach to European integration.  
 
Table 1: Categorisation EU support Kopecký and Mudde 




EU-optimist Euroenthusiasts Europragmatists 
EU-pessimist Eurosceptics Eurorejects 
Source: Kopecký and Mudde, 2002. 
 
5 This is not the very first use of the term Euroscepticism, which was first used in 1985 in a political and 
journalistic context in the United Kingdom (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004).  
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 Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) then shot back with three critical points of their 
own on Kopecký and Mudde’s classification. Firstly, the authors use a more restricted 
definition of Euroscepticism which, according to Szczerbiak and Taggart, would only 
include Eurosceptic attitudes, and not opposition to the EU/European integration that is 
both principled and contingent. Secondly, the category Europragmatists (opposition to 
European integration, support of the EU’s current trajectory and further extension of 
sovereignty to the EU) is illogical, because it only fits parties that are very hard to 
categorise in the first place. Thirdly, the Euroenthusiast category is too inclusive, and 
“just as opposition to the European integration project as embodied in the EU can be both 
principled and contingent so can support for it” (244).  
 Flood proposed his own six categories of support for the European Union in 2002, 
ranging from rejectionist to maximalist strategies. There are four categories of support 
between those categories, namely revisionist, minimalist, gradualist and reformist, each 
encapsulating an attitude towards the EU. While the differentiation between policy area 
or the EU as a whole has merit, it fails to make a classification of support for the EU 
based on policy areas. Responding to Kopeczký and Mudde’s differentiation between 
support for the EU and European integration, Flood argues that their approach treats 
“ideology in a rather reductive way, as if it could be encapsulated in a binary opposition 
between Europhile commitment to, or Europhobic antagonism towards, an ideal of 
European integration” (5).  
 Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) have their criticism of Flood’s categorisation, 
claiming that, like Kopecký and Mudde, some parties would fit into multiple categories 
and that operationalisation becomes more complicated, the more categories you have.  
 Similar to Flood (2002), Conti (2003) also reflects on Kopeczký and Mudde’s 
differentiation between parties that support/reject the EU ideologically and that 
support/reject European integration, highlights that their categorisation does not fully 
apply to Western Europe – Kopecký and Mudde developed their categorisation based on 
the attitudes of Central and East European countries to the EU. Therefore, Conti suggests 
distinguishing between the approach that parties have to the EU, and whether the attitudes 
of parties will be positive or negative towards the EU (21).  
 A more gradualist approach was taken by Rovny in 2004, where he conceptualises 
Euroscepticism on a spatial map, where the magnitude of Euroscepticism is based on the 
classic soft/hard distinction of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002), and the other axis is a 
continuum between the extent of strategic or ideological motivations. While the idea of a 
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continuum of Euroscepticism or “Eurosupport” makes sense, the problem is that the 
fluidity of the notion complicates calling a party, or any other political actor for that 
matter, Eurosceptic, Europhile or anything else.  
All these categorisations have their strengths and weaknesses. However, the added 
value of Taggart and Szczerbiak’s categorisation lies in its elasticity in the sense that the 
soft-hard distinction leaves room for horizontal and vertical expanding and fine-tuning, 
for instance by adding support for the EU as categories. This is what Vollaard and 
Voerman did. In their typology, Vollaard and Voerman (2015) use Taggart and 
Szczerbiak’s (2008) differentiation between hard and soft Euroscepticism and add two 
other categories that refer to non-Eurosceptic parties, Europragmatic parties and 
Europhile parties. Europragmatic parties see the nation-state as the primary political 
actors and want to maintain this balance. They see European integration as an instrument 
to serve the domestic public interest and the national interests. As the term implies, 
Europhile parties envision a further development of a supranational union with European 
citizens. This does not necessarily exclude any criticism towards the EU though (2015: 
101). These two additional categories offer a more holistic view of party-support for the 
EU. 
2.2. Dimensions of Euroscepticism 
Having established what Euroscepticism has come to mean in the academic literature, the 
next question is what drives or motivates political actors to be Eurosceptic and who are 
the actors to which these ‘flavours’ of Euroscepticism correspond? Leconte (2010) 
identifies four varieties of Euroscepticism. Firstly, utilitarian Euroscepticism refers to 
doubt as to what the gains of being part of the EU are. Secondly, political Euroscepticism 
is directed at the threat of European integration on national sovereignty and identity. 
Thirdly, value-based Euroscepticism “denounces EU ‘interference’ in normative issues; 
and cultural anti-Europeanism, which is rooted in a broader hostility towards Europe as a 
continent and distrust towards the societal models and institutions of European countries” 
(2010: 43).  
 Leconte’s typology of the drivers of Euroscepticism is not the only one. Instance, 
Skinner (2013) uses the typologies of Sørensen (2008), Leconte (2010) and Skinner 
(2012) for the definitions of the motivators of Euroscepticism. Sørensen (2008), however, 
focuses on public Euroscepticism, and her typology is based on survey data and 
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operationalises the manifestation of Euroscepticism among the public on how 
respondents replied to questions. She differentiates between four types of public 
Euroscepticism, namely economic, sovereignty-based, democratic and social dimensions. 
These differ somewhat from Leconte’s categorisation.  
Thirdly, Skinner (2012) uses Norway as a case study to develop a theory to explain 
Euroscepticism, which differentiates between postmaterialist value-systems, political 
culture and rural society as the sources of Euroscepticism in Norway. She also considers 
the economy and national identity as part of the causes for Euroscepticism, but they fail 
to explain Euroscepticism in Norway.  
 Taking a slightly different approach, Vasilopoulou (2011) looks at three patterns 
of Euroscepticism, which correspond to varying degrees of opposition to European 
integration and that include variations of the drivers mentioned above. In its most 
restrictive form, rejecting Euroscepticism supports the notion of common history and 
culture in Europe, but is against the principle of cooperation within the EU’s institutional 
framework, and disagrees with the EU’s “institutional and policy status quo and 
resistance to the future building of a European polity” (2011: 232). Actors that are 
conditionally Eurosceptic similarly recognise that there is a common history and culture 
in Europe, and support the principle of European cooperation, but are hostile to the way 
policies are conducted within the EU and how the European polity is developing. Lijst 
Pim Fortuyn (LPF) is one such party; while the party claims to be pro-European, it 
initially finds the bureaucratic burden and the questionable democratic accountability 
core problems of the EU (Fortuyn, 1997). Thirdly, comprising Euroscepticism is 
“acceptance of a common European culture, support for the principle and the practice of 
integration but opposition to the future building of a European polity.” (Ibid.:232). 
Compromising Eurosceptics see contingent, pragmatic benefits of membership to the EU, 
though would argue that it is not an inherently good thing.  
These dimensions of Euroscepticism appeal will more and less to a party, 
depending on the political ideology behind the party. For instance, Skinner (2013) found 
that left-wing and right-wing parties have different reasons to be Eurosceptic. These 
motivations of Euroscepticism are categorised along six dimensions: economic, political, 
left-wing values, cultural, right-wing values and rural values (2013: 128). Left-wing 
Euroscepticism is often linked to postmaterialist issues, like climate change, while wing 
parties are rather Eurosceptic based on economic concerns of membership to the EU. 
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Startin (2018) focuses on the logic of how radical right-wing parties use the EU 
as a criticism for the reinforcement of migration flows, but also develop Eurosceptic 
arguments that are about the principled functioning of the EU. On the one hand, the socio-
economic consequences of EU membership, manifested in the economic crisis and the 
perceived failings of the Euro. On the other hand, radical right parties direct their attention 
to the matters of security, thereby invoking the migration crisis and the open borders of 
the EU (2018: 82). Following Taggart and Szczerbiak’s categorisation, hard Eurosceptic 
parties tend to fit into this category. The radical left has quite different reasons to be 
Eurosceptic though; whereby the radical right is more driven by identity and the radical 
left is instead driven by the consequences of membership on economic and social justice 
(Meijers, 2017).  
While most political issues are viewed in terms of the traditional left-right 
spectrum of party competition, Hooghe and Marks’ seminal article from 2008 makes a 
distinction beyond that classical approach, and argue that, when it comes to the EU, party 
conflict does not always fit the left-right scale. They inferred that support for European 
integration fits a different scale, which is ranging from a green/alternative/libertarian 
(GAL) ideology to a traditionalism/ authority/nationalism  (TAN) (Hooghe and Marks, 
2008).  
 The authors also found that party conflict manifests itself along different lines in 
Western as compared to Eastern Europe. The division in Eastern Europe is along left-
right lines and is reinforced with gal-tan ideology - with parties that have a GAL ideology 
are more pro-European, and the traditionalist-nationalist parties are more inclined to be 
critical of the EU. “The axis of party competition that emerged after the collapse of 
communism runs from left-tan to right-gal, pitting market and cultural liberals against 
social protectionists and nationalists,” they argue (Hooghe and Marks, 2008: 18). Come 
the 2010s, dominant contemporary Euroscepticism parties in Eastern Europe are rather 
nationalist and right-wing, like the ruling Fidesz party in Hungary and the PiS party in 
Poland.  
Other authors also looked at party positioning across geographical lines. Like 
Kopecký and Mudde (2002) above, Riishøj (2007) looks at the party-based 
Euroscepticism in Central Eastern Europe. He extracts three types of party-based 
Euroscepticism in the region in the mid-2000s, namely neo-liberal, traditionalistic 
conservative and left-populist. The Euroscepticism in CEE gradually became “more 
practice- and policy related and less symbolic and abstract” before and after the acceding 
 
23 
to the EU. Rohrschneider and Whitefield find, in a comparative study between parties in 
Western and Eastern European regarding the deepening and widening of European 
integration and the effectiveness of democracy in the EU, that East European parties tend 
to have an overall more positive perception of European integration and democracy in the 
EU (2016). 
Furthermore, the financial crisis has made mainstream parties in Western Europe 
more Eurosceptic, while this did not happen in Central Eastern Europe (2016: 158). In 
terms of changes in the salience of the EU in the two regions, European integration plays 
a slightly larger role in the East as compared to Western Europe, though in both regions, 
the increased salience of the EU is mainly a product of communist and nationalist parties 
(Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015). A slightly different but related issue is the effects 
of crises are starker in terms of a party’s position on the EU as a regime than the effects 
on specific policy positions or European integration in general, with the countries most 
affected by the financial crisis seeing the most considerable shift towards Euroscepticism 
(Schäfer and Gross, 2020) 
Leconte (2010) distinguishes between three classifications of Eurosceptic 
orientations of parties: “parties of government versus protest-based, anti-establishment 
parties; incumbent parties versus opposition parties; and office-seeking parties versus 
vote-seeking and policy-seeking parties” (107). She argues that government parties are 
going to be less Eurosceptic than protest or opposition parties. Recent electoral results, 
and sizeable Eurosceptic parties taking office in several European countries, however, 
weakens this argument. In the case of hard Euroscepticism (or soft Euroscepticism in a 
party system where there are no Eurosceptic parties yet), a party might use it as a strategy 
for voter maximisation, in that the party sees an opportunity to tap into an existing gap in 
the party competition. 
 Furthermore, Topaloff argues that marginal parties use Euroscepticism as a 
strategy because it allows them to politicise European integration, and this provides them 
with the tools for contestation (2012: 74). Noteworthy is the strategic usage of a pro-
European/Eurosceptic agenda by parties like the Labour and Conservative parties in the 
UK. Based on the Euromanifestos in the UK, Benedetto and Varela found that in 1979 
the Conservative Party was pro-EU and the Labour Party was Eurosceptic, which by 2009 
was reversed (2014: 62). The Front National softened her critical position towards the EU 
as well during the 1979 and 1984 election campaigns, in the hope that a strengthened 
European Communities would weaken national political forces (Topaloff, 2018). The 
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policy repositioning on European integration of parties towards the more extreme 
positions of Eurosceptic parties can be a strategic move to chip away votes from those 
parties (Meguid, 2005 and 2008; more on this in section 3.1).  
 Having established the what Euroscepticism amongst parties means and what 
motivates parties, section 2.3 shortly deals with the concept as an independent variable. 
2.3. Euroscepticism as an independent variable  
Lastly, contrary to most studies, some authors have looked at the consequences of 
Euroscepticism by treating it as the ‘independent’ and not as the ‘dependent’ variable (see 
Vasilopoulou, 2018 for a review of the literature). In her exploratory work, Vasilopoulou 
(2013) emphasises the need to look beyond the public and parties to understand where 
and how Euroscepticism manifests itself elsewhere, and secondly, calls for moving 
beyond definitional and the causal aspects of Euroscepticism to test “the precise ways in 
which Euroscepticism has shaped and continues to shape domestic politics and European 
integration over time” (163). By 2018, she takes note of the welcome change that 
“[s]cholars are increasingly employing Euroscepticism in order to understand a number 
of other phenomena, which suggests that the study of Euroscepticism is increasingly 
becoming integrated into the study of European integration and national European 
politics” (2018: 74). 
 Meijers (2015) appears to be one of the first in line to be dealing directly with the 
ways that party-based Euroscepticism shapes domestic politics. He studied how the 
Euroscepticism of one party influences the position of mainstream parties on European 
integration. By looking at the contagion effect, Meijers found that the presence of 
Eurosceptic niche parties has shaped the policy position of mainstream parties as well. 
Elsewhere, Meijers and Williams (2019) note that converging towards the Eurosceptic 
position of niche parties will not always pay off electorally for mainstream parties. 
However, Meijers does not directly look at the effects of Eurosceptic parties on the policy 
position of the government, which is the independent variable of the current research, i.e. 
Euroscepticism is treated here as an independent variable, whereby the presence of 
Eurosceptic parties is taking to be the point of departure which influences the policy 
outcome of the government. 
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 Now that party-based Euroscepticism has been discussed in detail, chapter 3 
reviews three distinct literatures that can be used for the explanation of how Eurosceptic 





3. How influence can be measured 
After having established in chapter 2, the Eurosceptic dimension of the research question 
What is the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states?, is it 
now in place to delve into the literature that reflects on the impact and influence 
dimensions of parties on policy. The word influence easily allows people to allocate 
intuitive meanings to it. Dahl coined a clear definition of influence: “a relation among 
actors such as that the wants, desires, preferences, or intentions on one or more actors 
affect the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more other actors” (Dahl, 1991: 32). 
This definition may describe what influence comprises, yet tells nothing about how one 
can observe influence, therefore making its operationalisation important. In the below 
literature review, three research areas within the political sciences are covered. While all 
fields are related to political parties and policy change, their operationalisation of 
influence is quite different. Since it depends on whether one is talking about the relation 
between actors and policy change within the study of party competition – specifically 
spatial theories – or coalition negotiations or legislative studies, the elaboration of 
influence is encapsulated in the causal mechanisms that close the reviews of these fields. 
The literature on the contagion effect, and the strategic considerations of policy 
convergence, will be discussed in section 3.1. Secondly, coalition bargaining is the 
process where coalition partners can shape the government agreement and policy. This 
process is discussed in section 3.2. Thirdly, the formal and informal tools available for 
parties in their national parliaments to influence the EU policy of a member state is 
discussed in section 3.3. These sections precede the discussion of how policy change is 
measure, necessary for establishing when spotting policy change when we see it. 
The three concepts cover the influence of Eurosceptic parties in overlapping 
phases of the government/policy cycle. In the first phase of the government cycle, during 
the coalition formation, the literature of coalition bargaining explains the bargaining 
success of parties (Thomson, 2001; Leinaweaver and Thomson, 2016; Bolleyer, 2007). If 
a Eurosceptic party is part of the coalition negotiations, it will be enabled to impact the 
policy formulations of the new cabinet. Once the coalition agreement has been drafted, 
and policy goals are formulated, the government will start policy implementation. During 
this post-formation phase, parties will be able to challenge and try to shape government 
policy as coalition partners (e.g. Kaarbo, 2008; Moury and Timmermans, 2013), or in 
parliament (e.g. Saarfeld, 2000; Auel, 2007; Rozenberg and Hefftler, 2015), or via other 
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extra-parliamentary activities. Inside parliament, oversight mechanisms will be used, 
mainly via written or oral questions, or the use of motions. The literature on parliamentary 
oversight helps explain attempts of policy shaping in parliament. Finally, Eurosceptic 
parties may influence by tapping into issue areas that were previously outside of the party 
competition (Topaloff, 2012; 2018), which may trigger government parties towards 
strategies of policy convergence (Meguid, 2005; Meguid, 2008). These strategic 
considerations most clearly be identifiable after election cycles, as a reaction to the 
electoral success of the Eurosceptic (niche) party (Meguid, 2008). This indicates a time 
lag in the repositioning by parties. It is contingent upon the success of the Eurosceptic 
party’s policy position and electoral gains whether other parties will converge their policy 
position – the topic of discussion of the next section. 
3.1. Contagion effect 
3.1.1. Party competition 
The contagion effect refers to a policy repositioning of one party to that of an electorally-
successful party. The point of departure of the contagion effect is party competition, and 
the motivations of political parties to seek voters or office or policy outcomes (Strøm, 
1990). Müller and Strøm (2000) distinguish between party motivations that are policy 
seeking, office-seeking and vote-seeking, though recognise the overlap. However, 
“[p]arty leaders rarely have the opportunity to realize all of their goals simultaneously. 
The same behavior that maximizes one of their objectives may not lead to the best 
possible outcome with respect to the others” (9). Beyond vote, office of policy seeking 
motivations, Sitter argues that parties consider a fourth element when developing their 
political strategy, namely ideology and party identity, and how ideology and identity may 
have implications on policy, voters, and office (2003, 249). That would imply that the 
strategic recalculation of policy positions is within the realm of what parties might 
consider their possibilities to maximise votes.  
 Other groups of studies – more relevant for the current discussion – have looked 
at party competition from the policy positioning point of view (Adams et al., 2011) and 
the issue ownership and salience points of view (Petrocik, 1996; Sheets et al., 2016). 
While there is little evidence that policy change by political parties changes citizens’ 
perceptions of these parties (see Adams et al., 2011), there is increasing support for 
 
28 
mainstream parties moving towards, the policy position of electorally successful niche 
parties, described here as the ‘contagion effect’ (Van Spanje, 2010; Ivaldi, 2011; Meijers, 
2015; Abou-Tarik and Krause, 2018). The contagion effect is reviewed here. 
 Rooduijn et al. (2014) find that no effect of populist parties on the amount of 
populist rhetoric in the party manifestos of mainstream parties, and that mainstream 
parties do not increase their populist rhetoric in the face of electoral losses. However, in 
several policy areas, a shift in the policy position of mainstream parties towards fringe 
parties has been identified. Most of these studies focused on immigration policy. For 
instance, Van der Brug et al. (2009) find that parties across the full political spectrum in 
the Netherlands have adopted more restrictive immigration policies from 1998 to 2009, 
and there has been more emphasis on the integration of migrants in the Netherlands. Van 
Spanje (2010) similarly shows, by conducting a large comparative study of expert surveys 
that parties across the political spectrum – and thus contrary to popular belief that this 
would be manifest only among right-wing parties – are susceptible to the contagion of a 
restrictive immigration policy. However, opposition parties tend to be more prone to 
contagion effects than government parties. Thirdly, Ivaldi has looked at the contagion 
effects in immigration policy, focusing on Front National in France, and found that 
central-right parties have moved towards the very restrictive immigration position of FN 
(2012). Similar contagion in migration policy in France was found by Meguid (2008). 
 Empirical support for the contagion effect is also identified beyond immigration 
policy. Environmental policy is the second most common studied policy area of the 
contagion effect, mainly focusing on Green parties’ impact of the policy space (Abou-
Chadi, 2014). Meguid shows that the Green Party in the UK threatened the electoral 
success of the both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in the late 1980s. The 
party did so by tapping into an issue considered important for many voters but which 
previously had not been not considered relevant by the Tories and the Labour Party. 
Meanwhile, the Green Party was becoming the issue owner of environmental policy, but 
the Conservative Party and the Labour Party adopted strategies that successfully managed 
to fend off that electoral threat (2008: 124-133). These specific strategies will be 
discussed below. 
While in the year 2003 Nick Sitter did not consider Euroscepticism to become a 
strategic tactic for mainstream parties to increase voter share, Meijers (2015) finds 
support for the presence of Eurosceptic contagion, albeit conditioned on a high salience 
of the EU for the contagious radical parties. This contagion led to lower levels of support 
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for European integration among mainstream parties. Elsewhere, Meijers and Rauh (2016) 
look at whether the contagion effect is also present among parties in the European 
Parliament and whether there were any notable changes in the Netherlands and France 
between 2009 and 2014. They found that the radical right successfully mobilised the EU 
as a political issue, which has a strong contagion effect for mainstream parties – 
mainstream parties often reacted the next day to claims of radical right parties (Ibid.: 91). 
Unlike the above cases, this variation of contagion does not relate to policy positions but 
to agenda-setting or political mobilisation. Interestingly, in both France and the 
Netherlands, the contagion effect was more significant in 2009 than in 2014, though 
politicisation increased over that period.  
For his analysis, Meijers conducts a quantitative analysis using Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey data. Other authors that conducted quantitative studies on the positioning of 
parties similarly use a scale that varies from 1 – denoting strong opposition – to 7 –  
denoting strong support (Ezrow et al., 2010; Somer-Topcu, 2009; Van Spanje, 2010; 
Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015), which are either from coded datasets of party 
manifestos or expert surveys. This approach, however, does not help to understand the 
strategic considerations of parties towards such policy convergence, whereby 
convergence refers to a converging towards a policy position, not necessarily as adoption 
of the same standpoints. 
The contribution of Salo and Rydgren (2018) is a qualitative analysis of 
Eurosceptic contagion of the radical right Finn Party on mainstream parties in Finland 
during the Eurozone crisis in 2010. They find that the Finn Party successfully polarised 
the political debate in Finland concerning the Greek and Irish financial instability by not 
favouring financial support for these countries, in contrast to the mainstream parties who 
did. Subsequent, the mainstream parties repositioned towards the position of the Finn 
Party, who had a more anti-establishment solution to Greece and Ireland financial 
difficulties in the EU context: “it was the strict constraints imposed on policymakers by 
the necessity of acting in a certain manner, lest the EMU and its constituent economies 
face an existential crisis, that brought on the punitive political climate where the national 
interest appeared as the guiding principle of all policymaking” (254).  
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3.1.2. Policies strategies niche parties and mainstream parties 
What theoretical framework might help explain the strategic motivations of Eurosceptic 
parties in influencing government parties’ policy positions and in addition to that also 
influence government policy? Conceptually, the contagion effect, in the case of policy 
positions, does not refer to the specific party strategy that a party employs but refers 
instead to the manifestation of policy convergence towards the position of another party 
(mostly a far-right/far-left party) in some policy area. However, one should be aware that 
other contextual elements might as well lead to a repositioning by a mainstream or 
government parties (Van Heerden et al., 2014: 134); think of unforeseen crises or a Treaty 
change in the EU that is expected to affect a country adversely. Nonetheless, the 
parliamentary representation and political mobilisation of niche parties will often speed 
up policy changes (Ibid.).  
Bonnie Meguid (2008) developed a spatial theory of party strategies, where one 
of those strategies involves policy convergence by the mainstream parties towards the 
niche party. As shown in table 2, the strategies for mainstream parties to deal with the 
electoral threat of niche parties are composed of 3 factors, namely: issue salience, issue 
position and issue ownership. The above-mentioned accommodative and dismissive 
strategies are strategies that have the same effect (if successful), but with contrary 
mechanisms that lead to the decrease in the electoral support of niche parties. The most 
straightforward approach is the dismissive strategy, which focuses on ignoring the efforts 
of upcoming niche parties to claim issue ownership. If successful, ignoring the niche party 
will decrease the salience of an issue and further marginalise the niche party. When a 
mainstream party adopts an adversarial strategy, it polarises the political debate about the 
issue that the niche party has raised, with the aim of winning the debate by persuading 
voters of the weaknesses of the niche party’s position. The party thereby increases the 
issue salience of the policy and diverges from the position of the niche party. 
As for the party strategy involving policy convergence, Meguid (2008: 27-30) 
finds that an “accommodative strategy” which “is typically employed by parties hoping 
to draw voters away from a threatening competitor” (Meguid, 2005: 348). Such a strategy 
leads to a convergence of issue position, increased issue salience and transfers the issue 
ownership to the mainstream party (away from the niche parties) and thus decreases the 
electoral support of the niche party. The combination of dismissive and accommodating 
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strategies for the same policy issue by the same party at different points in time also 
happens.  
There are several factors on which the likelihood of parties adopting an 
accommodative strategy is contingent. The primary point of departure is that mainstream 
parties will adopt an active, and more costly, strategy in the face of the threat of losing 
vote share to a niche party. The risk of a mainstream party to suffer electoral losses will 
depend on the electoral system in which they function: “Where parties react to threats, 
any factor that alters the perceived significance of those threats naturally affects party 
behavior” (Meguid, 2008: 97). Firstly, the electoral threshold impacts party sensitivity 
negatively, for the lower the threshold for a small party to get into parliament, the higher 
the risk of loss of a party’s governmental strength. Secondly, the proportionality of the 
electoral rules also impacts the threat of niche party influence, where the risk of losing 
seats is directly connected to the number of votes a party received. In a completely 
proportional system, the threat of electoral losses for the mainstream party is the greatest, 
since the relative weight of a vote for a big party is relatively smaller as compared to the 
weight of a vote in a system where big parties receive disproportionally more seats in 
relation to the votes they receive.  
Since Meguid’s spatial theory looks at the strategic response of mainstream 
parties to niche parties, a conceptual note on what is understood as a niche party is 
appropriate here. Both Meguid (2008) and Adams et al. (2006) label Communist, Green, 
and extreme nationalist parties as niche parties. Meguid (2008) argues that niche parties 
share three characteristics that differentiate them from other parties. Firstly, the traditional 
class-based orientation of politics is rejected. Secondly, niche parties put novel issues on 
Table 2: Predicted effects of mainstream party strategies 




Strategies Issue salience Issue position Issue ownership 
Dismissive Decreases No movement No effect Decreases 
Accommodative Increases Converges Transfers to 
mainstream party 
Decreases 
Adversarial Increases Diverges Reinforces niche 
party’s ownership 
Increases 
Source: Meguid, 2005: 350 
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the agenda that mostly do not coincide with the traditional left-right political spectrum. 
Third, niche parties focus on a smaller scope of issues than mainstream parties.  
Meguid’s spatial theory has been applied in numerous studies, covering varying 
policy areas, and leading to mixed results. For instance, Dahlström and Esaiasson (2013) 
found that in Sweden, parties mostly applied a dismissive strategy to impede the electoral 
success of anti-immigration parties. However, during the 2002 election campaign, the 
Liberals in Sweden adopted an accommodative strategy by passing a language test a 
requirement for naturalisation, which was rewarded by voters. 
Abou-Chadi (2014) found that on the issue of multiculturalism mainstream parties 
adopted an accommodative strategy, but that a similar policy shift was not identified on 
environmental issues and the emergence of green parties. These findings come with some 
conditions. Firstly, while there is a stronger tendency for centre-of-right parties to adopt 
radical right positions, even centre-of-left parties were inclined to choose an 
accommodative strategy (2014). Secondly, in the case of a niche green party putting the 
environment on the agenda, all mainstream parties de-emphasised the environment when 
the green party won more votes and owned the issue (Ibid.). The latter result is in line 
with Meguid’s finding that the mainstream parties in the UK used dismissive strategies 
when the Green Party entered the political arena in the 1980s. 
Perhaps the most directly relevant study using Meguid’s POS theory is by Meijers 
and Williams. They found that mainstream parties adopting an accommodative strategy 
towards Eurosceptic right-wing parties suffer electorally from doing so when niche 
parties can claim issue ownership of European integration (2019). Therefore, it seems 
more advantageous for those mainstream parties to resist the temptation of adopting a 
more Eurosceptic policy position and resort to different strategies.  
All in all, Meguid’s POS theory is excellent for the analysis of how Eurosceptic 
(niche) parties influence the EU policy of the government, through the government 
parties.  
3.2. Coalition bargaining 
Coalition bargaining is the second avenue that offers a theoretical toolbox of the study of 
influence by Eurosceptic parties on government. The starting point is, however, that the 
Eurosceptic party plays a role in the government coalition. Political parties that are a 
partner in a government coalition will be able to shape the policy process in a relatively 
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straightforward fashion, namely as part of the team of chief negotiators. Therefore, the 
function of coalition agreements will be reviewed in order to reflect on the influence 
Eurosceptic parties may have on the EU policy of the government coalition. 
 Coalition agreements play an important role in coalition governance, for the 
institutionalised nature of the agreement aims to decrease the sources of tension between 
coalition partners and also build trust between the same actors (Timmermans, 2006; 
Moury and Timmermans, 2013; Timmermans and Breeman, 2014), increase the stability 
of coalition cabinets by lowering the probability of intra-cabinet conflict (Krauss, 2018), 
and increase the stability of the legislative agenda, since the likelihood of majority support 
is higher (Timmermans and Breeman, 2014). However, the tension between coalition 
parties is part of the dynamics of party competition6, and therefore coalition agreements 
are mechanisms of conflict prevention and increase the efficiency of coalition 
policymaking (Müller and Strøm, 2000; Timmermans, 2006; Strøm et al., 2010). 
Formalised institutional arrangements and balanced agenda management by the head of 
government are ways of enforcing the coalition agreement (Timmermans, 2006).  
 Artes and Bustos studied the role of parliamentary support of minority cabinets in 
Spain. They found that the permanent parliamentary supporters of governments were 
successful in bargaining during the coalition formation phase which led to a fulfilment of 
a large amount of campaign pledges by these parliamentary supports (2008: 323). The 
authors thus conclude that the electoral programmes of parties are reasonable indicators 
of future government action (Idem.: 329). Moury and Fernandes (2016) found that 
minority governments in Portugal offer more possibilities for opposition parties to deliver 
on their campaign promises, that minority governments are not less likely to fulfil pledges 
than majority governments and that good economic conditions play a facilitating role in 
pledge fulfilment. 
 
6 This tension is a consequence of the delegation process. The first chain of delegation in the coalition 
government is intra-party delegation, described as the process that happens within parties, where party 
leaders and candidates for public office are appointed. Furthermore, there is delegation within coalitions, 
which is the connection between the coalition partners and the cabinet and the individual ministers (Müller 
and Meyer, 2010: 1070-1072). However, to deal with the agency losses that can occur due to delegation, 
control mechanisms exist; and these exist prior to the coalition government taking office (ex-ante) and in 
the post-formation phase as well (ex-post). When referring to government politics, ex-ante mechanisms are 
used to reduce the information asymmetry between the cabinet minister and the other coalition partners. 
Similarly, ex-post mechanisms are in place to reduce the potential of “hidden action” (Strøm et al., 2010). 
In the case of the coalition parties, the ex-ante mechanism concerns the coalition agreement that the parties 
draft before taking office. This way the coalition parties will negotiate on the clauses of conduct before 
taking office and thereby maximise the compatibility of the coalition partners, often by constraining the 
actions and policies that can be pursued after the government is formed” (Strøm et al., 2010: 521). Ex post 
mechanisms that coalition partners use are via mutual control of the cabinet (junior) ministers. 
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 After the government formation phase, coalition parties will have the role of 
governing together. Whereas most literature on coalition theory deals with the formation 
phase of coalition, Andeweg and Timmermans (2008) and Moury and Timmermans 
(2013) focus on the stages of coalition governance post-formation. Inter-party conflicts 
are the points where parties might shape policy. Junior government parties have 
disproportionately more bargaining power in the post-formation phase because they are 
often indispensable for the cabinet to stay in power. They also tend to control more 
ministries in the cabinet relative to their size (Kaarbo, 2008). Furthermore, Oppermann 
and Brummer argue that the influence of junior coalition partners on foreign policy to 
mean that policy “can at least partly be ascribed to the preferences of a junior partner”, 
but is not restricted to the substance of policy distance, for it includes the process and 
agenda of the decision-making process (2014: 558).  
 Moury and Timmermans (2013) operationalise a “major inter-party conflict as an 
instance of explicit dispute that involves the mobilization of party branches—ministerial, 
parliamentary, extra-parliamentary—or even entire parties acting en bloc in confrontation 
with one or more other parties in the coalition” (121, emphasis in original). Furthermore, 
the authors found that coalition agreements increase the incentives of coalition partners 
to resolve issues that arise from inter-party conflicts (Idem.: 129). Furthermore, Vercesi 
writes about inter-party conflict management in coalitions, and argues that “[p]arty unity 
can originate from either an actual sharing of political viewpoints or effective party 
discipline” (2016: 173).  
Martin and Vanberg (2008) found that coalition partners use parliamentary 
debates as the way through which they differentiate their party’s position and the 
compromise policy that the coalition partners have negotiated (513). It has further been 
found that the parliamentary arena can be an important platform for coalition partners to 
overcome intracoalition policy disagreements (Martin and Vanberg, 2004). 
 Turning to the theoretical applications of coalition bargaining, pledge or mandate 
theory relates to the fulfilment of campaign pledges by parties, and can be used for the 
operationalisation of influence of coalition partners on coalition agreements, for it gives 
the possibility of measuring the negotiation success of the coalition partners. Thomson 
(2001) applied mandate theory to coalition formation in the Netherlands in the period 
1986-1998, and tests for the “effects of the distribution of ministerial portfolios and the 
formulation of coalition agreements between prospective governing parties on the 
likelihood of pledge fulfilment” (172). He found that pledge fulfilment is more likely 
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when parties hold the ministerial post of the policy area in which the pledge was made, a 
finding echoed by Oppermann and Brummer (2014), underlining the importance of 
portfolio allocation in a coalition system. Furthermore, that pledges that maintain the 
status quo are more likely to be fulfilled than those aimed at policy change. In terms of 
pledge fulfilment, there was a significant difference between the pledges that were 
supported by more than one of the prospective coalition parties and those pledges made 
by only one prospective coalition party (Thomson, 2001; Costello and Thomson, 2008; 
Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik, 20147). Leinaweaver and Thomson (2016) used 
mandate theory but investigated under which conditions pro-environment policy 
positions of the government parties of the 27 EU member states is translated into actual 
government policy. When drafting a coalition agreement, the party delivering the prime 
minister is generally in the position that she can influence the policy pledges more than 
other coalition partners, since that party typically is the biggest, has initiated the 
government formation process, and has relatively more leverage in the allocation and 
distribution of ministerial portfolios (Leinaweaver and Thomson, 2016: 638).  
Deriving from pledge theory, Bolleyer’s (2007) developed a way to operationalise 
the strength of party influence on the formation phase and the post-formation 
(governance) phase, by using the conceptualisations of formation weight and coalition 
weight. Formation weight refers to the influence that a party has during the coalition 
formation. It is operationalised as the party pledges that end up in the coalition agreement, 
but which have not been supported by the other coalition parties. By excluding the pledges 
which have broader partisan support, one can isolate the strength of individual parties in 
the coalition bargaining game. Coalition weight, on the other hand, captures the influence 
of a coalition party when inter-party conflict arises in the post-formation phase, the phase 
after forming the coalition and writing the coalition agreement. Albertazzi and 
McDonnell (2010) also use these concepts to show Lega Nord’s strong position in the 
formation of the coalition with PDL in Italy in 2008. Besides, they argue that Lega Nord 
was able to shape the government’s policy on federal reform and security by negotiating 
useful ministries, despite the number of ministries being limited. Section 4.2.5 will return 
to Bolleyer’s work for the mechanism to be used in the case study. 
 
7 Pledge fulfilment during coalition bargaining increases with consensual and majority-supported pledges, 
accounting for 28% and 22% increases in the probability of fulfilling a pledge (i.e. being contained in the 
coalition agreement). The likelihood of pledge fulfilment also increases when the pledge keeps the status 
quo (from 37% to 50%) and when the pledge is made if the party who made the pledge takes ministerial 
responsibilities for fulfilment. (from 29% to 37%) (Ibid.: 14). 
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3.3. Parliamentary oversight 
This third section of the literature, the role of parliament(ary oversight) as a platform for 
Eurosceptic parties to influence the EU policies of member states is reviewed. This 
chapter reviews the formal parliamentary oversight mechanisms in general and then 
zooms into the EU-specific instruments and procedures and closes with a section on the 
scrutiny ladder of Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) which will be applied to the principal-
agent theory. 
In their introductory book ‘Representative Government in Modern Europe’, 
Gallagher, Laver and Mair argue that the role of parliaments has been declining since the 
nineteenth century, and that since the middle of the twentieth century “it was generally 
agreed that governments acted while parliaments just talked” (2006: 62). However, they 
also noted that the role of parliament cannot be generalised and needs to be distinguished 
according to a Lijphartian differentiation whether the system of government is 
majoritarian or consensus-oriented.  
According to Lijphart, three institutional features of parliaments contribute to the 
power of parliament in law-making, distinguished between the majoritarian and 
consensus systems of government. In consensus systems this means that (1) parliament 
sets the agenda in consultation with party groups, (2) the most important work is done in 
committees and (3) legislative acts first pass the committees before the whole parliament 
debates them. Conversely, in majoritarian systems (1) the agenda is controlled by the 
government, (2) the most important work is done in the plenary debates and (3) bills first 
passes parliament as a whole before being sent to the committees. Given these differences, 
consensus systems facilitate coordination amongst parliamentary stakeholders while 
majoritarian systems facilitate a confrontational attitude between parliament and 
government. (Gallagher et al., 2006: 62) 
Those distinctions have important implications for the ways that Eurosceptic 
parties in parliament will be able to shape the government’s EU policies. In consensus-
building systems of government, parliamentary parties that are outside of government are 
more likely to be able to influence the government, while in majoritarian systems that 
influence is much less likely. The section will start with a discussion of delegation, as the 
principal-agent model serves as a basis of the study of Eurosceptic parties’ influencing 
capabilities where parliament is the political arena, followed by a discussion of the key 
government oversight tools at the parliament’s disposal in European affairs. 
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3.3.1. Delegation in the legislature and oversight 
The logic of parliamentary oversight can conveniently be framed in terms of a chain of 
delegation. But what is delegation? In the principal-agent model, delegation explains the 
interaction between principal and agent, and is defined as “an act where one person or 
group, called a principal, relies on another person or group, called an agent, to act on the 
principal’s behalf” (Lupia, 2003: 33). As such, delegation necessarily involves a risk in 
that the agent does not do what the principal would want it to do. There are significant 
agency problems involved in the delegation of power, which translate into “agency loss” 
for the principal. In case there is a divergence of interests between the principal and the 
agent, the agent might be inclined to pursue its own interests at the cost of the principal’s 
interests, leading to agency loss (Auel, 2007: 496). Under perfect delegation, the agent 
would do “what the principal would have done if the principal had unlimited information 
and resources to do the job herself” (Lupia, 2006: 35). Potential information asymmetries 
could amplify the agency losses for the principal, for it might increase the incentive for 
the agent to pursue her own interests if those interests were to diverge from those of the 
principal. The agent then either shirks – it does not act in the interest of the principal – or 
commits sabotage by acting against the interests of the principal (Auel, 2007: 496; also 
see Lupia, 2006: 43). 
 Parliament is both an agent and a principal, depending on the perspective that the 
delegation chain is looked at. Firstly, parliament functions as the representative of the 
citizenry, and is given the power to act on their behalf. Here, the citizenry is the principal 
and parliament the agent. In the second chain of delegation, the government is mandated 
by parliament to act on its behalf (and thus indirectly on behalf of the citizenry) in the EU 
institutions. Now national parliament is the principal and government the agent. Where 
the agent is granted the authority to act on behalf of the principal, the agent will be held 
accountable for its actions (Strøm, 2000: 267). An important prerequisite for the 
functioning of government is the endowment of trust by parliament onto the government, 
for without the confidence of parliament, the government will not have the mandate to 
govern. As Laver and Shepsle argue, a “government is said to be accountable to 
parliament when parliament has no reason to replace it with an alternative” (1999: 290).  
 The delegation process is summarised in figure 1 and shows the interrelations 
between the different political actors involved in the national policy decision-making 
process. Saarfeld (2000) illustrates the parliamentary delegation process, where point b is 
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the delegation process which this section looks at, since the parliament is the principal 
and the government is the agent in EU parliamentary oversight.  
 
Figure 1: A simplified model of the parliamentary delegation process. 
 
Parliament is granted several powers to oversee the activities of the government, 
both before and after the cabinet take office. Strøm et al. (2010: 526) refer to a so-called 
investiture vote as an ex-ante control mechanism for parliament. This is a vote in 
parliament that grants parties with the competence to form a coalition, though not all 
parliaments have this competence at their disposal. Ex post-government oversight tools 
for parliament are most in the form of parliamentary questions and interpellations. 
“Question time” is the primary tool for parliamentary scrutiny, and questions are posed 
either in written or oral form (Müller and Sieberer, 2014: 322). Particularly in single-
party government, opposition parties often use parliamentary questions as a form of 
extracting information from the government or when seeking to “embarrass the governing 
party” (Strøm et al., 2010: 526). A further tool used for control purposes is the 
organisation of parliamentary committees that have the power to demand progress or 
policy reports from government, use the know-how of specialised committee members 
and hear witnesses (Müller and Sieberer, 2014: 323). The third, and most potent, yet 
relative rarely used, means of parliamentary control is the establishment of non-
permanent investigative committees (Ibid.: 323).  
Depending on their place in parliament, the aims of MPs will vary when they are 
members of oversight or legislative committees. In the latter case, MPs more actively 
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seek to advocate policies, whereas in oversight committees the focus is more on 
controlling the administration (Bundi, 2017: 2). 
 On a different note, Finkel and Herbel find that a leading motive of opposition 
parties to engage in scrutiny activities of the government policy is over policy 
disagreements. Scrutiny is primarily used by opposition parties when the chances of 
successfully influencing the government’s policy position is large, which is more likely 
in the case of a thin majority of government parties in parliament (2015: 508).  
3.3.2. National parliaments and EU policy 
The next step is to focus on the instruments at the disposal of parliament to scrutinise the 
EU policies of government. Parliamentary scrutiny on matters concerning EU is the 
primary institutional source for the government to hear from opposition parties 
(Holzhacker, 2008: 144). There are competing arguments regarding the powers of 
parliaments to conduct oversight on the government in the face of increased penetration 
of EU laws and regulations in national legislation. On the one hand, the 
deparliamentisation thesis argues that national legislation has suffered from increased 
erosion of parliamentary oversight over legislation.8 On the other hand, the opponents of 
the deparliamentisation thesis argue that it is necessary to go beyond the formal 
institutional powers of parliament and assess the behaviour of national parliaments, since 
that defines the scope of its oversight opportunities (Auel and Benz, 2005; Auel, 2007)9. 
The provisions stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty provide national parliaments with 
increased access to information of Commission and Council documents and allow 
nationals parliaments to check whether legislative proposals do not exceed the scope of 
subsidiarity principle (see Rozenberg and Heffler, 2015; Rozenberg, 2017). Furthermore, 
interparliamentary cooperation and cooperation between national parliaments and the 
 
8 The argument goes that, since most issues do not require unanimity, the national legislature’s reach in 
shaping EU affairs is mostly limited to scrutinising the policy initiatives of the European Commission, and 
to influence government (Raunio, 2014: 553; De Ruiter, 2013). Also, most EU directives are by government 
decree, and EU directives and decisions do not need parliamentary approval (Raunio and Wiberg, 2010: 
78). A further limitation to parliament’s scope is the increased use of QMV (qualified majority voting) in 
the European Council and the Council of the European Union which, coupled with the complex bargaining 
process in the Council, “make it difficult for national parliaments to force governments to make detailed 
ex-ante commitments before taking decisions at the European level” (Raunio, 2014: 553). 
9 The emphasis on parliamentary scrutiny in the different member states has led to the development of more 
adept scrutiny mechanisms, which caused an EU-wide convergence of these institutional mechanisms 
(Raunio, 2014: 555). The function of parliament in the EU decision-making process lies in part in the 
enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and its influence is mostly through the 
informal or private cooperation with the government (Auel, 2007). The Europeanisation of national 
parliaments has made these parliaments more capable of becoming involved in EU affairs. 
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European Parliament increases their ability to scrutinise the executive (Finke and Herbel, 
2015: 492).  
Winzen (2013) distinguishes between two categories of oversight institutions 
national parliaments have at their disposal. Firstly, those rules and structures that help to 
overcome the information asymmetry between the government and parliament; like rules 
that grant parliament rights to access EU legislative documents and oblige governments 
to inform parliament about negotiations. The creation of a European Affairs Committee 
and sectoral committees, either ad hoc or obligatory, also increased the scope of oversight 
capabilities. Sectoral committees, either ad hoc or obligatory, also contribute to 
decreasing information asymmetries (Winzen, 2017: 30). Secondly, there are those rules 
that address parliamentary authority losses via scrutiny mechanisms “that prohibit 
governmental commitments at the EU level before domestic scrutiny finishes” (300). 
Summarising, the general dimensions of parliamentary control are “(a) the access to 
information on both EU policy proposals and developments (such as EU documents) as 
well as on the government’s negotiation position; (b) the parliamentary infrastructure to 
deal with EU issues; and (c) the binding character of parliamentary positions (resolutions 
or mandates)” (Auel et al., 2015: 62). 
Within the parliamentary setting, plenary debates are the most important means 
for political parties to raise issues on the political agenda (Auel et al., 2016: 156). 
Strategies for parliament seeking to exercise control over EU policy is by holding closed 
committee sessions, instead of plenary debates, informal cooperation with a minister 
without a binding mandate, or through cooperation with other actors from other member 
states (Auel and Benz, 2006 in Holzhacker, 2008).   
However, the (perception of) policy influence of parliamentarians on domestic 
EU policy is not the same across countries, nor necessarily similar when national 
parliaments both score on institutional strength, like Sweden and Finland (Öberg and 
Jungar, 2009). Öberg and Jungar found that the internal organisation of parliamentary 
work on EU matters is relevant for the role of parliamentarians in EU decision-making. 
Sweden’s parliament has few parliamentarians that deal with EU affairs through the 
Committee of EU Affairs, while in Finland parliamentarians have the chance to engage 
with EU affairs through other standing committees as well. The more decentralised 
organisation of EU decision making affairs in Finland’s parliament increases the 
perception of parliamentary of the role they play in shaping policy (378).  
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In terms of the role of Eurosceptic parties, the presence and strength of 
Eurosceptic parties is found to increase parliamentary oversight only marginally (Winzen, 
2013: 317), and the amount of questions asked and debates organised due to the presence 
of Eurosceptic parties is also marginal (Auel et al. 2016: 161). Furthermore, the length of 
floor debates increases a bit with an increased presence of Eurosceptic parties in 
parliament (Auel et al., 2015: 298). In the case of the Netherlands, Unlike Auel and 
Raunio (2014), Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) do find that the Eurosceptic parties in 
parliament engage in oversight activities like asking questions. However, these parties do 
not engage in more ‘rigorous’ scrutiny activities like presenting alternative policy 
positions or instructing government.  
 While a lot is known about the role of national parliaments in terms of 
parliamentary scrutiny over the EU affairs of member states, Rozenberg and Hefftler 
highlighted (2015) that there is a gap in the literature as to whether and how parliament 
actually influences EU policy – a question the current research seeks to contribute in 
answering. They note that binding mandates are an efficient way of influencing 
government policy, whether direct or indirect, yet, given their rare occurrence, so far 
“studies have failed to demonstrate that reducing the information gap through detailed 
scrutiny offers greater influence for MPs” (Rozenberg and Hefftler, 2015: 26). The five 
“ideal types of parliamentary involvement” outlined by Rozenberg and Hefftler are 
(2015): policy shaper, government watchdog, public forum, EU expert and European 
player.  
 Building on the literature of parliamentary scrutiny and legislative control 
mechanisms, Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) developed the scrutiny ladder, named after 
the metaphorical idea that climbing on the scrutiny ladder by MPs represents more 
challenging levels of scrutiny towards the government. There are four types of scrutiny, 
as shown in Table 3. As the level of scrutiny increases, the demands – both in terms of 
knowledge and expertise, and terms of the access to information on the matter – on the 
members of parliament engaging in the scrutiny process also increase.  
Table 3: Overview of the ex-ante steps on the scrutiny ladder and related demands for 
the MP 
Type of scrutiny →  Monitoring scrutiny Political scrutiny 
Scrutiny level → 
Demands for MP ↓ 
Step 1: expressing 
support/disagreement 
Step 2: asking 
questions 









Knowledge of gov. 
position on issue 
X  X  X  X  
Analysis of gov. 
position and 
argumentation 
 X  X  X 
Own information or 
expertise on issue 
  X X 
Overview state of 
play in negotiations 
   X  
Source: Smeets and De Ruiter, 2018: 5 
 This relatively simple framework offers a very useful complement to using the 
principal-agent theory to get closer to an answer to this gap in the literature. This 
theoretical integration will be discussed in section 4.2.6. 
3.4. Policy change 
In sections 3.1 through 3.3, three theoretical frameworks were identified as avenues for 
Eurosceptic parties to influence EU policies of governments. This section will discuss the 
ways that policy change can be identified and measures when it occurs.  
 When political parties refer to the European Union in their party manifestos, 
statements tend to refer to the EU in general terms, such as: “As the Netherlands, we need 
a strong and effective Europe to protect our interests and strengthen our position” (CDA 
2017: 34), or “Europe is struggling with itself and its ideals” (CU 2017: 87). Similar 
statements are made in domestic State of the European Union debates. These are cases 
where there is an explicit reference to the European Union, yet without a specific policy 
position. Ideological statements like these do not lend themselves for the analysis of 
substantive policy positions.  
Peter Hall, in his seminal work “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: 
The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain” (1993), offers a systemic approach to 
identifying policy change, based on the theories of social learning in state-centric 
approaches. He argues that policy change is a consequence of a social learning process, 
whereby how a policy problem is conceptualised plays a role in the policymaking process. 
Hall distinguishes between three different degrees of policy changes that can occur, and 
that differ in their impact. These are “the overarching goals that guide policy in a 
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particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to attain those goals, and the 
precise settings of these instruments” (278), yielding different magnitudes of change. 
Table 4 summarises the three degrees of policy change. 
First-order change refers to incremental and routine decision making that is part 
of the normal policy process. It is considered a social learning process, whereby the 
policymaker adjusts policies in point t=1 based on what was decided in t=0 and traced the 
change that occurs over the period t=0 to t=1. As such, the goals and instruments remain 
the same, but the level of the instruments is adjusted. While Hall does not explicitly state 
so, the adjustments are modest in the case of first-order change, for large changes in the 
level of expenditures would rather be a second-order change or even third-order policy 
change, whereby the adjustment falls outside the scope of “normalcy”. Examples of first-
order change are changes in the interest rate or incremental increases in the annual budget 
of a department (Greener, 2001: 135), small adjustments to the eligibility criteria for 
social security (Blomberg and Kroll, 2004:21), the level of payment fees for physicians 
in health policy (Bryant, 2002: 91) or modest adjustments to the level of allocations of 
the EU budget to the Common Agricultural Policy. If one were to look at migration 
policy, it could be incremental increases or decreases in the number of refugees that a 
country takes in.  
Second-order change corresponds to more far-reaching changes, “like the 
development of new policy instruments [that] may move one step beyond in the direction 
of strategic action” (Hall, 1993: 280). By adapting to past experiences (Kettell and 
Cairney, 2010), not only do the level (setting) of the instruments change, but the 
Table 4: Operationalising policy change, as according to Peter Hall’s (1993) 
categorisation of change 
Policy change Dimension of change 
First-order change Goals and instruments remain the same, but the level of the instruments change 
(policy adjustments) 
Second-order change Goals remain the same, but the instruments and the level of the instruments 
change 
Third-order change The hierarchy of goals, the instruments themselves and the level of the 
instruments all change 
Source: Hall, 1993. 
 
44 
instruments10 themselves are subject to change, while maintaining the same hierarchy of 
goals. The techniques to achieve the goals are re-evaluated based on past experiences. 
According to Ian Greener, second-order changes are of more importance than Hall 
suggests. Greener argues that policy instruments flow from the ideological considerations 
of those shaping the policy change (2001: 139). Therefore, changes in policy instruments 
are not part of the normal policymaking process but have more profound consequences. 
Examples of second-order change are the “establishment of community health centres to 
complement existing primary care” (Bryant, 2002: 91), or the abandonment of strict 
targets of monetary growth that was implemented by Thatcher’s government (Hall, 1993: 
278-279). Blomberg and Kroll looked at the social security policies in Sweden and 
Finland, and they operationalised a second-order policy change as the share of state-
funded contributions for financing social insurance programmes exceeding a 20 per cent 
increase or decrease (2004: 20).  
Third-order changes, the most radical form of change, are inspired by the concept 
of paradigm shift, a derivative of Kuhn’s scientific paradigm shift. It is the hierarchy of 
policy goals that are subject to change in third-order policy changes, thereby affecting the 
types of instruments used to achieve these goals and leading to a complete overhaul of 
the previous policy framework. Such paradigm shifts can manifest themselves in three 
ways (Hall, 1993: 280). Firstly, paradigm shifts instead originate in sociological processes 
than scientific ones and are based on predominantly political motivations. Secondly, those 
actors which the policy community deems authoritative will be guiding in the process of 
change, leading to a competition for policy authority. Thirdly, “instances of policy 
experimentation and policy failure are likely to play a key role in the movement from one 
paradigm to another,” and the government will then try to deal with policy problems via 
“experiments to adjust existing lines of policy”, which may result in a policy failure if 
there an incapability “of dealing with anomalous developments” (Ibid.: 280).  
Unfortunately, Peter Hall does not further elaborate on the implications of these 
order changes, and his article then goes on to illustrate his theory with an empirical case 
study of the macroeconomic policy of the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the article has 
received much scholarly attention, while being criticised for its lack of clarity on the 
 
10
 Policy instruments are understood to be those “tools used by governments to pursue a desired outcome. 
Examples include economic tools (taxes, spending, incentives), and regulations (voluntary, legal)” 
(Cairney, 2013). The European Union has four categories of policy instruments at its disposal, namely 
"hard" legally binding rules, "soft" regulation, education and information, and economic instruments 
(European Commission, n.d.).  
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concept of “policy paradigm” (Cairney and Weible, 2015: 83-85). Cairney and Weible 
picked up on that lack of conceptual clarify and argue that significant policy change might 
rather be a continual and gradual process instead of a one-time “big bang” change. 
Paradigms shift are considered to be rare, though there can be major variation in the speed 
of change depending on the policy area (Ibid: 89-92). Furthermore, paradigm shifts are a 
construct of the prior ideas of policy actors, which can signify the persistence of rigid 
belief systems that might even be maintained in the face of policy failures (Jacobs, 2015). 
Political actors will resort to existing paradigms by default, even when policies have 
failed; but “when failures sufficiently accumulate – and if they are inexplicable in terms 
of the old paradigm – then social learning may occur” (2015: 59).11  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical underpinnings of three literature reviews, used 
to understand the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states. 
Firstly, we found that the mainstream parties will have vote-seeking motivations to 
repositioning themselves towards the policy positions of niche parties, by what Meguid 
calls an “accommodative strategy”. Secondly, in terms of coalition bargaining, Bolleyer’s 
concepts of “formation weight” and “coalition weight” help to identify the influence of 
Eurosceptic coalition parties on the EU policy of the government. Thirdly, Smeets and 
Ruiters “scrutiny ladder” and the principal-agent theory serve as the basis of the strength 
in which Eurosceptic parties will be able to pressure the government to modify their (EU) 
policies.  
 These three literature reviews lead to the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis C1: Mainstream parties will use an accommodative party strategy in reaction 
to the electoral success of Eurosceptic niche parties. 
Hypothesis B1: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the formation weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition 
bargaining process. 
 
11 Policy failure can catalyze policy change. Peter Hall identifies different levels of policy change in the 
case of the United Kingdom’s economic policy, that were the consequence of policy experiments and policy 
failures (Hall, 1993). In quite a different context, a recent collection of case studies tries to understand the 
policy successes and failures in Central and Eastern Europe (Batory et al. 2018). 
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Hypothesis B2: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the coalition weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition 
bargaining process. 
Hypothesis P1: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party asks parliamentary questions 
as a way to modestly shape policy. 
Hypothesis P2: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party takes up an alternative position 
as a way to moderately shape policy. 
Hypothesis P3: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party provides the government party 




4. Methods and techniques 
That is the question we have been building towards answering. In chapter 2, the concept 
of party-based Euroscepticism was discussed in detail, to know what is meant by this 
widely-used term. Chapter 3 then went on to find ways in which the idea of influence can 
be understood in the context of the research question. Eventually, three research fields 
were identified that could answer our question, each with their theoretical frameworks: 
the literature on party strategies, coalition bargaining and parliamentary oversight. The 
discussion of those research areas was followed by the question of how influence can be 
measured. In the end, Peter Hall’s differentiation between first, second and third-order 
policy change serves the purpose in this journey.  
 Before moving on to the empirical part of the research, we still need to establish 
how that what we already know (chapter 3) can be utilised to answer the case studies. In 
order words, how do we recognise policy change under policy convergence, coalition 
bargaining and parliamentary oversight when it actually happens? For that, we need to 
identify the causal mechanisms of how the theories can explain the research question in 
the context of the case studies and what observable manifestations of policy change can 
be expected. Therefore, this chapter discusses issues that relate to how the present 
research is conducted and how the research question will be answered. It describes the 
research design and research methods and is separated into two subchapters. The first 
subchapter delves into the logic of case study research and explains which cases have 
been selected and why. In the second subchapter, the research methods are introduced in 
the context of the selected case studies. From this follow the causal mechanisms and then 
the hypotheses that will be tested, to test the explanatory power of the contagion effect, 
coalition bargaining and parliamentary oversight as frameworks for the analysis of the 
influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policies. 
4.1. Case selection and logic 
Two case studies were selected for answering the research question. The first case study 
focuses on the Netherlands from 2010 to 2012, more specifically the influence of the PVV 
and SGP – two Eurosceptic niche parties – on the EU policy of the Rutte I cabinet, 
consisting of the Christian Democrats (CDA) and conservative-liberal People's Party for 
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Freedom and Democracy (VVD). In the second case study, the Eurosceptic Jobbik is the 
niche party, and Fidesz is the Eurosceptic government party.  
 From 2010 to 2012, the Dutch had a minority government of the VVD and the 
CDA, with the parliamentary support of the PVV. For the Netherlands, this was a unique 
arrangement, since minority governments are relatively uncommon, and it was the first 
time an outspoken hard Eurosceptic party (PVV) played a significant role in government, 
albeit without ministerial responsibilities. After the fall of the government, Minister of 
Immigration, Gerd Leers, argued that the bargaining power of PVV had been particularly 
strong during Rutte I (Leers, 2012b).  
 The position of the PVV appears to have been particularly beneficial for shaping 
policy, as Geert Wilders, party leader of PVV, took part in the weekly meetings of the 
prime minister and key ministers. Therefore, without ministerial and governing 
responsibilities whilst nonetheless participating in cabinet meetings, the PVV had the 
power to play a decisive role in shaping the government’s policies. The threat of pulling 
the plug if things were moving in an undesirable direction was present. Furthermore, the 
Eurosceptic conservative Reformed Political Party (SGP) also played an important role 
in parliament during the Rutte I coalition, since it became the ‘silent supporter’ of the 
government after the coalition lost its majority in the Senate (De Jong, 2012). After the 
coalition lost its majority in the Eerste Kamer (Senate) in 2011, the SGP supported the 
coalition in the Senate. In return, the party wanted the government to refrain from 
extending the possibilities of shopping on Sundays, from imposing any restrictions on the 
freedom of (religious) education and desired the coalition to fare a conservative course in 
the field of medical ethics (Trouw, 2011).  
In Hungary, the Fidesz-KDNP government won the general elections three times 
in a row with an overwhelming majority in parliament, holding around 2/3 of the seats 
since 2010. While the position of Fidesz concerning European integration is at times 
ambiguous (see section 7.2), its position on the EU-related dimensions of migration after 
2014 have been Eurosceptic. The case study will look at the 2015 to 2020 period, and 
analyse the role of Jobbik, a (hard) Eurosceptic niche party in Hungary, that has 
influenced the EU policies of the Hungarian government. Jobbik won 16.7% of the votes 
in the 2010 elections and has since had a notable influence on Fidesz’s policies (Krekó 
and Enyedi, 2015; Enyedi and Róna, 2018). In fact, the policy positions of Jobbik have, 
on several occasions, served as the instigators of future policies of the Fidesz government.  
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 Case selection is based on the logic of Beach and Pedersen’s (2013) for theory-
testing process-tracing. They argue that theory-test process-tracing strategies may be used 
“when there are well-developed theoretical conjectures but we are unsure whether they 
have empirical support” (146). Chapter 3 focused on developing these “well-developed 
theoretical conjectures”. With those established, the necessary criteria for case selection 
will be the presence of the cause and effect – the presence of Eurosceptic niche parties 
and EU policy change, respectively. In both of the case studies, these criteria are met.  
 Furthermore, the two case studies are selected because I command both languages 
rather well, which avoids a language gap. However, the cases are also interesting because 
they offer insights into the workings of a founding member with typical consensus-based 
government system (the Netherlands) versus a newer member states with a majoritarian 
government system (Hungary). However, both have a relatively strong party-based 
Euroscepticism.  
 Besides, the Dutch case study is an excellent example of what influence a party 
might have that functions as a parliamentary supporter for the government, but without 
any ministerial responsibilities, thereby contributing to the study of the dynamics of 
minority governments. The Hungarian case study, on the other hand, is a prime example 
of how a self-proclaimed illiberal regime, with an overwhelming parliamentary majority, 
may be influenced by other parties in its political arena. Therefore, the case studies may 
be considered as likely cases where the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy can 
be expected. Consider this as a softer version of the most-likely case study logic of George 
and Bennett (2005): “[i]n a most-likely case, the independent variables posited by a theory 
are at values that strongly posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome. ... Most-likely 
cases ... are tailored to cast strong doubt on theories that do not fit” (121). 
4.1.1. Migration policy 
In both case studies, the EU-related dimensions of migration policy as the subject of 
discussion. To be able to trace policy change and the influence of Eurosceptic parties on 
the government’s migration policy, specific policy items are reviewed. For the Dutch 
case, two directives (Qualification Directive (2004/83) and Family Reunification 
Directive (2003/86) and one regulation (Dublin Regulation (343/2003) are discussed. 
These are selected based on the policy document that Minister of Immigration and 
Asylum Leers presented in December 2010, shortly after taking office in the VVD-CDA(-
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PVV) coalition, and which were included in the coalition negotiations. This document is 
guiding since it offers very concrete policy aims for the immigration policy of this right-
wing government. For the Hungarian case study, the government’s response to Council 
Decision 2015/1601 and the Stop Soros legislative package of 2018 are analysed. 
 Migration policy makes for an appropriate policy area to examine here, since the 
main Eurosceptic niche parties under examination in the Dutch and Hungarian cases, 
namely the PVV in the Netherlands and Jobbik in Hungary have an outspoken anti-
immigration position, and both parties use immigration policy as a central motivation to 
be Eurosceptic12. 
Furthermore, in both the Netherlands and Hungary, immigration policy was one 
of the most salient dimensions of their EU politics and policy. The agreement between 
the government parties and the PVV in the Netherlands, appending the coalition 
agreement, dedicated the most attention to curbing immigration (CDA-VVD, 2010). 
Similarly, in Hungary, “[m]igration was without a doubt, the key theme in Hungarian 
politics during the 2014-2018 parliamentary cycle” (Bíró-Nagy, 2018: 269).  
4.2. Research process 
After having established which case studies will be analysed and why, the next step is to 
explain with which research method, these case studies will be tackled. Since the 
academic literature has not yet dealt elaborately with the effects of Euroscepticism on 
policy, as the three literature reviews in the previous chapter testify, the two case studies 
described above are going to be within-case analyses. Both will be subject to an in-depth 
analysis and are treated as stand-alone cases of Eurosceptic parties (attempting to) 
influencing the EU policies of a member state. Following the logic of within-case 
analyses, which according to the Encyclopedia of Case Study Research involves “an 
intimate familiarity with a particular case to discern how the processes or patterns that are 
revealed in that case support, refute, or expand (a) a theory that the researcher has selected 
or (b) the propositions that the researcher has derived from a review of the literature 
and/or experience with the phenomenon under study” (Paterson, 2012: 971-972). The 
case studies are developed with that in mind, namely that case studies are the most 
suitable for the analysis of causal relationships between cause and outcome.  
 
12 It is common for radical right parties to couple anti-immigration to anti-EU (e.g. Fennema, 1997; 
Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Akkerman, 2018).  
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 Figure 2 illustrates the research problem, where the big question mark refers to 
the causal mechanisms that are described below.13  
Figure 2: Causal process of research question
  
4.2.1. Methods of within-case analysis: process tracing and the 
congruence method 
Within the qualitative research methods, process tracing is most suitable for studying 
causal mechanisms by linking causes to outcomes, whereby the aim is to make stronger 
inferences about how causes contribute to bringing about an outcome.  
 Process tracing is a within-case method that seeks to trace the causal process from 
a cause to an outcome, whereby it opens the “black box” (the causal mechanism) and not 
only identifies the parts of the causal process but explains their logical sequence (Beach 
and Pedersen, 2016: 323). Three variants of process tracing have been identified, each to 
be used for a distinct research purpose. The purpose of theory-testing process tracing is 
to test whether the causal mechanism, based on the theoretical framework, is present “a 
population of cases of a phenomenon” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 11). Theory-building 
process tracing ‘builds’ a causal mechanism from rich empirical evidence, and explaining 
outcome process tracing looks at a unique case and traces what case-specific mechanism 
(Ibid.). Of the three variants of process tracing, theory-testing process tracing, since the 
three theoretical frameworks outlined in chapter 3 should be tested for their explanatory 
power.  
 
13 Note that this research adopts the terminology used by Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen when 
talking about research methods. Rather than using the terms “independent variable” and “dependent 
variable”, cause and outcome are used to denote the starting and endpoint of causal mechanisms. The reason 
is that I will use Beach and Pedersen’s interpretation of causality and causal mechanisms, and they rightly 
point out that “symmetric theoretical claims would claim that an independent variable (X) has an impact 
across values of the dependent variable (Y)” (2016:24), while process tracing is “tracing mechanisms only 
between a given cause and outcome, meaning that we are making no presumptions about mechanisms in 
cases where the cause and outcome are not present” (Ibid: 24). 
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 Theory-test process tracing involves three steps that the researcher needs to work 
out. Firstly, one needs to conceptualise the causal mechanism based on the theory, thereby 
explaining the parts of the causal mechanism from the cause to the outcome, depicted as 
P1, P2, P3 in figure 3. Secondly, after having distilled the causal mechanism from the 
theory, the theorised mechanism needs to be operationalised, i.e. translated into 
observable pieces. Those observable manifestations will serve the answer to the question: 
how will I recognise the parts of the causal mechanism if I see them? Thirdly, the 
theorised causal mechanism is tested against the evidence of the case, to see whether the 
causal mechanism is empirically present as well. (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 14-16; 
Beach and Pedersen, 2016: 322-325).  
Figure 3: Causal mechanism and black-boxing
 
 Conversely, the starting point for the use of the congruence method are the 
expectations of the independent and the dependent variables as they were derived from a 
theory: “The investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to 
explain or predict the outcome in a particular case” (George and Bennett, 2005: 181). 
Beach and Pedersen (2016) argue that this would be a weak test of causality, since 
selecting an appropriate case to test your theory already establishes causality between the 
cause and outcome (270). According to Blatter and Haverland (2012), the congruence 
method is used to make inferences about the explanatory power of competing theories, 
which are tested based on a set of empirical observations14. They differentiate between a 
“competing theories approach” and a “complementary theories approach” (Ibid.: 145). 
On the other hand, Beach and Pedersen (2016) differentiate between four types of 
congruence methods: explaining outcome congruence case studies, theory-building and 
 
14 A classic case study with the congruence method is Tannenwald’s article on “The nuclear taboo” (1999). 
She had four case studies and tested whether “taboo talk” was present in the non-use of nuclear weapons, 
and whether that explained changes in the outcome. 
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theory-testing congruence case studies, and lastly, congruence case studies that refine 
causal theories (271).  
 In the end, the key difference between the congruence method and process tracing 
is how these methods try to ‘solve’ the causal mechanism. “Congruence investigates 
correlations between X and Y, whereas process-tracing investigates the workings of the 
mechanism(s) that contribute to producing an outcome” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 4-
5). The subtle but important difference between the congruence method and process 
tracing thus lies in the degree that they explain the causal mechanism. Process tracing 
explains the full sequence of the parts that constitute the causal mechanism and how the 
parts logically follow one another, while the congruence method establishes that there is 
a causal mechanism but does not give insights into the sequential logic of the parts of the 
mechanism.  
 Also, while the aim is to illuminate as much as possible the steps in the causal 
mechanism and how the parts of the causal mechanism might be sequential, it would be 
an overstatement to claim that full-fledged process tracing takes place. Therefore, the 
more modest aim here is to establish the explanatory power of the theoretical frameworks 
as developed in sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, and thus whether the theoretical 
expectations match with the empirical findings in the case studies. In the empirical 
chapters, the goodness of fit of each causal mechanism is extensively analysed.  
4.2.2. Operationalising Euroscepticism  
The definition of soft and hard Euroscepticism by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) serves 
as the basis of the working definition for this research15. Of the Eurosceptic parties that 
are part of the case studies, the classification is as follows: 
Party (country) Hard of soft Eurosceptic 
PVV (Netherlands) Hard 
SGP (Netherlands) Soft 
Jobbik (Hungary) Hard until 2017 (approximately), then soft 
Fidesz (Hungary) Soft, especially from 2015 
 
15 Hard Euroscepticism refers to “a principled opposition to the EU and European integration”, implying 
that parties wish to “withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being 
opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.” Soft Euroscepticism 
does not refer to principled opposition to European integration or membership, but opposition “where 
concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or 
where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU trajectory." (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2002: 4) 
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4.2.3. Contagion effect 
For the application of the literature on the contagion effect, the theoretical framework 
elaborated by Bonnie Meguid will be used to test its applicability to the research question 
of this work. This section first presents the causal mechanism that is distilled from 
Meguid’s PSO theory and then makes the case which within-case study method will be 
applied. 
 Table 5 summarises the different strategies that mainstream parties are theories to 
resort to as a consequence of the electoral success of a niche party. Upon considering the 
contagion effect, the accommodative strategy is the party strategy that mainstream parties 
are expected to be used in the face of a growing Eurosceptic party, since policy 
convergence is the phenomenon to look at when talking about the contagion effect. Figure 
3 is the graphical representation of the causal mechanism derived from Meguid’s 
accommodative strategy. Part 1 is the cause, and part 5 is the outcome (using Beach and 
Pedersen’s (2016) denotations, as mentioned in section 4.2.1), whereas parts 2, 3 and 4 
are the different elements of the causal mechanism that mirror the mechanism of the 
accommodative strategy. The electoral success of a Eurosceptic niche party triggers the 
mainstream party to react to this success. In doing so, they (part 2) increase the amount 
of attention to migration policy (thereby increase issue salience) and (part 3) converge 
their position on migration towards that of the niche party, which then (part 4) leads to a 
decrease issue ownership of migration policy by the Eurosceptic niche party. The so-
called black box is unpacked, whereby the steps of the accommodative strategy are the 
black box that is the causal mechanism. 
 One of the important things to do is to identify the observable manifestations, .e.g. 
the operationalisation of the parts of the causal mechanism so that it is possible to identify 
the presence of the part when one sees it. Firstly, Meguid considers salience to be “the 
importance of an issue dimension … subject to manipulation” (2008: 25). Secondly, 
policy convergence or divergence is operationalised through policy changes along the 
categorisation of Peter Hall (first, second and third-order change, also see section 3.4 and 
section 4.2.6). Thirdly, issue ownership can be identified according to survey data and 
what previous scholars have identified the issue ownership of migration policy to be. 
However, this last factor is the least directly measurable and will be contingent upon a 




Based on the discussion of niche and mainstream parties in section 3.1.2, niche parties 
can be distinguished on three grounds: (1) the traditional class-based orientation of 
politics is rejected, (2) novel issues are put on the agenda that mostly do not coincide with 
the traditional left-right political spectrum, (3) a smaller scope of issues is focused on 
(Meguid, 2008: 3-4). With that in mind, it is clear that the PVV in the Netherlands and 
Jobbik in Hungary are, or at the very least started as, niche parties, with their anti-EU, 
anti-immigration policies. As Jobbik matured, one might argue that the party is no longer 
a niche party and uses different party strategies (Meyer and Wagner, 2013), like the Green 
Party in Ireland developed (Bolleyer, 2010). Another relevant actor in the Dutch case is 
the SGP, which is an orthodox Christian party that represents a conservative Protestant 
community. Van Ditmars and De Lange (2014) categorise this party as a niche party, and 
this research will follow their logic. While the party would not fall within the category of 
niche party according to Meguid’s definition, Wagner’s 2011 study on defining and 
measuring niche parties finds that expert surveys do put SGP into the niche party category 
(856).  
In the case studies, the steps of the causal mechanisms will be tested. Has the issue 
salience of migration policy increased from t=0 to t=1? Has the position of the mainstream 
party converged towards the position of the niche party? Has the issue ownership of 
migration policy shifted from the niche party to the mainstream party? If these questions 
can be answered in the affirmative, then the strategy was successful for the mainstream 
party, conditioned that it did gain, or at least did not lose, votes in the election at t=1. 
Table 5: Predicted effects of strategies of CDA/VVD (NL) and Fidesz (HU) 
 Mechanism Electoral support 
of PVV/SGP (NL) 





Dismissive Decreases No movement No effect Decreases 
Accommodative Increases Converges Transfers to 
mainstream party 
Decreases 
Adversarial Increases Diverges Reinforces niche 
party’s ownership 
Increases 
Source: Meguid, 2005: 350 
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Figures 4 and 5 show the causal mechanisms for the Dutch and Hungarian cases 
studies, respectively. In the Dutch case study, the PVV is the contagious Eurosceptic 
niche party that the two government parties (VVD and CDA) are changing their position 
on migration policy. If both parties would follow an accommodative party strategy, they 
would both end up with a more restrictive position on migration policy, to weaken the 
influence of the PVV in the political arena. Similarly, in the Hungarian case study, Jobbik 
is the Eurosceptic niche party which Fidesz is trying to weaken, by shifting their policy 
position towards that of Jobbik. Though these strategies of the government parties, the 
PVV and Jobbik exert influence on the EU policies of the governments, since these 
parties, by “carving out of a niche for themselves in the political spectrum” (Topaloff, 
2012: 74), politicised previously untapped issues that appeared to be electorally 
advantageous (Salo and Rydgren, 2018). 
After explaining the causal mechanism of the contagion effect, the next section 
will look a coalition bargaining. 




Figure 5: Causal mechanism accommodative strategy in Hungarian case study
 
4.2.4. Coalition bargaining 
Coalition bargaining is the second literature that is used to test for the influence of 
Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states. It studies how parties in 
government can shape coalition agreements and negotiate when inter-party conflicts 
arise.  
 In order to identify the influence of individual parties on government policy, 
Bolleyer’s concepts of formation weight and coalition weight are guiding, for they allow 
for a straightforward operationalisation of how parties might influence policy. Bolleyer 
(2007) assessed the negotiation capacity of small parties and distinguished between two 
dimensions upon which negotiation capacity depends. Firstly, formation weight refers to 
the influence that a party has during the coalition formation. This factor is operationalised 
as the number of party pledges that make it into the coalition agreement, but which have 
not been supported by the other coalition parties. Secondly, coalition weight captures the 
influence of a coalition party when inter-party conflict arises during the post-formation 
phase, and is operationalised as the share of commitments that end up in the coalition 
agreement and which are subsequently translated into legislation, and which are not states 




Figure 6: Causal mechanism coalition bargaining
 
 Figure 6 illustrates the causal mechanism of coalition bargaining in the 
Netherlands. The mechanism starts from the point that the PVV, as a parliamentary 
supporter, plays a role in the coalition bargaining process, and thereby helped shape the 
coalition agreement of the Rutte I cabinet. Steps 2a and 2b refer to the formation weight 
and coalition weight of the PVV in the Rutte I cabinet. In the coalition formation phase, 
formation weight measures the party pledges that the PVV made, but that neither the 
VVD nor the CDA made, and which ended up in the coalition agreement. Formation 
weight can then be seen as a measurement of the bargaining strength of the PVV in the 
coalition formation. Secondly, during the post-formation phase, when the Rutte I cabinet 
is governing, the PVV’s policy positions which made it into legislation, and which had 
not been stated by the VVD and CDA, are the measurement of the coalition weight. If 
any ‘exclusive’ pledges of the PVV made it into the coalition agreement, and, in 
particular, were implemented by the Rutte I government, this will be considered a 
successful influence of the PVV on the government’s migration policy.  
 Regrettably, the Hungarian case study goes not lend itself to the study of its 
coalition politics, since (1) Fidesz-KDNP have been in a permanent coalition since 2006 
and are considered to be one party, and (2) in 2010, 2014 and 2018 Fidesz-KDNP ended 
up with a 2/3 majority in parliament16, so no coalition negotiations were necessary. 
 
16 Fidesz received 53% of the votes in 2010, 44% in 2014 and 49% in 2018 (Hungarian National Election 
Office, 2020). The redrawing the electoral districts and the reform of the electoral system in 2011 led to the 
supermajority, despite significantly lower votes in 2014 (Tóka, 2014).  
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4.2.5. Parliamentary oversight 
The causal mechanism that is partially derived from the literature of parliamentary 
oversight over EU policy is based on the principal-agent theory. As a recap of the main 
points of the principal-agent theory for our case studies: the government is the agent and 
is bestowed the authority to represent parliament, the principal, in the European Union. 
That means that parliament will not have full control over the government and will lack 
complete information. Parliament, however, has numerous tools to decrease the 
information asymmetry that follows from this delegation, like the ability to ask questions 
to government representatives about Council meetings. Beyond control mechanisms, the 
principal might aim to shape the actions of the agent.  
 The remainder of the causal mechanism is derived from Smeets and De Ruiter 
(2018), who identified four steps on a so-called “scrutiny ladder”, which shows how 
different types of scrutiny correspond with levels of scrutiny, represented in table 6. Steps 
1 and 2, expressing support or disagreement of a government policy and asking 
parliamentary question respectively, require relatively little effort from MPs, even though 
asking informative questions are more demanding than the simple task of expressing 
agreement or dissatisfaction. These steps do not directly challenge the government’s 
policy or position and are thus rather elements of monitoring government activities. A 
more demanding scrutiny intervention is taking up an alternative position from that of the 
government’s; this step can only be taken after having informed oneself about the 
government’s position through the use of questioning time (step 2), increasing the 
investment for both the MP and the (prime) minister. Lastly, the fourth step in the scrutiny 
ladder ex-ante EU meetings is when an MP provides instructions to the government 
representative  
Table 6: Overview of the ex-ante steps on the scrutiny ladder and related demands for 
the MP 
Type of scrutiny →  Monitoring scrutiny Political scrutiny 
Scrutiny level → 
Demands for MP ↓ 
Step 1: expressing 
support/disagreement 
Step 2: asking 
questions 







Knowledge of gov. 
position on issue 
X  X  X  X  
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Analysis of gov. 
position and 
argumentation 
 X  X  X 
Own information or 
expertise on issue 
  X X 
Overview state of 
play in negotiations 
   X  
Source: Smeets and De Ruiter, 2018: 5 
 Based on this table, the causal mechanisms of the parliamentary oversight for the 
Dutch and Hungarian case studies are expressed in figure 7 and 8, respectively. Steps 1 
through 3 in both cases are part of the principal-agent model, where the respectively Rutte 
I cabinet and the Fidesz government are mandated by parliament to govern (step 1), and 
then develop and implement their respective (migration) policies (step 2). In step 3, we 
focus on the Eurosceptic niche parties and their attitude towards the migration policies of 
their governments. Within the parliamentary setting, the members of parliament (MPs) of 
these parties are expected to exercise their right to scrutinise the government’s migration 
policy. According to Smeets and De Ruiter’s (2018) scrutiny ladder, the impact of their 
scrutiny is contingent on the effort they put into it, i.e. the more energy they put into an 
issue – their expertise and (inside) knowledge – the more these Eurosceptic MPs will be 
able to influence the migration policies of their governments.  
Figure 7: Causal mechanism parliamentary oversight Dutch case study
 
More specifically, it is assumed here that expressing support or disagreement of policy 
preferences of the government by the Eurosceptic MP does not effectively impact the 
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policy preferences/choices of the government. When an MP of PVV /Jobbik asks 
questions to Rutte I/Fidesz, it thereby shows an interest in the policy developments of 
migration policy and triggers the respective government to account for its actions. When 
the Eurosceptic MP takes up an alternative position, it offers the government policy 
alternatives, which might indirectly affect the government policy preferences/actions. 
Lastly, when an MP of the PVV or Jobbik providing instructions to the VVD-CDA 
coalition or the Fidesz government, respectively, that MP allocates significant resources 
to know what their government is doing on the international level, which decreases the 
information asymmetry they have, and which paves the way for actual and direct policy 
influence. 
Figure 8: Causal mechanism parliamentary oversight Hungarian case study
 
4.2.6. Operationalising policy change 
Lastly, the measurement of policy change as a consequence of the influence of 
Eurosceptic parties on EU policies is shortly discussed. In order to understand the degree 
of change, Peter Hall’s (1993) categorisation of first, second and third-order change is 
used. The following policy items will be looked at: the Qualification Directive, the Family 
Reunification Directive and the Dublin Regulation for the Netherlands, and the 
consequences of Council Decision 2015/1601 and the Stop Soros legislative package of 
2018 for Hungary. While tracing the developments of these policy issues, did the level of 
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the instruments, the instruments themselves and/or the hierarchy of goals change? If yes, 
how? These two questions will be asked for all policy items, to establish whether first, 
second or third-order change occurred. That will then represent the gravity of the policy 
change, whereby first-order change is part of the ‘normal’ decision-making process, and 
second-order change is already influenced by ideological considerations of the political 
actors (Greener, 2001). Third-order change falls under what Peter Hall calls paradigm 
shifts. In the face of significant policy failure, political actors might refer to such paradigm 
shifts, and policy learning would occur (Peter, 1993).  
 Table 7 summarises the dimensions of change for each order of change. If only 
the level of the instruments of the policy issues of migration policy (Qualification 
Directive, Family Reunification Directive, etc.) was altered, for instance through a change 
in the age requirement for immigrants seeking family reunification in the Netherlands, 
then a first-order change occurred, since the instruments and goals of the policy issue 
remain the same. When the policy instruments are subject to change as well, but the goals 
of the policy are unaltered, Hall’s speaks of second-order change. An example would be 
altering the requirements for family reunification. In third-order change, the goals of the 
policy themselves are altered. Sticking with family reunification, an example of third-
order change could be the complete abandonment of the possibility for family 
reunification, whereby the very goal of allowing family the reunify is off the table. 
 The explanation of the classification of the order changes of the five policy items 
that are discussed across the two cases studies will be part of the analysis in the empirical 
chapters. 
Table 7: Operationalising migration policy change 
Policy change Dimension of change Examples 
First-order change Goals and instruments remain the same, 
but the level of the instruments change 
(policy adjustments) 
Age requirement for family 
reunification is altered. 
Second-order change Goals remain the same, but the instruments 
and the level of the instruments change 
Next to an age requirement, an 
income requirement and 
minimum age also become 
criteria for family 
reunification. 
Third-order change The hierarchy of goals, the instruments 
themselves and the level of the instruments 
all change 




The previous sections discussed the logic behind the choice to use qualitative case studies 
to answer the research question, that process tracing is used to establish the causal link 
between the presence of Eurosceptic parties and EU policy change, and what these causal 
mechanisms look like. The sources used for this dissertation serve to determine that 
parties are indeed Eurosceptic, whether the above-described causal mechanisms are 
present and whether they have led to policy change. They can be grouped into the 
following categories: 
• Academic output: academic books, journal articles, survey data.  
• Official documentation: coalition agreements, party programmes, party 
websites parliamentary debates, legislation proposals and bills, policy 
documents, case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, proposals 
of the European Commission, conclusions of the Council of the European 
Union, websites of the Dutch Senate and House of Representations and the 
Hungarian Parliament. 
• Media output: NOS (Dutch), Telegraaf (Dutch), NRC (Dutch), NPORadio 1 
(Dutch), Nieuwsuur (Dutch), Trouw (Dutch), 24.hu (Hungarian), 444 
(Hungarian), AboutHungary.hu (Hungarian), BBC (UK), BBJ (Hungarian), 
HungaryToday (Hungarian), De Volkskrant (Dutch), Index (Hungarian), 
Joop.nl (Dutch opinion website), Mandiner (Hungarian), NOL (Hungarian), 
Origo (Hungarian), Irish Times (Irish), Project Syndicate (International), 
Reuters (International), De Hofvijver (Dutch). 
• Journalistic accounts: For the Dutch case study, several journalistic accounts 
of the political events unfolding in the period 2010-2012 were used.  
• Interviews: I conducted six interviews with leading scholars in the field and 
one interview with a Dutch EU representative. 
When using non-academic or official sources, I always sought an objective interpretation 
of events, and deliberately avoided speculative analyses on blogs or other information 
portals. Alfahír,hu was not put in the list of media output since it is rather the opinion 
page of the political party Jobbik. The journalistic accounts of events and the interviews 





This concludes the theoretical and methodologic parts of the research. In this chapter, we 
argued that within-case studies, using process tracing, are the most appropriate way to 
understand better whether and how Eurosceptic parties might influence the EU policies 
of member states. By developing three explanations of influence from three literature 
reviews, the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy can now be tested in the Dutch 
and Hungarian case studies. These case studies focus on migration policy because the 
Eurosceptic niche parties examined below have a radical right orientation and couple an 
anti-immigration agenda to an anti-EU approach. Preliminary research showed that both 
the Netherlands and Hungary had Eurosceptic niche parties that were electorally 
successful and where influence was likely. Furthermore, the two case studies are 
insightful in that they cover different government systems (consensus-seeking in the 
Netherlands versus majoritarian in Hungary) (Gallagher et al., 2006), geographical areas 
with diverging political cultures and heritage (Western versus Central Eastern) 
(Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2016) and where the Eurosceptic niche parties have 
different roles vis a vis the government (parliamentary supporter in the Netherlands 
versus opposition party in Hungary). 
 Chapter 5 will discuss Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, and chapter 6 will 





5. Party-based Euroscepticism in the Netherlands 
Until the early 2000s, the Dutch parliament17 was supportive of European integration. 
Besides manifestations of Euroscepticism, it was not until the early 1990s that a critical 
attitude towards the EU became more rooted in the Dutch parliament. Frits Bolkestein, 
former party leader of the VVD and European Commissioner for the Internal Market and 
Services (1999-2004), was vocal in his criticism towards the EU. Bolkestein (VVD) 
called for more emphasis on national interests in foreign policy-making, for a strict 
implementation of the EMU criteria, for a decrease in the Dutch contributions to the EU 
and was against extensive European competences, particularly regarding security policy 
(Bolkestein, 2011). However, despite his hawkish rhetoric, his party had voted in favour 
of the all European treaties. Whether Bolkestein can be considered a Eurosceptic 
politician is thus not entirely clear. 
 However, Euroscepticism was rooted in the political programme of the 
Socialistische Partij (SP), which first took a seat in the national parliament in 1994 
(Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013: 193). The SP, as a Marxist-Leninist party, had very 
different ideological motivations to be critical towards the EU that the conservative-
liberal VVD. It used a Maoist-like populist rhetoric to mobilise “the people” (Lucardie 
and Voerman, 2012). In 1992 the party campaigned for a referendum on the Maastricht 
Treaty, was vocally against introducing the Euro and saw the Maastricht Treaty as a 
further step toward an “undemocratic superstate” (Ibid.: 53).  
 It was not until the early 2000s that criticism against the European Union became 
more prominent in the Netherlands. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, a stagnating 
economy and the rise to prominence of the charismatic Pim Fortuyn fuelled opposition to 
the EU in the Netherlands (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013). Fortuyn called the EU a 
“done deal” (Ibid.: 294). 
Pim Fortuyn’s quick ascent to prominence in Dutch politics came to a sudden and 
tragic end with his assassination on 6 May 2002. Only nine days later, the Netherlands 
held general elections, which was largely overshadowed by the assassination. Despite 
having lost its leader, the LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuyn) won 17% of the votes, making it the 
second-largest party only after CDA. The LPF entered government after their electoral 
 




success, but this cabinet could hold office for only 87 days, after a period of massive 
internal unrest in the party and the cabinet (Akkerman and de Lange, 2012). 
Where Bolkestein’s critical attitude towards the EU remained mostly within the 
realm of parliament and did not resonate beyond the political elite, it was Fortuyn’s 
criticism of the European Union that found a wide footing among the public (Mudde, 
2007). Pim Fortuyn introduced populism on a large scale into Dutch politics (Lucardie, 
2008: 164). However, Fortuyn was not principally against the EU. It was instead the EU’s 
rigid bureaucratic structure, with its apparent lack of democratic accountability that he 
opposed. LPF’s party program for the 2004 EP elections closed with a quote from 
Fortuyn’s 1997 book Soulless Europe: “I love Europe, I love its multitude of people, 
cultures, landscapes, weather conditions, languages and human beings. I sometimes hate 
the euro-elite [sic] in its arrogant negligence. In short, I want a Europe of the people, of 
the human scale. A Europe for you and me!” (as quoted in Mudde 2007).  
On 1 June 2005, the Netherlands held a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. 
No less than 61% of the Dutch population voted against the Treaty. This rejection of the 
Treaty was in marked contrast to the parliamentary vote several days earlier, where the 
87% voted in favour of the Treaty. According to Aarts and Van der Kolk (2005), the 
failure of the Yes campaign lay in their inability to campaign together. Furthermore, the 
Yes campaign lacked ‘credibility’, since those parties in favour of the Treaty continued 
to criticise the (functioning of the) EU. The media picked up on this ambiguous attitude 
and discussed it extensively (Ibid.). 
On the other hand, the SP and the PVV, as key parties of the No campaign, 
celebrated their success. Geert Wilders declared in the Tweede Kamer one day after the 
Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 that “It was a wonderful day 
yesterday! The Dutch voter spoke out. A large majority said no. I am proud of the Dutch 
voter, because he said no to the European constitution of the elite in Brussels, who are 
light years away from the regular man and woman” (Wilders, 2005). 
During the parliamentary elections in 2012, the European Union became much 
more politicised than during the 2010 elections. On average, around twice as much 
attention was attributed to the EU in the party programmes in the Netherlands in 2012 
compared to 2010 (Van Dorp and Hoekstra, 2012). Harryvan and Hoekstra found that 
during the 2012 parliamentary elections the key debates on the European Union were not 
about “being in favour or against Dutch membership of the European Union, despite the 
PVV’s intentions, but much more about the specific choices that had to be made in the 
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framework of Europe, such as the tasks and size of the ESM debt rescue fund and whether 
and how a maximum government debt of 3% ought to be realised” (2013: 53). 
Harryvan and Van der Harst identify three “manifestations of Eurocriticism” in 
the Netherlands that played out on the government level (2017: 4-6). The first wave took 
place after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, when the Netherlands, as net-contributor, 
campaigned for a decrease in the national contributions to the EU during every budget 
negotiation. From the early 2000s onwards, the principle of subsidiarity more 
prominently features in policy debates, which have led towards a more critical position 
on the transfer of competences from the domestic level to the European level. Third, the 
Rutte-I cabinet (a coalition of VVD and CDA with the parliamentary support of the far-
right PVV, 2010-2012) pushed for a further curbing of the transfer of competences.  
 The Euro crisis boosted the politicisation of the EU in the Netherlands, just like it 
did in France (Hutter and Kerscher, 2014). Adam et al. (2017) find that the political debate 
on the EU has highly polarised in the Netherlands, with an increasing gap between the 
positions of Eurosceptic and pro-European parties. This polarisation is amplified by the 
fact that catch-all parties in the Netherlands are inclined to silence the Eurosceptic parties 
by not joining the debates on EU-related issues that Eurosceptic parties put on the agenda 
(Ibid.). 
 After this short review of the contemporary state of the political debate concerning 
the EU in the Netherlands, the remainder of this chapter looks at party-based 
Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, particularly since the 2000s, and will give more 
detailed explanations of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties.  
5.1. Party support/scepticism for the EU  
In chapter 2, several definitions of party-based Euroscepticism were presented, and 
eventually, Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 2002 (2008) classification was considered the most 
practical for our purposes here. The attitudes towards the EU of all the political parties 
that made it into the Tweede Kamer since 2002 will shortly be discussed before delving 
into the motivations of Eurosceptic parties to oppose (part of) the EU.  
 First, table 8 summarises the political parties in the Netherlands according to their 
support for the EU. The categorisation by Vollaard and Voerman (2015) serves this 
purpose well, since it is complete and uses Taggart and Szczerbiak’s categorisations of 
Euroscepticism, complemented with two categories of non-Eurosceptic party positions. 
 
68 
The table looks at three periods, the periods after 2005, 2010 and 2017. As mentioned 
above, in 2005 the Netherlands held a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, which 
was rejected by 61% of the Dutch population. A “numbing silence” which lasted for a 
about a year followed in Dutch parliament, where no party was keen to emphasise the 
benefits of European integration (Harryvan and Van der Harst, 2013: 251). In 2010 the 
Geert Wilders’ PVV became a parliamentary supporter of the Rutte I cabinet, and in 2017 
the Netherlands held its most recent parliamentary elections at the time of writing.  
Table 8: Categorisations of party support for the EU in the Netherlands 
 Party position in the given period 
Party post-2005 post-2010 2017* 
50+ - Soft Eurosceptic Europragmatic 
CDA Europragmatic Europragmatic Europragmatic 
CU Europragmatic Soft Eurosceptic Soft Eurosceptic 
DENK - - Europragmatic 
D66 Europhile Europhile Europhile 
FvD - - Hard Eurosceptic 
GL Europhile Europhile Europhile 
LPF Soft Eurosceptic - - 
PvdA Europragmatic Europragmatic ‘Soft’ Europhile 
PvdD Soft Eurosceptic Soft Eurosceptic Soft Eurosceptic 
PVV Hard Eurosceptic Hard Eurosceptic Hard Eurosceptic 
SGP Soft Eurosceptic Soft Eurosceptic Soft Eurosceptic 
SP Soft Eurosceptic Soft Eurosceptic Soft Eurosceptic 
VVD Europragmatic Europragmatic Europragmatic 
Source: Vollaard & Voerman, 2015 * author’s calculation based on the Vollaard and Voerman 
categorisation 
 Of the 13 parties that are represented in the Dutch parliament since the last general 
election in 2017, six parties classify as Eurosceptic, four of which are considered soft 
Eurosceptic and two are hard Eurosceptic, amounting to approximately 32% of the 
votes18. Since the early 2000s, the share of Eurosceptic parties in the Dutch parliament 
has hovered around 30%, making it part of the political mainstream. As for the specific 
parties, D66 and GroenLinks have historically been Europhile parties. Early on, D66 
(established in 1966) sought to deepen and widen European integration and continued to 
 
18 The Netherlands have a completely proportional election system. With 32% of the votes in the 2017 
elections, those parties received 32% of the seats in the Tweede Kamer. 
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support a Federal Union in the general elections of 2017. GroenLinks similarly seeks 
deeper and broader integration, and both parties support an EU army, and are in favour 
of cooperation or common policies in most fields. The mainstream parties CDA, PvdA 
and VVD, may not find a Federal Union desirable, but all recognise the Dutch dependence 
on the EU for safety and welfare. Cooperation and common policies are desirable to tackle 
common issues like crime, climate change, mass migration, energy dependence, 
economic and financial instability, and to spur economic development by investing in 
infrastructure and innovation/research. They also remain open to, yet reserved about, 
further enlargement of the EU, but CDA and VVD state that an EU army is not 
desirable19. The Labour Party (PvdA) has been a Europhile party since the 1940s, 
embracing federalism, but has been critical of the overemphasis on the market and the 
negative consequences this might have for social wellbeing (Vollaard and Voerman 2015, 
137). PvdA was one of the three parties that initiated the 2005 referendum on the 
Constitutional Treaty as a proponent of the treaty – just like almost every other party in 
the Dutch parliament. The crushing vote against the treaty thus came as a blow to the 
party and its Europe policy. Its 2006 party manifesto focused on winning back the 
confidence in the European integration project, emphasising that policy areas should 
become an EU competence only when a national approach is not suitable (PvdA 2006). 
Nevertheless, the emphasis is also on solidarity between countries, “in order to offer 
everything chances for a better future - whether that is by supporting the poorest regions 
in Europe, or via a foreign policy that focuses more on human rights, international 
development cooperation and conflict prevention - is an essential part of European 
cooperation” (PvdA 2006).20   
 Based on the categorisation by Vollaard and Voerman, the following parties are 
considered Eurosceptic and will thus be discussed below: SP, ChristenUnie/SGP, PVV, 
PvdD, and FvD. This overview will set the stage for the first case study, that will be 
discussed in chapter 6. 
 
19
 These positions are based on a content analysis of the party manifestos of the parties, performed by the 
author in 2017.  
20




As mentioned in the introduction, the SP was founded in the 1970s, and initially followed 
a Marxist-Leninist ideology that used populist rhetoric to mobilise its constituency 
(Lucardie and Voerman, 2012), and has been a long-term critic of the EU. The SP voted 
against all recent Treaties – from the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the Lisbon Treaty in 
2007. It aimed its opposition towards the Lisbon Treaty at the weak role of the national 
parliaments in the EU’s decision making and the continuous process of state-building 
within the EU (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2008).  
In their 2017 election programme, the SP continued to emphasise the democratic 
deficit of the EU. To tackle that democratic deficit, national parliaments should play a 
more prominent role in the EU decision-making process, the European Commission’s 
political function should be suspended, and there should be a halt to the transfer of 
competences to the European Parliament. The SP’s opposition to the EU is directed at the 
power balances within the EU, which calls for a realignment of the powers and 
competences towards the national parliaments, and away from the European Commission 
and European Parliament.  
On substantive matters, the EU should focus on concerted efforts to tackle global 
issues like international crime and climate change, and to deal with financial shocks, by 
reforming the Stability and Growth Pact. They do not support the TTIP and CETA and 
underscore the importance of global and European fair trade. While the SP does not 
outright reject further enlargement of the EU, it does not see enlargement desirable for 
the foreseeable future. In case of a prospect of new countries joining the EU, a referendum 
should decide on whether that country may accede. (SP, 2017) 
Two quotes from the 2006 and 2012 party programmes summarise the main 
objections of the SP to the EU: “In the last twenty years the EU has focused on becoming 
a powerful superstate that mostly wants to compete with other world powers” (SP, 2012), 
but where its “neoliberal course ... [since the 1980s] threatens the social relations and 
disturbs the public services in the member states” (SP, 2006). It was the financial crisis 
that clearly showed the SP’s opposition to the economic and financial policies of the 




5.3. ChristenUnie and SGP 
The two conservative Christian parties – ChristenUnie (Christian Union) and SGP 
(Reformist Political Party) – are both critical of the EU and its functioning, though to 
different degrees. These parties are discussed together, since they are small and have had 
a joint list for EP elections since the 1980s. Both parties favour the transfer of 
competences back to the national governments and would want to condition any further 
transfers of competences to the European Commission or European Parliament on at least 
two-thirds of the Tweede Kamer supporting it. Furthermore, both the ChristenUnie and 
SGP argue that preparatory work should be done in case there would be a Dutch exit out 
of the EU or the Eurozone in their 2017 election programmes. 
Nevertheless, there are also differences between the SGP and the ChristenUnie. 
The SGP appears to be the only party against an EU-level border protection. The party 
also supports the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in its current form, while all other 
parties call for reforms of the CAP that would decrease the share of CAP of the EU budget 
and make the European agricultural more sustainable. In a nutshell, the SGP’s vision of 
the EU would make it “simpler and more flexible. Power needs to be given to the national 
parliaments. On issues like the internal market, clear agreements are needed between 
member states, but it is good if on some terrains, some states do cooperate while other 
states do not do so, or less. More freedom, less uniformity” (SGP, 2017: 86). 
Conversely, the ChristenUnie is a party that has a more ambiguous and pragmatic 
approach to the EU. On various issues, it is particularly sceptical, while on others it is not. 
For instance, the party was in favour of the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, 
but against Turkey’s candidacy, and it was fiercely against the Constitutional Treaty but 
supported the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, the ChristenUnie voted against the Constitutional 
Treaty, because the title of the Treaty implied a move towards the EU becoming a state, 
as did an official European flag and anthem. However, the party voted for the Lisbon 
Treaty, since those issues were no longer present in that Treaty21 (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten Generaal, 2008). Also, it is in favour of close cooperation within the EU but against 
a political union and had a mixed position on the financial bailout of Greece (Vollaard 
and Voerman, 2015). Again, there are push and pull forces within the party that fostered 
an ambiguous attitude towards European integration. One example of this was how party 
 
21 It is likely that the ChristenUnie’s role as junior party in the Balkenende IV government also played a 
role in the vote in favour of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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leader Arie Slob in 2012 stated that “a monetary union may very well work without a 
political union”22, while in the same year MP Gert-Jan Segers stated that he “has 
absolutely no principle objection to a United States of Europe” as long as it an organic 
process built on values (Vollaard and Voerman, 2015: 126-127).  
In terms of specific policy issues, the ChristenUnie believes that the EU has gone 
too far in its integration process, though recognises the necessity to work together on 
cross-border issues like climate change, mass migration, international crime and 
terrorism. The party also supports a deep regulation of the financial markets and a 
Banking Union (ChristenUnie, 2017).  
Until 2019 the ChristenUnie and SGP had a common list during the EP elections. 
Their collaboration ended after the 2019 elections, and the parties ended up in different 
political factions within the European Parliament. One of the key reasons for the split was 
the ChristenUnie’s principal opposition to be in a fraction with the far-right Forum for 
Democracy (FvD) – FvD’s call for a “Nexit” (Dutch exit out of the EU) was irreconcilable 
with the ChristenUnie’s position (Radio 1, 2019). On the other hand, the SGP did not 
object to cooperation with the FvD and ended up in the same Eurogroup as the FvD. 
Eventually the ChristenUnie joined the European People’s Party (EPP), and the SGP 
joined the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). 
5.4. PVV 
After the no vote on the Constitutional Treaty in June 2005, Geert Wilders, leader of the 
PVV, enthusiastically proclaimed: “It was a wonderful day yesterday! The Dutch voter 
spoke out. A large majority said no. I am proud of the Dutch voter, because he said no to 
the European constitution of the elite in Brussels, who are light years away from the 
regular man and woman” (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2005).  
 In 2004, Geert Wilders left the VVD with the aim of founding his own party, of 
which the PVV (Party for Freedom), established in 2006, is the product. Wilders may be 
considered Pim Fortuyn’s successor as the populist leader in the Netherlands. However, 
there is ambiguity about how well Wilders fits in the populist frame. Vossen argues that 
while Wilders focused on conflict, “the main conflict he perceives appears not to be a 
national conflict between the people and the elite, which is the core of populism, but an 
 
22
 Own translation  
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international conflict between the Islam and Western society that is weakened by left-
wing relativism” (2010, 30). In fact, it is a left-wing economic policy blended with a 
strong anti-immigration and anti-EU vision that led to the growth of the PVV, from 
around 6% of the votes in 2006 with a high point in 2010 with 15.45%, that made the 
PVV the second biggest party in 2010.  
After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, it was unsurprising that the 
parliamentary approval of the Lisbon Treaty three years later was called the “biggest 
political disaster of the year” by PVV MP De Roon (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 
2008). Illustrative of the PVV’s position towards the EU are other parts of De Roon’s 
statement in parliament during the debate on the Lisbon Treaty back in 2008: “The PVV 
faction wants a smaller Europe with fewer member states, so that less rather than more 
euros are paid [into the EU]. We don’t want more but less competences for Europe, not 
more but less bureaucracy, not more but more immigration” (Tweede Kamer der Staten 
Generaal, 2008). That points towards a strictly intergovernmental relationship with other 
countries in the EU. 
For the PVV, the salience of the EU grew in particular after the 2010 general 
elections. Its 2012 programme centred around an anti-EU rhetoric, carrying the title Our 
Netherlands, their Brussels. The aim was a Dutch exit out of the EU, with a full transfer 
of competences back to the national parliament.  
The PVV has adopted a consistent approach towards the EU, though they have 
become less elaborate in their anti-EU criticism. In the 2017 party programme (a single 
page in total), the only reference to the EU was: “The Netherlands regains independence. 
So out of the EU” (PVV, 2017). The 2019 EP programme provided six bullet points, 
namely that the Netherlands should come first, regain its sovereignty, have control over 
its own borders, have control over its own money, should de-Islamise and that the 
Netherlands should leave the “European Super State” and not get lost in its “climate 
hysteria” (PVV, 2019). These points echo its ambition to leave the Union.  
5.5. PvdD  
The Animal Rights Party (PvdD) first entered the Tweede Kamer in 2006. As the name 
implies, it is instead a single-issue party. Nevertheless, the party has a position on most 
salient policy areas. Regarding the EU, the PvdD’s main criticism is directed at the EU’s 
overemphasis on the capital system and its lack of democratic accountability (PvdD, 
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2017). In its party manifesto of 2012, the party stated the need for international and 
European cooperation in cooperating on global issues like climate change and 
maintaining peace, but also stressed that the EU and the decision-making process on the 
EU level need to democratise. More competences need to go to the EP, and this 
democratisation process is a condition for further enlargement (PvdD, 2012). The PvdD 
devoted more attention to the EU during the 2017 general elections, and was more 
uncompromising regarding the EU: (1) no new competencies should go to the EU without 
at least a referendum, (2) member states will have full authority over their budgets, and 
(3) exit strategies out of the Eurozone should be drafted.  
5.6. FvD 
The most recent addition (in 2016) to the group of Eurosceptic parties in the Netherlands 
is the Forum for Democracy (FvD). Its party leader, Thierry Baudet, successfully initiated 
a civil initiative that called for a referendum on the EU, basing his justification for a 
referendum on the continuous transfer of competences from the Netherlands to the EU 
(NOS.nl, 2014). The Tweede Kamer was therefore obliged to vote on the call for a 
referendum but voted it down. Baudet and others nonetheless managed to initiate a 
referendum related to the EU in 2016 – this time on the Dutch position regarding the EU’s 
Association Agreement with Ukraine (NOS, 2016). Voters were overwhelmingly against 
the Association Agreement, forcing Prime Minister Mark Rutte to renegotiate parts of the 
agreement with Ukraine. Eventually the Association Agreement was signed, with a delay 
of several months. 
 In the general elections of 2017, the FvD won 2 seats in the Tweede Kamer. In 
terms of specific policies, the party calls for an immediate stop to the enlargement of the 
EU and wants the Netherlands to leave the Euro, the Schengen Treaty and in due time to 
leave the EU as well (Forum voor Democratie, n.d.). The party proposes to call 
referendums on membership to the Euro, the Schengen Treaty, and the EU (Ibid.). These 
proposals make the FvD the second hard Eurosceptic party of the Netherlands, after the 
PVV.  
5.7. Conclusion 
Chapter 5 discussed party-based Euroscepticism in the Netherlands, focusing on the 
period 2002-2019. Six Eurosceptic parties – the PVV and FvD as hard Eurosceptic and 
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SP, ChristenUnie, SGP and PvdD as soft Eurosceptic – were identified, and their 
motivations to be critical towards the EU were discussed. While the PVV and FvD are 
both anti-immigration and anti-EU parties, the soft Eurosceptic parties direct their 
objections mostly to the undemocratic nature of the EU, albeit with different solutions to 
this problem – from more competences for the national parliaments (SP, ChristenUnie, 
SGP) to a more prominent role for the European Parliament (PvdD). 
 In the next chapter, we will look at the EU-related dimensions of migration policy 
in the Netherlands in the period 2010-2012. Of the 6 Eurosceptic parties that were 
discussed, the PVV will play a prominent role, and the SGP will play a minor role. As for 
the SP, ChristenUnie and PvdD, these parties do not have an anti-immigration policy like 





6. Case study: NL migration policy 2010-2012 
In October 2010, the Netherlands witnessed the first time the government parties – VVD 
and CDA – signed a separate parliamentary support agreement with a party that is not 
formally governing – PVV (Parlement.com, 2020). This chapter will focus on the Rutte I 
Cabinet (October 2010-April 2012), and analyse how the PVV and SGP (as niche parties) 
influenced the EU-related dimensions of the migration policy of Rutte I. The time frame 
is relatively short, but the policy proposals of the Rutte I government on migration policy 
were substantial. The policy output of the governments preceding and succeeding Rutte I 
(i.e. Balkenende IV and Rutte II, respectively) will be touched upon to put into 
perspective the policy change under Rutte I.  
 The two Eurosceptic and right-wing niche parties in the Netherlands (PVV and 
SGP), each played an essential role for the governability of the Rutte I cabinet. First, by 
being the parliamentary supporter of the coalition23, the PVV was able to attend 
ministerial meetings, while not having the ministerial responsibilities or being 
accountable in case of crises or contested policy decisions. It was the second-largest party 
in parliament, with an anti-immigration and anti-EU programme. These two factors are 
expected to have strengthened the bargaining position of the PVV vis-à-vis the 
government. Another Eurosceptic party is likely to play a role in shaping the 
government’s migration policy, albeit to a lesser extent, is the SGP. This conservative 
Christian party expressed compassion with the plight of migrants, though was one of the 
few parties reluctant to embrace a coordinated EU effort to tackle immigration. Also, after 
Rutte I lost their majority in the Eerste Kamer (Senate) in March 2011, SGP became the 
‘silent supporter’ of the government, which also put the SGP in a strong bargaining 
position (De Jong, 2012).  
 The chapter starts with a section on the general direction of migration policy under 
Rutte I. In section 6.2, three specific EU-related policy proposals will be discussed in 
detail. Based on the collected empirical data, the three causal mechanisms will be used 
for the analysis of the policy proposals. Section 6.4 closes the chapter and presents the 
main findings of the Dutch case study. 
 
 
23 In the agreement, there is an explicit reference to the disagreement which the CDA and VVD on the one 
hand, and the PVV on the other hand, with regards to the nature of Islam. The PVV treats it as a political 
ideology, while the other parties see it as a religion (Coalition Agreement VVD-CDA 2010, 4). 
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6.1. General direction migration policy under Rutte I 
Shortly after taking office in October 2010, Minister of Immigration and Asylum Gerd 
Leers presented a Roadmap for migration policy, which summarised the agenda points 
for migration and asylum policy that the Dutch government was going to work on within 
the EU. The minister got the mandate to work on the following specific issues in terms of 
the EU dimension of migration policy. First, the amendment of the Qualification 
Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC). Second, the Dublin Regulation (Council 
Regulation 343/2003), where immediate (re)negotiation would be possible. Third, 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC on family reunification was similarly deemed suitable for 
revision; the Commission had a green paper scheduled for publication in 2011. A fourth 
policy item which might be renegotiated in the medium to long term, namely Council 
Directive 2003/109/EC on the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents. In this case, negotiations were pending, and cooperation was sought with other 
member states. Furthermore, there were two directives where at the time no adjustments 
were expected but where the Netherlands would try to bargain: (1) Council Directive 
2004/38/EC on the rights of EU citizens to move freely within the EU, (2) Directive 
2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, and the Association Agreement with Turkey. 
(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 30 December 2010). Therefore, here the focus is on 
the first three policy items, since immediate or short term action by the Dutch government 
expected on these issues. 
In a letter in March 2011, Minister Leers discussed the negotiation process at the 
Council of the European Union and claimed that the Dutch approach—to have a list of 
concrete issue proposals—was “very positively” received: “I was able to explain that the 
measures that I proposed are meant to prevent newcomers from ending up on the 
periphery of society and will rather fully participate in society. Of course, this does not 
mean that the member states with whom we talked endorsed fully and without 
reservations the Dutch proposals” (Letter of government to Tweede Kamer, 16 March 
2011).  
A more general formulation of the position of the Rutte I cabinet on the EU-related 
dimensions of migration is in the updated publication of the annual State of the European 
Union by Minister of Foreign Affairs Uri Rosenthal and Secretary of State of Foreign 
Affairs Ben Knapen. In it, the Dutch government put on the developments in the EU into 
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perspective and interpret those events and address what the course of action the 
government will take. In the letter to the Tweede Kamer supplementary to the State of the 
European Union, the government’s position was put as follows: “The cabinet will invest 
considerably in domestic and international measures to curb, control and decrease 
immigration in the Netherlands, answering to societal problems. We strive towards a 
selective immigration policy that gives priority to immigrants that can contribute to 
society (for instance, high-skilled migrants) and which is restrictive for other migrants. 
Since European legislation is in place, the government will invest in the modification of 
the relevant European guidelines” (Rosenthal and Knapen, 2011). For Rutte I, 
immigration was considered a pressing problem that needs to be addressed. The focus on 
bringing in high-skilled labour migrants and thwarting lower-skilled immigrants from 
entering the Netherlands points towards a somewhat restrictive policy. 
The efforts of the Dutch government to shape European migration policy on issues 
like stricter rules for family reunification was met with scepticism by the European 
Commission. During a visit to the Netherlands in May 2011, Commissioner for Home 
Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, highlighted that other member states do not share the need 
to make family reunification more trying, and she expressed reservations regarding the 
Dutch position on immigration and asylum (De Koning, 2011).  
How did the PVV’s position on immigration align with that of the coalition 
parties? In terms of the more specific policy items, one of the most important points of 
disagreement on EU-related immigration policy is that the PVV and the cabinet had 
diverging views on the Common Asylum Policy, which was rejected by the PVV but 
considered essential by the CDA and VVD. In a Senate debate, the cabinet underlined the 
relevance of a common migration (and asylum) policy, for two reasons in particular. First, 
it prevents asylum seekers and migrants from cherrypicking in which member state they 
will apply for asylum. Since some member states might have more favourable conditions, 
these countries receive disproportionately more asylum applications. Second, too many 
migrants fail to participate in the labour market and society, and therefore European 
legislation on these matters is urgently needed to overcome these problems (Eerste 
Kamer, 2011). During the same debate, Ministers Leers pointed out that the Netherlands 
needs to approach the migration question with a ‘practical realism’, since the attitude as 
a moral know-it-all ended up in failed integration projects.  
Surprisingly, the PVV did support increasing Frontex’s capacity to be able to hold 
back incoming migrants. Even though MP De Roon (PVV) stated that the PVV supports 
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only a very limited EU (economic cooperation), this was an “exceptional situation” that 
“tens of thousands of Tunisians” are “roaming freely through Europe”, and thus Frontex 
needs to be a “serious protector of Europe’s outer borders”. PVV’s support for the 
increased capacity of Frontex appears to be as a conciliatory move from PVV towards the 
coalition partners, which both saw a concerted European handling of the migration crisis 
as essential. However, De Roon stressed that the PVV “has always been a warm supporter 
of shelter in the region,” a position that has since become the mainstream. (Tweede 
Kamer, 26 April 2011)  
The plenary debate in the days following the fall of the Rutte I in April 201224 is 
the last point where the Rutte I cabinet’s migration policy was articulated. Minister Leers 
emphasised that he supported many of the policy proposals he had been negotiating since 
took office as minister of immigration and asylum, although these policies were 
considerably more restrictive than those under Prime Minister Balkenende (2003-2010), 
when Leer’s own party (the CDA) was the biggest and delivered the prime minister 
(Mipex.eu). Several MPs expected a sigh of relief from Ministers Leers, not to have to 
support the policies which were mostly part of the PVV’s agenda, Leers went on to say 
that the “content [of the proposals made by the Netherlands] was convincing, and I still 
support it” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2012: 19). Nonetheless, the minister and 
the government remained in favour of a Common Asylum Policy to control migration 
flows.  
 
24 On 1 March 2012 the Dutch Central Planning Agency calculated that between 9 and 16 billion euro 
would have to be cut from the government budget for 2013 in order to meet the European requirement of 
keeping government spending under the 3% mark, which was denounced by the PVV. On 5 March the 
negotiations started between the government parties and the PVV on how to overcome these austerity 
measures. Eventually, these negotiations lasted for a long 7 weeks and ended in an impasse, when Geert 
Wilders decided to reject the austerity plans on 21 April. For the PVV, the austerity measures necessary for 
staying within the limits of the EU Stability and Growth Pact, coupled with the negative effects of austerity 
on basic state pensions, were deemed unacceptable. (Parlement.com, 2019c) 
 However, two other reasons have been attributed to the fall of the Rutte I cabinet. According to 
De Volkskrant, which in 2014 reconstructed the fall of Rutte I, there was a misunderstanding among the 
top decision-makers of the Christian Democrats as to whether or not there could be significant cuts in 
development aid, which was a demand of the PVV to continue the negotiations. State Secretary Knapen 
(CDA) was fiercely opposed to cutting development aid threatened with resignation if the government 
would decide to cut aid, which allegedly shocked Prime Minister Rutte and vice PM Verhagen (CDA) 
(Hoedeman and Meijer, 2014a). According to Gert Leers, Minister of Immigration and Asylum, both the 
VVD and CDA were held “hostage” by the PVV for the duration of the Rutte I Cabinet (Hoedeman and 
Meijer, 2014b). Elsewhere, former members of the PVV claim that Wilders felt the influence of the PVV 
wither due to the resignation of prominent PVV politician Hero Brinkman, who had left the party weeks 
before over disagreements with Wilders on Muslims and Eastern European labour migrants (ANP, 2014). 
Other members of the party were shocked that Wilders let the cabinet fall without consultation on the 21st 
of April 2012 (Ibid.). 
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The next section discusses the three main policy proposals which the Rutte I 
cabinet, and Minister Leers in particular, brought to the negotiating table in the European 
Union. 
6.2. 2 Directives and 1 Convention 
How did the PVV and SGP influence the Dutch migration policy, specifically (1) the 
Dublin Regulation (Council Regulation 343/2003), (2) the Qualification Directive 
(Council Directive 2004/83/EC), and (3) the Family Reunification Directive 
(2003/86/EC)? Detailed descriptions of these three policy items follow, which will then 
be operationalised according to Hall’s conceptualisation of policy change and then 
analysed via the causal mechanisms presented in chapter 4.  
6.2.1. Dublin Regulation (343/2003) and (604/2013) 
In 2003 the Dublin Regulation replaced the Dublin Convention from 1990, to establish 
“criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national” 
(EUR-Lex, 2003). The regulation meant to clarify which member state would be 
responsible for examining any incoming asylum application. It was assumed that by the 
time of the adoption of the regulation, a harmonised asylum procedure across the EU 
would be in place. This harmonisation practically never materialised, and thus the lack of 
harmonisation called for an amendment. Consequently, in late 2008 the European 
Commission proposed an amendment of the Dublin Regulation, “to enhance the system's 
efficiency and, on the other, to ensure that the needs of applicants for international 
protection are comprehensively addressed under the responsibility determination 
procedure” (European Commission, 2008). This proposal addressed those cases where 
member states faced unprecedented pressures on their asylum system and their capacity 
to cope with the incoming applications, as well as cover the situations where applications 
might face an inadequate level of protection. 
 The Balkenende IV government supported the Commission’s proposed 
amendment to the Dublin Regulation, while emphasising, as it had done before, the need 
to first put in place a Common European Asylum System prior to re-evaluating the 
burden-sharing agreement in the EU (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a). Furthermore, 
the Balkenende IV did not support temporary waiving the Dublin Regulation for member 
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states that face high migratory pressure, since this would lead to “asylum shopping”, 
whereby the asylum seeker calculates into his/her decision where to apply how he could 
get into the host country of his preference.  
 Under Rutte I, there was no substantive change in the position of the Dutch 
government. The Roadmap presented by Minister Leers emphasised the need for an 
effective implementation of the Dublin Regulation. The Dutch government negotiation 
position was that the responsibility of processing the asylum application should be for the 
member state where the asylum seeker first entered the EU. Beyond the issue of member 
state responsibility, Leers stressed the need for operational support from the European 
Asylum Support Office in cases where member states face very high migratory pressures. 
Exceptions to this rule at the time related to the protection of nuclear and other family ties 
(Eerste Kamer, 2011).  
 During a session of the Eerste Kamer’s Commission for Immigration and Asylum 
in the summer of 2011, Minister Leers explained in detail the Dutch government’s 
position on immigration policy in the EU, in particular the emergency mechanism of the 
Dublin Regulation. The government clarified that in the case of exceptional pressure in a 
country, the Regulation might be temporarily waived. However, Leers expressed that this 
might come at the risk of freeriding by member states, since member states might be 
tempted to claim to be in an exceptional situation for the sake of not having to comply 
with the Dublin Regulation. Therefore, the Dutch position in the negotiation was that the 
introduction of an emergency mechanism, i.e. if a member state wishes to declare an 
exceptional situation, should be conditioned on the compliance to the EU acquis 
communautaire (Eerste Kamer, 2011).  
 By 2012, Minister Leers argued that the EU negotiations regarding the Dublin 
Regulation’s potentially new suspension mechanism were moving in a direction 
favourable to the Dutch position (Leers, 2012). After the fall of Rutte I, the suspension 
mechanism was however abandoned during the negotiation process in the EU (Council 
of the European Union, 2012). 
 When the Commission proposed another amendment to the Dublin Regulation in 
2014 (on the rules determining the Member State responsible for examining the 
application for international protection of unaccompanied minors with no family 
member) (European Commission, 2014), the Rutte II cabinet (consisting of VVD and 
PvdA) opposed that part of the Commission’s proposal that put the responsibility of the 
asylum application on the host country. The Dutch government argued that the 
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responsibility of processing the application should be on the country where the asylum 
application was first submitted, echoing the position of the Rutte I cabinet. The Dutch 
government did highlight the importance of ensuring that unaccompanied minors are 
informed about its asylum status as quickly as possible, while ensuring the primary 
objective of the amendment to the Dublin Regulation, namely to combat asylum shopping 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). 
6.2.2. Qualification Directive (2004/83) and (2011/95)  
The Qualification Directive from 2004 pertains to the “minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted” (EUR-Lex Document 32004L0083). In 2009, the European Commission 
proposed an amendment of this Directive that would broaden the scope of the minimum 
norms for recognising a person as an asylum seeker, and the kinds of subsidiary protection 
accompanying those norms (European Commission, 2009). The Balkenende IV cabinet 
fully endorsed this amendment and highlighted that the Common European Asylum 
System needs to the developed to be better able to execute the identification and 
protection of asylum seekers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b). The Rutte I cabinet, 
however, sought to put the burden of proof – that the asylum seeker rightly applies for 
asylum – in the hands of the applicant rather than the state. At the time it was the member 
state’s responsibility to ensure that applicants qualify for asylum. This reversal of the 
burden of proof to the applicant would alleviate the administrative and legal burden on 
the state, because “the asylum seeker would have to show that the threat also applied to 
other parts of the country of origin before a member state would have to investigate 
whether the asylum seeker could avail himself of protection in those parts” (Leers, 2011).  
On 13 December 2011, an update to the Qualification Directive (2011/95) was 
approved via the ordinary legislative procedure by the Council of the European Union 
and the European Parliament. According to the government communication in January 
2012, this update to the Qualification Directive covered the Dutch position, as stipulated 
in the 2010 Roadmap, since member states would no longer be required to prove that the 
asylum applicant can reside in other parts of their home country (Leers, 2012). In chapter 
II, article 4 of that Directive, the government’s position, that the asylum seeker should 
deliver the burden of proof, is captured. The article reads: “Member States may consider 
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it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all the elements needed to 
substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant, 
it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application” 
(Directive 2011/95/EU). Subsequently, Rutte II transposed the amendment of the 
Qualification Directive in 2013 (Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 December 2011) and with that concluded the negotiation on the 
Qualification Directive.  
6.2.3. Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) 
The third and last piece of European legislation related to migration policy covered here 
is the Family Reunification Directive of 2003. The motivation behind the development of 
a family reunification directive was expressed during the European Council session in 
Tampere in October 1999, and the Commission released a proposed in December of 1999. 
After more than two years of negotiations in the European Parliament and Council of the 
EU, the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) finally entering into force in October 
2003. According to Groenendijk et al. (2007), there was little public debate in the 
Netherlands around the transposition of this legislation, which took place in 2006. 
However, academicians did send a letter to parliament, arguing that the requirements for 
family reunification should be stricter (7). 
 The Dutch government did the Directive not considered final, but rather a step in 
the right direction. In 2009 the Balkenende IV cabinet drafted proposals for a more 
effective regulation of family migration (EMN, 2010; Tweede Kamer, 2009). The 
proposals specifically aimed to improve the measures to combat fraud and abuse of 
marriage migration. Secondly, the government’s goal was to increase the successful 
integration of migrants and to improve training requirements. Thirdly, the cabinet 
proposed measures to combat the undesirable aspects of marriage migration; including 
prohibiting marriage between nephews and nieces, increasing the recognition of 
marriages that were concluded abroad from 15 to 18 years, abolishing the acceptance of 
prior polygamous marriages and “setting the requirement of an independent 
accommodation for the person bringing a marriage partner to the Netherlands from abroad 
(EMN, 2010: 30).  
 However, in 2010 the Balkenende IV cabinet suffered a setback in this policy area. 
On 4 March 2010, the European Court of Justice established that the Dutch government 
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made legal distinctions between the requirements for family formation and family 
reunification, which is in contravention with EU law (see EMN, 2011: 68). The Court’s 
decision forced the government to amend Dutch legislation to be in line with Directive 
2003/86. Specifically, the Dutch income requirement of 120% of the minimum wage had 
to be reversed back to 100% for family formation25. Furthermore, the Dutch policy of 
distinguishing “between the minimum age of the partners/marriage partners for family 
reunification (18 years of age) and family formation (21 years of age) was abandoned as 
well. From then on, the principal person as well as the family member requesting entry 
to the Netherlands must at least be 21 years of age, irrespective of whether it concerns 
family reunification or family formation” (EMN, 2011: 68).  Under Rutte I, 
reducing the number of family-related immigrants became one of the key policy proposals 
(Goudappel and Hoevenaars, 2012). Concretely, the new government called for an 
increase in the age requirement for reunification to the age of 24, tightening the income 
requirement, imposing educational requirements on sponsors in the case of family 
migration, and the introduction of an assessment that proves that the ties to the host 
country are more substantial than those to the country of origin, amongst other things 
(Leers, 2011). In defence of the strict family reunion policy, the government proposal 
stated that the measures aim to maximise the chances that immigrants successfully 
integrate into the host state and that the stricter rules, like the educational and age 
requirement, will allow the incoming persons to be more independent from each other 
and their families (Ibid.). The proposal faced legal restrictions because, in August 2011, 
the Administrative High Court of the Netherlands deemed the requirement for Turkish 
citizens to be obliged to fulfil a civic integration examination to be contrary to clauses in 
existing agreements between the EU and Turkey (EMN, 2012: 30). 
As of January 2012, Minister of Immigration and Asylum Leers could not indicate 
whether any substantive progress had been made during the EU negotiations that aimed 
to modify the Family Reunification Directive, except that there appeared to a broad 
agreement among his counterparts that the directive needs to be updated to be able to face 
the new challenges that immigration brings (Leers, 2012). In terms of actual policy 
output, Rutte I had managed to make family reunification only possible for persons who 
are married or that have a registered partnership. For those who were not able to marry 
 
25 The income requirement did not change for family reunification, since the Dutch requirement was already 
at 100% of the minimum wage, in line with the Qualification Directive. 
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due to conditions in their home country, they would be given a temporary marriage permit 
to then get married in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the eligibility of an independent 
residence permit has extended from 3 to 5 years (EMN, 2012). 
Did the restrictive migration policy of Rutte I last into the Rutte II cabinet? The 
government Rutte II relaxed family reunification policy in several ways. During Rutte I, 
family reunification and family formation were only possible for partners who were either 
married or in a registered partnership. However, this piece of legislation was relaxed 
afterwards, so that it was no longer necessary for the partners in question to be married 
or to have a registered partnership, and it sufficed for the partners to prove their long-
lasting relationship (EMN 2012; EMN, 2015). Shortly after Rutte II took office, the 
requirements for applying for family reunification were effectively reversed, because the 
government wanted to give partners a choice whether or not to get married (Staatscourant 
2013 nr. 15593). Nevertheless, Rutte II emphasised strict oversight over sham marriages 
and relationships.  
6.3. Analysis 
After an overview of the three policy items of the EU-related migration policy that the 
Dutch government decided to focus on in the Council of the European Union, it is time 
to analyse in detail whether and how the PVV and SGP, as Eurosceptic niche parties, 
influenced the migration policy of the Rutte I government (2010-2012).  
6.3.1. Policy change 
The Nativist Immigration and Integration Policy Index (NIIP index), developed by 
Akkerman and De Lange (2012), is a good starting point for the measurement of 
legislative changes in the field of migration policy. The index measures the degree of 
restrictiveness of migration and integration policy by accumulating policy output based 
on 25 policy items. If a policy is restrictive, then a positive score of 0.5 or 1.0 will be 
added to the index; conversely, policies which are not in line with the agenda of radical 
parties will receive negative scores (Ibid.). Therefore, a higher score in the NIIP index is 
assumed to correspond to the electoral or governing success of the respective anti-
immigration party in government. Van Beijsterveldt (2018) measured the migration 
policy output and position for the Rutte I government and found that the output of this 
administration was more restrictive than the Balkenende IV and Rutte II cabinets. But 
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what were the policy proposals and actual policy outputs of the Dublin Regulation and 
the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives?  
The policy position on migration policy of the VVD-CDA(-PVV) government did 
not change substantially during their time in office, and the government’s policy results 
in migration policy were mixed as well (Goudappel and Hoevenaars, 2012). Table 9 
summarises the proposed and actual policy output of the Qualification Directive 
2004/83/EC, and the Dublin Regulation 343/2003, and Family Reunification Directive 
2003/86 that were described in section 6.2.  
In the case of the Dublin Regulation, the position of the governments did not 
change substantially. All three of the Dutch governments that were analysed were in 
favour of a Common Asylum Policy. Likewise, the issue of “asylum shopping” found 
resonance across all three governments. In the case of waiving the Dublin Regulation 
under exceptional circumstances, Rutte I was more lenient on the matter compared to 
Balkenende IV. While Balkenende IV was not in favour of temporarily suspending the 
Agreement when a country was facing very high migration pressures, Rutte I did support 
a temporary suspension in cases of exceptional migratory pressures. With the introduction 
of the Dublin Convention III in 2013, the policy positions of the Balkenende IV and Rutte 
I cabinets, namely that asylum applications should be processed by the member state 
where the asylum seeker first enters the EU, was realised. 
Table 9: Proposed and actual changes of migration policy 































Proposed: 1. First put in 
place a common system, 
then re-evaluate the burden-
sharing agreement.  
2. Against waiving the 
Dublin Regulation for 
member states that are under 
a high migration pressure, 
since this would lead to 
“asylum shopping”.  
Proposed: 1. Asylum application 
should be performed at the point 
of entry.  
2. Support exceptions in case of 
high pressure but conditioned on 
compliance to EU acquis. 
Proposed and actual: 1. 
Asylum application 
should be performed at 
the point of entry.  
2. Asylum shopping 


























Full support EC proposal. Actual: The burden of proof in 
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alternatives put in the hands of the 






















Proposed but forced to 
amend: “A prohibition on 
marriages between nephews 
and nieces; an increase in the 
minimum age for the 
recognition of marriages 
concluded abroad from 15 to 
18 years of age; the 
abolishment of the Dutch 
recognition of polygamous 
marriages concluded abroad; 
setting the requirement of an 
independent accommodation 
for the person bringing a 
marriage partner to the 
Netherlands from abroad.” 
Actual: For family 
formation, the income 
requirement reduced from 
120% to 100%. Distinction 
minimum age between 
family formation and 
reunification abandoned. 
Must be at least 21 years to 
request. 
Proposed: 
• Increasing the age requirement 
for both partners to 24;  
• Tightening the income 
requirement; • requiring the 
deposit of a bond;  
• Admitting a maximum of one 
partner every ten years;  
•Introducing an assessment to 
prove that ties with the proposed 
host country are stronger than 
those with the country of origin;  
• Excluding sponsors convicted of 
certain violent crimes (e.g. 
domestic violence); • imposing 
educational requirements on 
sponsors in the case of family 
migration; • revoking temporary 
residence permits if holders do not 
fulfil the civic integration 
conditions that apply in the 
member state. 
Actual: Family reunification only 
for persons who are married or 
that have a registered partnership. 
Actual:  
1. Requirements for 
applying for family 
reunification reversed, to 
give partners a choice 
whether or not to be 
married. 




1250EUR to 225EUR, 
extension validity 
application from 
375EUR to 225EUR.  
Sources: Collection of official documentation. 
Regarding the Qualification Directive, Balkenende IV recognised the need to 
harmonise migration and asylum policy, and thus considered the directive an essential 
step in that direction. Rutte I elaborated a specific position on the Directive. Concretely, 
Rutte I put forward the requirement for the asylum seeker to justify his application for 
international protection, rather than the state needing to investigate that. Moreover, it was 
in December 2011, under Rutte I, that the Council and the EP approved the Directive. 
The Rutte II cabinet eventually did not have a role in the bargaining process surrounding 
the Qualification Directive, but transposed the Directive into law on 1 October 2013 
(EMN, 2014).  
Lastly, the Rutte I cabinet put more emphasis on the Family Reunification 
Directive (Goudappel and Hoevenaars, 2012). The proposed measures of Balkenende IV 
were focused on the prohibition of family reunification and formation in the case of 
polyamorous marriages and increasing the requirements for family formation and 
reunification. However, Balkenende IV also suffered a setback when the ECJ found that 
Dutch legislation dating back to 2004 was not in compliance with Family Reunification 
Directive (2003/86), and so the income requirements for family formation were reduced 
from 120% to 100% of the minimum wage. Furthermore, the distinction of minimum age 
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between family formation and reunification was abandoned, and the minimum age for 
both was put at 21 years  
Rutte I proposed far-reaching measures to curb family reunification and family 
formation, for instance by increasing the minimum age to 24 years, again increasing the 
income requirement, and admitting only one family member every ten years (see table 9). 
The government was able to achieve that family reunification would only be granted for 
persons who are married or that have a registered partnership. This piece of legislation 
entered into force in October 2012 (EMN, 2013). However, it was already in early 2013, 
in the first months of the Rutte II government, that this law was amended. These 
restrictions were eased such that people would be able to choose to get married or commit 
through a different form of partnership. Similarly, the application fees for family 
formation and reunification were significantly decreased (Ibid.).  
First, second or third-order change 
At first sight, the changes in the policy items of the three governments did not constitute 
very significant changes. From the NIIP index, it becomes clear that the Rutte I cabinet 
adopted a stricter migration and integration policy. The same holds for the Dublin 
Regulation and the Qualification and Family Reunification Directives. However, like the 
NIIP index above, Peter Hall’s categorisation of policy change helps to standardise the 
measurement of policy change26.  
 
26 The NIIP index developed by Akkerman and De Lange (2012) is not used for the operationalisation of 
policy change, because this research analyses the impact of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy, and while 
the case studies are both related to migration policy, also non-EU related issues like integration policy is 
compounded in this index. Secondly, the aim is to offer a more standardised measurement that can only be 
used for the analysis of other policy areas.  
Table 10: Policy changes of Dutch migration policy according to Peter Hall’s 
categorisation 
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instrument changed 
(responsibility of 
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 Table 10 summarises how the three policy items changed across the Balkenende 
IV, Rutte I and Rutte II governments. Under the Balkenende IV cabinet, there were no 
policy changes regarding the Dublin Regulation and Qualification Directive that can be 
attributed to the government. In terms of the Family Reunification Directive, there was a 
first-level change under Balkenende IV, specifically a relaxation of the income 
requirement for family formation. Second, the Rutte II cabinet saw several changes on 
these policy items. In the case of the Dublin Regulation, the policy change occurred 
during the Rutte II cabinet, but should be attributed to the negotiations of the Rutte I 
cabinet, given the time lag that legislative procedures bring. As for the Qualification 
Directive, the Rutte II cabinet transposed this directive. As under Balkenende IV, Rutte 
II relaxed the Family Reunification Directive; this time in response to strict policies of 
the Rutte I government. The levels of fees for applying to family reunification or family 
formation which reduced, marking a first-level policy change, which the instrument (fees) 
remained the same. However, a second-level policy change also occurred, since 
requirements for applying for family reunification were reversed. 
 The VVD-CDA(-PVV) government (Rutte I) saw a second-order change on all 
three policy items. In all three cases, policy goals were unchanged, but the instruments 
were altered, from a transfer of responsibility in the Dublin Regulation, a transfer in the 
burden of proof in the Qualification Directive to a change in the requirements for family 
reunification. Even if Rutte I had wanted to alter the goals of any of these policy items, 
they were bound by their EU membership and their colleagues in the Council of the 
European Union to achieve more profound changes. Third-order change would have 
(2011/95) alternatives put in the 
hands of the applicant 
rather than the state); goal 






levels of instruments 
(income requirement)  
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Second-order change: the 
instruments changed 
(family reunification only 
for persons who are 
married or that have a 
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goal remains the same.  
First-order change: 
levels of instruments 








for applying for family 
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Sources: Collection of official documentation. 
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meant scrapping a whole directive or rejecting the transposition of a directive. Important 
to note is that in all three cases, the Rutte I government shifted towards a more restrictive 
migration policy, with one exception: it was more willing to temporarily suspend the 
enforcement of the Dublin Regulation in the case of exceptional migratory pressures on 
specific member states. 
It should be clear that member states are very restricted in the development of 
their own immigration policy and are bound by the regular Ordinary legislative procedure, 
whereby the European Commission proposes legislation and the Council of the European 
Union and European Parliament give readings and then adopt the Commission’s proposal, 
once the Council and EP approve it of course (Hampshire, 2016).  
However, the proposals of the government set the policy agenda and shape much 
of the perception of parties and public actors on policy (see for instance Kingdon, 2014). 
It was the prioritisation of immigration and asylum policy in the coalition agreement by 
VVD and CDA in 2010, and the policy roadmap of Minister Leers, that put migration 
high on the public agenda during the Rutte I cabinet. Therefore, the approach of the 
government was to “invest in the modification of the relevant European guidelines” to 
curb immigration into the EU, which has destabilising effects on society in Europe 
(Rosenthal and Knapen, 2011: 11). How did Eurosceptic parties play a role in bringing 
about these second-order policy changes under the Rutte I cabinet? The following 
sections test how the Freedom Party (PVV) and the Reformed Political Party (SGP) in 
particular shaped the government’s attitude towards the above-described policy items.  
6.3.2. Contagion effect  
Earlier research has taught us that in the Netherlands niche parties have affected the 
migration policy and the EU policy of the government (see Akkerman and De Lange, 
2012; Van Heerden et al., 2014; Akkerman, 2018). In the early 2000s, Pim Fortuyn and 
his party LPF contributed to the changing discourse on the European Union. Many 
political parties in the Netherlands now share the positions that were earlier echoed by 
Pim Fortuyn on issues like the decrease in the Dutch contributions to the EU budget, a 
strict subsidiary test on proposed legislation and an increased role of national parliaments 
(Schout et al., 2012: 417).  
The immigration policy of mainstream parties like the VVD and CDA was 
influenced by the LPF in the early 2000s (and less markedly of the populist CD which 
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did not win seats in parliament in 2002), which led towards a much more restrictive 
immigration policy than these parties embraced before (Van Heerden et al., 2014). Pim 
Fortuyn (from Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) introduced populism on a large scale to Dutch 
politics, and Geert Wilders (PVV) may be considered his populist successor (Lucardie, 
2008). When the PVV presented its first party programme for the 2006 elections, the 
CDA and VVD had moderated their positions on immigration during those elections, 
though their immigration policies converged towards the PVV’s position in the 2010 
elections (Van Heerden et al. 2014: 132). During the 2012 and 2017 general election 
campaigns, the policy convergence of the CDA and VVD towards the PVV’s position on 
immigration continued. National identity became a focal point, and both parties “even 
proposed policies that were in tension with or, at times, in contravention of the Dutch 
constitution” (Akkerman, 2018: 14).  
How does Meguid’s spatial theory explain the policy convergence of the 
mainstream parties (CDA, VVD) towards the niche parties (PVV, SGP)? This theoretical 
framework looks at three dimensions related to the strategies of mainstream parties that 
impact the electoral success of niche parties, namely issue salience, issue ownership and 
policy convergence or divergence. The niche parties are both proponents of a strict 
immigration policy. The SGP’s relevance in the party competition on immigration policy 
appears to be marginal. While the party is known for its outspoken position on opening’s 
hours of businesses on Sunday, the freedom of religious education and abortion or 
euthanasia (De Jong, 2012), it does not own the issue of immigration – issue ownership 
is one of the three dimensions of Meguid’s spatial theory. Where applicable, the SGP’s 
potential role is highlighted, though the emphasis is on the PVV.  
As described in the causal mechanism of section 4.2.3, if a party adopts an 
accommodative strategy, that should lead to a (1) increased issue salience of the niche 
parties, (2) a convergence of policy positions, (3) a transfer of issue ownership away from 
the niche party to the mainstream party, and subsequently would compromise the 
electoral support of the niche party. For this case study, this means explicitly whether 
issue ownership of immigration policy was transferred from the PVV to the CDA or 
VVD, whether the salience of immigration policy changed, whether there was a 
convergence of the policy positions of the CDA and VVD towards the position of the 
PVV, and how those issues related and help explain the electoral losses or successes of 




Since the early 2000s immigration and multiculturalism have been an essential part of the 
political and public debate in the Netherlands (Tillie et al., 2016). A report by the Dutch 
Social and Cultural Planning Office observes that immigration was one of the most oft-
mentioned societal problems among Dutch voters in 2010. Interestingly, immigration no 
longer made it into the top 6 of the most pressing issues by the end of 2012 (Den Ridder 
et al., 2010; Den Ridder et al., 2012). However, in the 2018 report of the SCP, the data 
for 2010-2012 showed that more than 25% of the respondents considered immigration to 
a major societal problem (Den Ridder et al., 2018). Eurobarometer data – the survey data 
conducted by the European Commission – shows a similar picture. When asked “What 
do you think are the two most important issues facing the Netherlands at the moment?” 
the answer “immigration” hovers between 10% and 20% from 2005 to 2010, and then 
dropped to 1% in November 2012, only to rise steeply in 2015 to more than 50% of the 
answers, a consequence of the mass migration flows into the EU. After the peak in 2015, 
immigration continued to be one of the two most important issues for the Netherlands for 
more than 20% of the respondents. As for political parties in the Netherlands, the salience 
of immigration policy has grown to become an issue that every party addressed, though 
the majority of the parties dedicate relatively little attention to it (Green-Pedersen and 
Otjes, 2019). When comparing the coalition agreements of 2007, 2010 and 2012, it is 
clear that the coalition agreement of the Rutte I Cabinet (2010) dedicates far more 
attention to immigration and integration policy then the preceding and following coalition 
agreements. In 2007 around 7%, in 2010 around 16% and 2012 around 8%. 
 All in all, immigration has become a prominent issue in the Netherlands, though 
its relevance has fluctuated over time. Between 2010 and 2012, immigration policy had 
lost much of its salience among the public. Irrespective of the renewed importance of 
immigration in 2015, the drop in salience in 2012 as compared to 2010 is not in line with 
the expectations of Meguid’s spatial theory for accommodative strategies. 
Issue ownership 
The second dimension of Meguid’s PSO (Position, Salience and Ownership) theory is 
issue ownership. The PVV was the apparent issue owner of immigration from 2010 to 
2012, and probably before as well. Bos et al. (2017) conducted an experiment in 2014 
and found that 48% of the 600 participants associated immigration policy to the PVV, 
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while 26.50% - also the most significant share of participants – claim that the PVV was 
“best able to effectuate its program” on immigration27 (Bos et al., 2017: 5-6). Electoral 
support for the PVV increased when immigration is covered in the media (Bos et al., 
2017; Burscher et al., 2015). The PVV can be considered the successor of the LPF policy 
in terms of issue ownership of immigration, and the VVD or CDA did not manage to take 
over this ownership. In the same study by Bos et al. (2017), the VVD and CDA score 
3.83% and 2% respectively in the frequency that they are associated with immigration. 
Therefore, even without data on issue ownership of immigration policy in 2012, the PVV 
can be assumed to claim ownership of the issue comfortably.  
 Some of the statements and actions of the VVD and CDA were considered “PVV 
moves” by the other opposition parties, which accentuated the perception of the PVV 
owning immigration policy. One such instance took place in November 2010, when 
Minister of Immigration and Asylum Leers decided to heed the call of the European Court 
of Human Right not to deport a group of asylum seekers to Iraq who had exhausted all 
legal remedies. Nevertheless, Leers insisted that all cases where the ECHR might object 
to deportation should be evaluated on a per-case basis, and that deportation remained an 
option despite the Court’s decision. The opposition parties considered this position to be 
particularly courteous towards the PVV (Ramakers, 2011).  
 Concluding, the issue ownership of migration was not transferred from the niche 
party to the mainstream parties, as the theoretical expectations of adopting an 
accommodative strategy would predict. 
Electoral gains/losses and policy convergence 
During the 2012 elections, the PVV suffered its first electoral loss in the Tweede Kamer 
since its establishment in 2006, ending up with 15 seats as compared to 24 seats in 2010. 
Whether that electoral loss is attributable to the party strategies of the mainstream parties 
is debatable. Previous research on the contagion effect of PVV’s immigration policy 
shows that the positions of the CDA and VVD on immigration policy converged towards 
that of the PVV. Akkerman (2015) notes that the VVD took substantial steps towards a 
more restrictive immigration policy following the 2002 electoral success of LPF, and 
again in 2010, following the PVV’s electoral success in 2006. As the above analysis 
 
27
 While the article did not explicitly state the date of conducting the experiments, email correspondence 
with one of the authors confirmed that the experiments were conducted after 2012, namely in 2014.  
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shows, also in the case of the Dublin Convention, Qualification Directive and the Family 
Reunification Directive, the proposals of Rutte I were more restrictive than those of the 
previous and next governments (see section 6.3.1). Whether this can be attributed entirely 
to the role of the PVV in Rutte I remains questionable. 
Table 11 shows the policy positions of the two mainstream parties and the two 
niche parties related to the Dublin Regulation and the Family Reunification Directive 
before (2006-2010), during (2010-2012) and after (2012-2017) the Rutte I cabinet. In 
terms of the Dublin Regulation, the CDA pledged in all election cycles for a common 
Table 11: Policy positions in party programmes of CDA, VVD, PVV in the Dublin 
Regulation and Family Reunification in 2006, 2010, 2012. Gedoogakkoord 2010 
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approach to immigration and asylum policy that would harmonise the regulations in these 
policies areas across the EU. The VVD and SGP also supported a unified European 
approach to the migration question, though the VVD further specified its position in 2012 
by stating that a common approach should ensure a decrease in asylum applications. In 
the absence of a decrease in application, the asylum policy of the Netherlands should 
become stricter.  
As for the issues related to the Family Reunification Directive, all parties call for 
further restrictions on the acceptance of family reunification and family formation. 
Interestingly, the only party which advocated limiting family reunification to married 
couples or those in a registered partnership, which the Rutte I cabinet advocated, was the 
SGP, not a party to the government coalition. On the other hand, the PVV was, and 
continues to be, principally opposed to migration for Islamic countries or labour migrants.  
One might argue that the PVV was the driving force behind the more restrictive 
approach to family reunification – though also the CDA and VVD called for stricter rules 
on the topic – and that the SGP’s position was a suitable compromise for Minister Leers 
to reinforce. At the same time, it could be that the SGP’s new strengthened bargaining 
position as ‘silent’ supporter of the coalition since March 2011 allowed it to put pressure 
on the immigration policy of the government. While that might not help in assigning 
influence to either one of the parties, it would strengthen the argument that either of these 
niche parties shaped the government’s policy towards immigration policy.  
 To summarise the results of this part of the analysis so far, table 12 shows the 
developments in terms of the issue salience, issue ownership, policy convergence and 
electoral consequences on the niche party. The above analysis shows a decrease in the 
issue salience of immigration policy, a convergence of the policy position, no effect on 
issue ownership, but a decrease in the electoral support of the PVV. However, the VVD’s 
and CDA’s decision to converge their policies towards the more restrictive position of 
the PVV indicates that these mainstream parties might have indeed attempted to utilise 
one of the key policy areas of the PVV – the niche party – the marginalise that party. 
Table 12: POS theory in immigration policy under Rutte I 
Strategies Issue salience Issue position Issue ownership Niche party 
electoral 
support 
Actual  Decreases Converges No effect Decreases 
Accommodative Increases Converges Transfers to 
mainstream party 
Decreases 
Sources: Meguid, 2008 and own calculations. 
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Therefore, hypothesis C1 – Mainstream parties will use an accommodative party strategy 
in reaction to the electoral success of Eurosceptic niche parties – is partially supported, 
since the actual developments do not coincide with the theoretical expectations of the 
POS theory of Bonnie Meguid, which suggests an increase in the issue salience of the 
policy area and increase issue ownership. However, the PVV is the absolute issue owner 
of immigration policy, plus there was a drop in the issue salience of immigration policy 
in public opinion in the period 2010-2012. Does this disqualify the theory as a whole or 
instead means that the theory’s explanatory power is contingent on certain conditions?  
Alternative explanations 
An alternative explanation for the repositioning of the CDA and VVD towards a more 
restrictive policy could be that there is an annual net increase in migration (immigration 
- emigration), which puts pressure on Dutch society. However, the presence of the PVV, 
and the LPF earlier (Van Heerden et al., 2014), facilitate mainstream parties to move to 
the right on the issue of immigration (Davis, 2012). The PVV’s electoral success in the 
2009 European Parliament elections is likely to have contributed to a shift to the right of 
the CDA and VVD.  
 Akkerman (2016) identifies the party strategy of the PVV to be primarily vote-
seeking28. However, during its role as parliamentary supporter of the Rutte I cabinet, the 
PVV took on a more cooperative role. Akkerman attributes this to the PVV’s self-
promotion as a reliable supporting partner for the government. After the fall of the Rutte 
I government; however, the PVV returned to its adversarial politics and radicalised 
further. In addition, far-right parties like the PVV and LPF tap into new policy items that 
also increase the policy options of parties, i.e. in the absence of these parties, these 
positions might not have been considered. 
 In 2007, when the Balkenende IV cabinet took office with a milder asylum and 
immigration policy than its predecessors, the PVV’s position became more extreme 
against Islam (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012: 166), thereby increasing the polarisation of 
the issue. Wilders’ move to film a short movie entitled Fitna that illustrates his 
interpretation of Islam – bombings, the execution of homosexuals, and condoning the 
physical abuse of women that cheat – are manifestations of the PVV’s radical views. 
 
28
 The original idea of a vote-seeking party strategy is that the ultimate aim of parties is to seek office for 
the sake of power and prestige that come with it  
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Nonetheless, during the EP elections of 2009 and the general elections of 2010, PVV 
made considerable electoral gains by capitalising on the worries of many voters that 
multiculturalism failed.  
In line with that argument, Dennison et al. (2017) find that there is a strong 
positive correlation between the number of incoming immigrants and the support for the 
PVV, a trend which was valid from the PVV’s inception in 2006 until the 2017 general 
elections. The authors conclude that this correlation highlights the salience of 
immigration as a public issue. Therefore, the previous indicator of salience (i.e. whether 
the public considered immigration one of the main societal threats) might not have been 
the appropriate measurement of salience. At the same time, the electoral losses of the 
PVV are likely not a consequence of the VVD’s and CDA’s political calculations on 
immigration policy, but instead followed from the unwillingness across the political 
spectrum parties to govern with the PVV, with the notable exception of the VVD (Joop.nl, 
2012b). This ‘cordon sanitaire’ might have discouraged voters from voting for the PVV. 
Secondly, voters might punish parties that shirk responsibility in times of critical political 
events, like the budgetary negotiations that led to the fall of the Rutte I cabinet. However, 
according to an opinion poll some months after the coalition fell, the majority of the PVV 
voters expressed their loyalty to the party (Joop.nl, 2012a), weakening the explanatory 
power of the voter resentment hypothesis. It, therefore, seems more likely that the 
political pressure from other parties to boycott the PVV shaped voter behaviour.  
Conclusion  
How well does the POS theory explain the policy convergence of the VVD and CDA 
towards the immigration policy of the PVV and SGP? Neither the issue salience of 
migration policy for public or issue ownership fit the theoretical predictions of the 
accommodative strategy.  
 When looking at the three policy items, the PVV does not offer a workable 
alternative position that a government can take to the European Union. Most political 
parties in the Netherlands remained dedicated to common asylum and migration policy 
through the EU. In contrast, the PVV’s position was that the Netherlands should (1) leave 
the EU, (2) opt-out from immigration policy, (3) stop immigration (from Islamic 
countries). These were not considered reasonable policy alternatives for the mainstream 
parties. While the VVD-CDA cabinet, and the VVD and CDA individually, moved 
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towards stricter immigration policies, the Netherlands leaving the EU or a complete halt 
to immigration were not considered reasonable and negotiable policy positions.  
Furthermore, the VVD and CDA might have decided not to invest heavily in 
increasing the issue salience of immigration policy, anticipating that they will not be able 
to take ownership of the populist PVV. A full-fledged accommodative strategy would 
have been too costly. Instead, the parties adapted to the changing public sentiments 
regarding immigration, which were not costly for the either the VVD or CDA, since their 
position towards immigration was already restrictive compared to other parties in 
parliament, like the PvdA, SP, D66 or GroenLinks. The mass migratory waves into the 
EU in 2015 caused the VVD to prefer a more restrictive immigration policy during the 
2017 general elections. For instance, with regards to family reunification, in addition to 
an income and age requirement, a language requirement and completing an integration 
exam was added to the restrictions for family reunification (VVD, 2017). Also, the VVD 
aims to stop asylum applications in the EU and promotes sheltering asylum seekers in the 
region (Ibid.). Therefore, there is partial support for the hypothesis (C1) that mainstream 
parties will use an accommodative party strategy in reaction to the electoral success of 
Eurosceptic niche parties 
6.3.3. Coalition bargaining  
Secondly, did the PVV and SGP influence the EU-related migration policy of the Rutte I 
according to the literature of coalition bargaining? As described in section 4.2.4, for the 
analysis of coalition bargaining, Bolleyer’s concepts of formation and coalition weight 
(2007) are practical and simple tools to measure the bargaining power of parties as part 
of a coalition29. Formation weight looks those pledges that are in the coalition agreement 
but not supported by the other coalition parties, while coalition weight looks at the share 
of commitments from the coalition agreement that are translated into legislation and are 
not shared by the other coalition partners. Only immigration policy of the Rutte I 
government is analysed here, so immigration policy is treated in isolation, and no other 
cabinets are considered.  
Coalition agreements play an important role in Dutch cabinet politics 
(Timmermans and Andeweg, 2003: 357). While coalition agreements are not binding, 
 
29
 The PVV is also considered a coalition party here, because it took part in the drafting of the immigration 
policy of the government. 
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they give the coalition parties as sense of responsibility to implement the policy proposals 
suggested in these agreements: “legislative adventures with opposition parties are not 
tolerated, at least not if these are on politically important issues” (Ibid.: 384). In the period 
1989-2002, inter-party conflict among coalition partners in the Netherlands in most cases 
were resolved by committing parties to the government agreement (Moury and 
Timmermans, 2013: 129). A key characteristic of decision-making in Dutch cabinets “is 
that all members are collectively bound by the final outcome” (Keman 2008, 230).  
On 14 October 2010, the minority cabinet of Mark Rutte (Rutte I) was formed 
with the parliamentary supporter of the PVV. Two weeks later, on 28 October 2010, the 
government presented the usual coalition agreement, but also a separate agreement that 
was negotiated between the PVV and the government parties VVD and CDA. with a 
separate section about the permanent support of the PVV in the VVD-CDA cabinet. The 
coalition agreement also contained a separate section dedicated to this special agreement, 
explaining that:  
“Minority governments are a rarity in the Netherlands. This coalition 
agreement is the result of consultations between the VVD and the 
CDA. Also, the VVD, PVV and CDA have concluded a parliamentary 
support agreement on immigration, integration, asylum, public safety, 
care for the elderly and the agreed package of cuts. The far-reaching 
decisions included in the support agreement have the support of the 
parliamentary parties of the VVD, PVV and CDA. The PVV may vote 
against proposals from the coalition agreement in parliament. 
However, it will not support motions of no confidence or censure that 
relating to measures in the coalition agreement.” (Coalition 
Agreement VVD-CDA 2010, 5) 
This agreement includes an explicit reference to the disagreement between the 
CDA and VVD and the PVV regarding the nature of Islam. Whereas the PVV treats Islam 
as a political ideology, the other parties see it as a religion (Coalition Agreement VVD-
CDA 2010, 4). During the presentation of the minority agreement, Mark Rutte (VVD) 
and Maxime Verhagen (CDA) focused on the success coming to an agreement (Heymans, 
2010), while Geert Wilders (PVV) considered the agreement to be historical: “We will 
significantly decrease the inflow of asylum seekers and immigrants, 50 per cent fewer 
incoming non-Western immigrants” (Wilders in Heymans, 2010). Vermeend and Bode 
 
100 
analysed the formation process and argued that the agreement is favourable to the 
preferences of the PVV30, amongst other things, through its restrictive immigration policy 
(2010: 107-108).  
Formation weight 
As per Bolleyer (2007), the PVV’s formation weight is measured by counting those 
pledges regarding immigration policy that ended up in the coalition agreement but that 
were not mentioned/supporter by the VVD and CDA. While the concept might be meant 
to review all of the party pledges that end up in the coalition agreement, and not only the 
ones referring to immigration policy, the aim here is more modest than Bolleyer’s analysis 
of small party government participation on policy (2007).  
 The coalition agreement (with the same text copied into the support agreement 
between the cabinet VVD-CDA and the PVV as a parliamentary supporter), dedicates 
more attention to immigration policy than to any other issues. Around 16% of the 
coalition agreement discusses Rutte I’s policy proposals on migration policy, while the 
support agreement even dedicated 43% (3022 of a total of 6989 words) to immigration 
and integration policy. This emphasis in immigration policy in itself is a success for the 
PVV, since immigration is among the most important issue for the PVV.  
 When comparing the positions of the CDA and VVD to the coalition agreement, 
one finds that several policy items in the agreement are more restrictive than the positions 
of these parties. Even though the PVV did not explicitly formulate a position on these 
items in its party programme, it is very plausible that the coalition parties would not have 
adopted such restrictive positions in the absence of the PVV as a coalition partner. One 
of these issues is the plan that welfare benefits should be conditional on the way one 
dresses, i.e. people should dress in a way it does not compromise one's chances of 
employment. Moreover, the input of the cabinet to renegotiate the EU’s Association 
Agreement with Turkey appears to be inspired by the PVV. The proposal in the coalition 
agreement was to make it possible to condition the admittance of Turks to the Netherlands 
on successfully fulfilling an integration exam/process. The CDA and VVD did express 
 
30 In social media the coalition agreement, which in Dutch is “regeerakkoord” is jokingly called the 
“reGeertakkoord”, after PVV’s frontman Geert Wilders. 
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great scepticism to Turkey joining the European Union but had not expressed the intent 
to change the requirements for Turkish people coming to the Netherlands31. 




VVD Formation and unification only for married partners or registered partnerships, and 
minors 
Neither Condition that referent at least one year in the Netherlands 
Neither Requirement for family migration: housing and insurance arranged by partners 
CDA Independent permanent residence status for family migrants from 3 to 5 years 
Neither Increase application fees to cover costs as much as possible 
Neither Forced marriage is prohibited and punishable 
[VVD implied] Marriage between cousins in principle prohibited 
Neither Polygamy not recognised 
Neither Exam requirements in Law integration abroad are increased 
CDA/VVD Age requirement 24 
Neither One partner per 10 years 
VVD Income requirement 120% of the minimum wage 
Neither  Implementation of a deposit 
Neither Implementation of a test whether ties with NL > home country 
[VVD implied] Family migration can be rejected if the incoming person has a record of violence 
CDA/[VVD] (language) Education requirement 
Source: Coalition Agreement VVD-CDA, 2010 
More specifically, a good measurement of formation weight are the specific 
measures stipulated in the coalition agreement on family reunification and formation. 
Table 13 lists the proposals that were included in the coalition agreement and whether 
these positions were listed in the party programmes of either the VVD or CDA. Of the 16 
 
31 Perhaps these parties knew that this proposal was going against the existing legislation, as mentioned in 
section 6.2.3.: The proposal faced some legal boundaries, because in August 2011, the Administrative High 
Court of the Netherlands deemed that the requirement for Turkish citizens to be obliged to fulfil a civic 




items that are dedicated to family formation and reunification, only seven items are either 
in the party programmes of the CDA, of the VVD, or both. The other nine items do not 
come back in any of the party programmes. These are issues like requiring family 
migrants to have housing and insurance arranged by their partners, increasing the 
application fees to cover the costs of bringing a family member/partner as much as 
possible, or implementing a test that would prove that the person who is arranging to 
come to the Netherlands has more ties in the Netherlands than in the home country. These 
proposed measures put further restrictions on the number of incoming migrants and their 
chances of successfully entering the Netherlands. Since the ultimate aim of the PVV was 
to stop immigration from Islamic countries completely and to curb the inflow of migrants 
and asylum seekers as much as possible, any proposals in the coalition agreement that are 
more restrictive than the position of the CDA and VVD were welcomed and point towards 
the PVV’s influence during the coalition negotiations.  
Nevertheless, this ambiguity makes the direct measurement of the formation 
weight of the PVV difficult, but as mentioned above, these policy items can indirectly be 
attributed to the PVV’s role in the coalition. As figure 9 shows, albeit purely for 
illustrative purposes and not to represent the actual distance, that the immigration policy 
of the coalition agreement is more restrictive than the policy positions of both the CDA 




After the government formation and the coalition negotiations, the Rutte I started working 
on the policy proposals that were outlined in the Roadmap of Minister Leers, released in 
December 2010. As detailed in section 6.3.1, in the case of the Dublin Convention, the 
Qualification Directive and the Family Reunification Directive, two changes ended up 
 Figure 9: Representation of role PVV on coalition agreement 
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being implemented during Rutte I (and one change happened with a time lag under Rutte 
II). In the case of the Qualification Directive, the burden of proof that there are no 
protection alternatives in the home country has become the responsibility of the asylum 
applicant. Secondly, Rutte I managed to make family reunification contingent on being 
married or having a registered partnership. These two measures cannot be found explicitly 
in any of the election programmes of the CDA, VVD or PVV, or in the Roadmap of 
Minister Leers. However, the SGP’s manifesto – the other ring-wing Eurosceptic niche 
party in the Dutch parliament – explicitly states conditioning family reunification on 
being married or having a registered partnership. Their precise wording is: “As long as 
registered partnerships are a recognised relational form, family reunification should only 
be made possible in the case of a marriage of a registered partnership” (SGP, 2010). It 
appears that this party was able to use its position as ‘silent supporter’ in order to shape 
the immigration policy of Rutte I. 
 The Orthodox Christian SGP began to play a role in the Rutte I cabinet when the 
coalition parties lost their majority in the Eerste Kamer (the Senate) in March 2011. While 
the SGP was not officially a parliamentary supporter of the coalition, there was a kind of 
“gentlemen’s agreement” between the SGP and the cabinet (De Jong, 2012: 15). In order 
to get legislation passed, the SGP would often support the cabinet. Party leader Van der 
Staaij formulated in his own words the difference in perception between any changes in 
the working method of the SGP and the strategic position in the 2010-2012 period:  
“We have not changed. We do what we always did: we position 
ourselves in a constructive yet critical way against the government. 
However, the context has changed. Since we [the SGP] are regularly 
required for a majority [in parliament], people start looking at us 
differently and suddenly frame our behaviour differently. Just like 
with our attitude towards the Islam. That [attitude] was always 
critical. But since the ascent of the PVV, this attitude means we are 
getting cosy with Wilders. Nonsense, we are doing what we always 
did32” (Ibid.: 113-114). 
 
32
 In de Jong (2012: 113-114): “Wij zijn niet veranderd. Wij doen gewoon wat we altijd deden: ons 
constructief-kritisch opstellen tegenover de regering. Alleen: de context is veranderd. Doordat wij 
regelmatig nodig zijn voor een meerderheid, gaan de mensen anders naar ons kijken en duiden ze ons gedrag 
plotseling anders. Het is net als bij onze houding tegenover de islam. Die is altijd kritisch geweest. Maar 
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Kees Van der Staaij, party leader of the SGP since 2010, wrote an article in the 
magazine of the research institute of the VVD in 2010 and stated that the SGP and VVD 
have a similar party position on issues like safety and immigration (Van der Staaij in De 
Jong, 2012). Given the special bargaining position of the conservative SGP, it appears 
that it could use its unique position to push through some policy preferences, like 
conditioning family migration on marriage or a registered partnership. This measure was 
however reversed in less than a year after the fall of Rutte I, when Mark Rutte formed a 
coalition of the VVD with the Labour Party (PvdA).  
Unlike during the coalition formation phase and the drafting of the coalition 
agreement, the PVV was not able to push through policies that were in its party 
programme during the government of Rutte I. However, that requires one to look further 
to explain why the influence of the PVV during the governance phase is nevertheless 
convincing. The position of the PVV regarding immigration is extreme compared to the 
other parties in the Dutch parliament. Therefore, even if none of the policy preferences 
of the PVV made it into legislative bills, the closer actual policy output comes to what 
the PVV proposes, the more plausible the influence of that party is in shaping government 
policy. 
Beyond substantive matters, the influence of the PVV was also noticeable in the 
political arena. The VVD and CDA were in constant communication with Wilders to 
make sure he will not give up his support of the government (Hoedeman and Meijer, 
2014b). According to Minister of Immigration and Asylum Gerd Leers, the government’s 
task to push through legislation backfired on the European level, because the “intentions 
of the Netherlands were immediately considered to be suspicious due to the sharp tone of 
Wilders” (Van Gorp and Van der Laan, 2012). According to the minister, one of the main 
reasons for policy failures was the highly polarised political climate in the Netherlands, 
and the importance that was attached to the framing of policies as opposed to their content 
(Ibid.). 
 An illustrative case of how Minister Leers was put under pressure to modify the 
government’s position on immigration to appease the PVV took place in October 2011. 
In a publication of the scientific magazine of his party CDA, the minister called migration 
an enrichment for society. This statement was immediately condemned by Geert Wilders, 
 
sinds de opkomst van de PVV heet het dat we tegen Wilders aanschurken. Onzin, wij doen wat we altijd 
deden” (emphasis in original). 
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who called the minister’s arguments “a bit stupid” and said he would judge the minister 
on the numbers (Van Keken, 2011a). Prime Minister Rutte called on Leers to mend ties 
with Wilders, and shortly after that Leers declared that his policy aims to “very 
substantially” decrease the number of migrants (Van Keken, 2011b). The role of the PVV, 
without ministerial responsibilities, was favourable in that it did not have to deal with 
tensions that come from being a coalition partner and having to satisfy voters and the 
“party on the ground” (Akkerman and De Lange, 2012: 595). 
 All in all, the formation and coalition weight of the PVV is relatively low in 
‘absolute’ terms, though the indirect influence of the party on the government policy was 
significant. Secondly, also the SGP was able to benefit on immigration from its role as 
‘silent supporter’ of Rutte I. Despite the difficulties of measurement, the below 
hypotheses are partially supported. Formation and coalition weight indeed serve as 
measurements of party influence on policy. However, from the Dutch case study, it 
becomes clear that the indirect influence of Eurosceptic parties, especially in the 
uncommon parliamentary supporter arrangement, is very significant.  
 
Hypothesis B1: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the formation weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition 
bargaining process. 
Hypothesis B2: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the coalition weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition 
bargaining process. 
6.3.4. Parliamentary oversight 
The third and final approach that is used to review the influence of the Eurosceptic PVV 
and SGP on the EU-related dimensions of migration policy in the Netherlands in the 
period 2010-2012 is through the literature of parliamentary oversight, specifically the 
application of the principal-agent theory on parliamentary scrutiny. Generally speaking, 
Högenauer (2015) found that the influence of the Dutch Parliament on EU policies 
strengthened during the Rutte I government. During this period the Eurosceptic PVV 
played a formative role as parliamentary supporter and sometimes opposed the coalition 
partners on EU issues – a policy area where the PVV and the coalition partners “agreed 
to disagree” (Tweede Kamer, 26 May 2011). Overall, the Dutch parliament is known to 
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be a policy shaper, actively seeking to control and shape the Dutch government’s position 
in the Council of Ministers. Ex-ante there are regular meetings with the ministers before 
the Council of the EU sessions, whereas ex-post “the government reports back, mostly in 
written form, on the outcome of the negotiations. On contested policies, resolutions are 
used to formalize the position of the Tweede Kamer” (Högenauer, 2015: 267). 
From a different point of view, Steunenberg (2014: 6) argues that, when it comes 
to parliamentary influence over the EU decision-making process, the Dutch parliament 
can mostly be seen as fulfilling the functions of lobbyist and networker. Over the years, 
and with the introduction of the subsidiarity principle, the Tweede Kamer has begun to 
take a more active part in the policy preparation process. In the period 2010-2013, the 
Dutch Parliament filed 20 subsidiarity complaints (10 were filed by the Tweede Kamer, 
five by the Eerste Kamer and another five jointly by the two Chambers)33. One of these 
subsidiarity complaints referred to migration, namely the Seasonal Workers Directive, 
sent to the European Commission on the day the Rutte I government took office.  
Elsewhere, Smeets and De Ruiter (2018) found that Eurosceptic parties in the 
Netherlands did not depoliticise EU issues in parliament. Eurosceptic parties were active 
in scrutiny activities during the debates about the Banking Union, but generally lacked 
the relevant information and expertise about the Dutch government’s negotiations on the 
EU level. This observation is contrary to what Auel and Raunio (2014) found, namely 
that Eurosceptic parties try to depoliticise EU matters in parliament by not asking 
parliamentary questions.  
When looking at the activities of the Tweede Kamer during Rutte I, table 14 shows 
the parliamentary questions that were posed per member of parliament (party), thereby 
distinguishing between the total amount of questions asked and those focusing on 
migration policy. The average number of questions asked by the government parties CDA 
and VVD is relatively low, as expected. Also, the PVV’s number of questions are lower 
than the average of the other opposition parties. Of the questions that the PVV asked the 
 
33
 Steunenberg notes that the Senate and the House tend to use very different arguments for their subsidiary 
complaints to the European Commission, The complaints are often used as ways to shape national elections, 
thereby making cross-national parliamentary cooperation more difficult than one would initially expect, 
since the domestic political context is the driving reason behind submitting complaints regarding subsidiary 
(2014: 9). Increased cooperation between national parliaments would be necessary for a more effective 
control of the EU’s legislative process. There has been increased orientation of the Dutch parliament on the 
preparatory phase of the EU legislative process, and a relative underemphasis on transposition and the 
executive process, despite the fact that the role of parliament on the national dimensions of transposition 
could be the most fruitful when it comes to parliamentary control of EU decision making (Steunenberg 
2014: 16).  
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government that related to migration, most referred to negative news concerning 
immigrants and crime. The party exploited news coverage on issues related to problems 
with immigrants in the Netherlands, like the question 27 October 2010 relating to violence 
against homosexual asylum seekers or of 12 January 2012 related to street crime in 
Utrecht and how expulsion of these “immigrants” would solve the problems of street 
crime in the city. By deliberately framing questions related to the news items, the party 
tried to shape the government reaction on these political developments. 
Furthermore, the number of questions per MP of the SGP on migration and asylum 
was higher than for other parties. One explanation could be there are only two SGP MPs 
in the Tweede Kamer. Their inquiries mostly related to the plight of persecuted Christians, 
which comes as no surprise given the devout character of the party. All in all, the PVV 
Table 14: Parliamentary questions Tweede Kamer (19.10.2010 – 20.04.2012) 
Party 
Written questions per 
MP (party), total 
Oral questions per MP 
(party), total 
Written questions per 
MP (party), migration  
Number of oral 
questions, 
migration  
50+ 6.76 (1) 0 (0) 0 0 
CDA 14.51 (296) 1.15 (23)  0.52 (11) 0 
ChristenUnie 35.59 (178) 2.39 (12) 6.8 (34) 2 
D66 26.6 (270) 2.39 (15) 4.2 (42) 0 
GroenLinks 27.53 (264) 2.35 (22) 4.7 (47) 3 
PvdA 24.75 (758) 1.17 (36)  2.97 (89) 5 
PvdD 71.04 (142) 1.91 (4)  2 (4) 0 
PVV 17.14 (400) 0.90 (21) 1.54 (37) 3 
SGP* 37.19 (77) 0.69 (1) 6.5 (13) 1 
SP 40.50 (608) 2.14 (32) 3.8 (57) 2 






Source: Own calculations, and Otjes et al., 2018:63 for the two right columns. Bold = 
coalition party or parliamentary supporter. *SGP became an unofficial parliamentary 




and SGP used these news items as windows of opportunities to place the issues that are 
salient for their parties on the political (and public) agenda (see Kingdon, 2014).  
Beyond parliamentary questions, parties could also make use of motions to try 
and shape government policy. In the case of immigration, none of the motions that were 
suggested received a parliamentary majority. One motion specifically referred to one of 
the policy items discussed in section 6.2. Motion Schouw 32317-62 (was tabled on 29 
June 2011) called for a clarification of the societal problems stemming from the inflow 
of migrants to the Netherlands, what solutions the government would have to tackle these 
problems, and in which European context these societal problems are dealt with (Tweede 
Kamer Motion Schouw 32317-62, 2011). All the opposition parties voted in favour but 
the ruling parties and the parliamentary supporters PVV and SGP voted it down. The 
second motion (Motion Schouw 30573-60) that was directly related to the EU dimensions 
of migration policy and called for the government to actively and exhaustively inform the 
Tweede Kamer about the negotiations in the EU regarding the proposals of the Roadmap 
of minister Leers (Tweede Kamer Motion Schouw 30573-60, 2010). The motion refers 
explicitly to how such transparency is crucial for the Tweede Kamer to be able to perform 
its role as scrutiny body of the government. The motion was rejected after being voted 
down by the VVD, CDA, PVV and SGP. One of the explanations for the PVV voting 
down this motion is that it preferred to maintain the information asymmetry between the 
government and the parliament, since it had access to the government’s information.  
Pressure from the PVV on the government also occurred during plenary debates. 
One such instance took place during a debate in April 2011 where the PVV raised 
concerns over the short period within which partners or family members of Turkish 
migrants can get a residency permit. Based on the Association Agreement with Turkey, 
this period was set to three years, but given the standstill provisions, a period of one year 
had to be maintained by the Netherlands. The PVV was pledging for five years, as 
expressed in the minority agreement. In reaction, Minister of Immigration and Asylum 
Leers stated that he would work to “prevent a wider interpretation of the Turkish 
association rights by actively interfering with Court cases”. At the same time, while he 
admitted “it is not going to be easy” and “that it is not sure we will manage,” he will not 
just stand by idly (Tweede Kamer, 26 April 2011). Leers thus felt the pressure of the PVV 
to push for stricter rules on residency permits, despite the knowledge that this proposal 




After the review of the parliamentary activities about the immigration policy under Rutte 
I, figure 10 shows how the PVV can influence the actions of the government (the agent). 
In step 4 of the causal mechanism, the four scrutiny types are shown, going from the 
lowest level of scrutiny (express support/disagreement) to the highest level of scrutiny 
(providing instructions), which represent gradually more influence from the principal on 
the agent. As table 6 showed, these types of scrutiny also come with increased costs for 
the principal, i.e. increased scrutiny comes at the price of an increased amount of 
resources (time) allocated to the scrutinising task. While providing instructions to the 
agent is the most far-reaching level of scrutiny by the principal, the demands on the 
principal are the highest as well.  
 When trying to influence the migration policy of the VVD-CDA cabinet, the PVV 
resorted to multiple types of scrutiny. The PVV posed 37 written questions on migration 
policy during Rutte I, where in most cases the PVV explicitly expressed support or 
disagreement of the position of the government. Furthermore, the PVV also provided the 
government with instructions through the parliamentary setting. As above example, 
which relates to forcing Turkish migrants to apply for a residency permit in the framework 
of the Family Reunification Directive, is a striking instance of how the PVV publicly 
pressured the government to negotiate a stricter eligibility regulation for immigrants.  
 
Figure 10: Causal mechanism parliamentary oversight during the Rutte I cabinet 
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 As parliamentary supporter of the government, the PVV enjoyed the privilege of 
access to much more information than the other opposition parties in parliament, for 
instance by being present at the weekly ministerial meetings. The PVV appeared to have 
used that privilege to its advantage, to which the voting down of the motion calling for 
an increased transparency on migration policy attests (Motion Schouw 30573-60). Lastly, 
the PVV and SGP were agenda setters by posing parliamentary questions that related to 
issues salient for them. 
 The hypotheses listed below indicate the ways in which the PVV sought to 
influence the Dutch government in terms of migration policy. The written questions (P1) 
of the PVV were meant to provoke a reaction from the government, but mostly served as 
a means to put issues important for the PVV on the political agenda, i.e. high crime rates 
of Muslims and the radicalisation of Islam in the Netherlands. Secondly, the PVV openly 
provoked the government by expressing policy alternatives to the standpoint of the 
government. Lastly, as mentioned above, one of the moments when the PVV influenced 
the government expressly in parliament was when it publicly pressured the government 
to negotiate a stricter eligibility regulation for immigrants. However, especially the latter, 
and most extensive, influencing measure by parliament was at the PVV’s disposal mostly 
because it was the parliamentary supporter of the government and therefore played a 
formative role in the survival of the government. 
 
Hypothesis P1: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party asks parliamentary questions 
as a way to modestly shape policy. 
Hypothesis P2: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party takes up an alternative position 
as a way to moderately shape policy. 
Hypothesis P3: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party provides the government party 
with instructions as a way to significantly shape policy. 
 
 All in all, within the realm of parliamentary scrutiny, the PVV’s influence was 
pronounced. However, its unique role as parliamentary supporter gave it the additional 
information it needed to shape government policy, which is usually not at the disposal of 
opposition parties in parliament. In short, the PVV did not suffer from the problem of 
information asymmetry, which the principal-agent theory identifies as one of the central 
delegation problems.  
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6.4. Closing remarks  
This chapter first described and then analysed how the Eurosceptic niche parties PVV and 
SGP influenced the migration policy of the VVD-CDA government (2010-2012). The 
three causal mechanisms that were employed to explain the influence of these parties on 
the government’s EU policies delivered mixed results. Firstly, the expectations of the 
POS theory did not materialise in the case of the Dublin Regulation, and the Qualification 
and Family Reunification Directives. It appears that the accommodative strategies of the 
VVD and CDA – as the mainstream government parties under consideration – were not 
successful or did not sufficiently explain the effects of the PVV on the government’s 
migration policy. While the POS theory expected an increase in the issue salience of 
migration and a transfer of issue ownership from the PVV to the mainstream parties, 
neither of these expectations materialised. On the other hand, the policies of the VVD and 
CDA did converge towards the PVV’s position on migration, and the PVV did suffer 
from electoral losses following the collapse of the coalition in 2012, as expected by 
Meguid’s POS theory. A more likely expectation of the electoral loss of the PVV in 2012 
is instead the political boycott by most parliamentary parties on the PVV than an 
accommodative strategy by the VVD and CDA.  
 As for the expectations of coalition bargaining, the PVV appears to have weighed 
in heavily during the formation negotiations. About one-sixth of the coalition agreement 
is dedicated to immigration policy, while close to half of the agreement between the PVV 
as parliamentary supporter and the government is dedicated to immigration. Furthermore, 
while there is little evidence of direct influence of the PVV as measured through the 
concepts of formation and coalition weight, its indirect influence is palpable, in that the 
coalition agreement refers to 7 (of 16) restrictive policy items related to Family 
Reunification that are not in the party programmes of either the VVD or the CDA (see 
table 13).  
 Lastly, the unique role that the PVV played as parliamentary supporter without 
ministerial responsibilities, and that the SGP played as ‘silent supporter’ of the 
government in the Senate, allowed these parties to put much pressure on the VVD and 
CDA, who were reliant on both the PVV and SGP for a majority in parliament. Especially 
the PVV did not face the information asymmetry that opposition parties typically face. 
 As outlined in chapter 4, the conditions for Eurosceptic parties to successfully 
influence government policy were most favourable in this case study. Important 
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conditions for the success policy influence of the Eurosceptic policy in the case of the 
Rutte I government (2010-2012): 
1. A hard Eurosceptic party as parliamentary supporter of the government, meaning 
with a prominent political position and in close contact with the government 
parties but without ministerial responsibilities and accountability. 
2. The most salient policy issue for this Eurosceptic party, immigration policy, was 
also a relatively salient issue among the public, making it a policy area to invest 
in. Immigration policy is an omnibus issue for the European far-right which has a 
strong European dimension to it, and it often coupled with European integration 
(see Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Fennema, 1997).  
3. The two government parties had a central-right agenda with a more-than-average 
restrictive immigration policy. Therefore, the mainstream parties were susceptible 
to the even more restrictive immigration policy of the far-right niche party. 
4. Immigration flows showed a steady upward trend in the Netherlands, which 
directly benefitted the electoral support of the PVV (Dennison et al., 2017). 
Therefore, the PVV’s participation in the Rutte I cabinet also allowed parties like 
the VVD and CDA to experiment with stricter immigration policies, that would 
have been considered controversial otherwise.  
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7. Party Euroscepticism in Hungary 
Hungary became a member of the European Union in 2004, 25 years after the fall of 
communism. From the 1990s, one of the leading foreign policy priorities of the first 
democratically elected government in Hungary (MDF-FKgP-KDNP) was the 
“reunification” of Hungary with the rest of Europe. Before accession to the EU, 
Hungarians were given a chance to vote in a referendum, whether they want Hungary to 
accede to the EU or not. Eventually, 83% of the voters supported the accession, though 
the voter turnout of the referendum was only 43% (Fowler, 2003).34  
 The first hard-Eurosceptic party to appear in Hungary was the Hungarian Justice 
and Life Party (MIÉP), which entered parliament in 1998. For MIÉP, the EU is a “symbol 
of liberalism”, and it compared EU membership to a “Second Trianon Treaty” 
(Neumayer, 2008 and Csurka in Neumayer, 2008). The reference to a Second Trianon 
Treaty is weighty since the Trianon Treaty of 1920 is to this considered a national tragedy 
for many, where Hungary lost 70% of its territory (Várdy, 1997). For MIÉP Hungary’s 
membership of the EU would undermine its national interests and threaten the plight of 
the Hungarians living in Slovakia and Romania (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Batory, 
2002). While the party did not manage to re-enter parliament after 1998, its ideological 
rhetoric did not disappear from the party competition in Hungary and was later used by 
both Jobbik and Fidesz. Before the Euroscepticism of Jobbik and Fidesz is discussed 
below, first a brief overview of the other non-Eurosceptic actors in the Hungarian 
parliament. 
The EU was already part of the party competition during the 1990s, when Fidesz 
was competing with the SZDSZ for becoming the leading liberal party in the Hungarian 
political system. SZDSZ pursued a pro-integration policy from the beginning and accused 
Fidesz of being Eurosceptic (Neumayer, 2008: 148). Membership to the EU was one of 
its main political goals (Enyedi, 2007b).  
 As the historically most significant electoral contender of Fidesz, MSZP followed 
a pro-European course and was a firm supporter of a speedy accession of Hungary to the 
EU. It was the party in government when Hungary joined the EU in 2004. The MSZP 
adopted an even more favourable view of the EU between 2007 and 2014 (Göncz and 
 
34 The main reasons for not voting in the referendum were: (1) the result was inevitable (57%), (2) people 
were too busy to vote (57%), (3) while accession is good, it is not enough to vote for (51%) (Szonda Ipsos 
poll in Fowler, 2003).  
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Lengyel, 2016: 111), perhaps in reaction to the shift of the Fidesz towards a more 
Eurosceptic position over that same period. The MSZP’s 2006 party programme was clear 
on how it viewed the role of the EU for Hungary: “The European Union is a decisive 
framework for the successful reunification and security of the Hungarians and the nation” 
(MSZP, 2006: 37). Similar sentiments were reiterated in their 2018 party programme, 
when the party conditioned peace in Europe to EU membership. MSZP sees the EU as 
the guarantor of the rule of law in Hungary:  
“Hungary will only be able to secure its national interests by 
converging towards the EU’s core countries, take part in further 
integration, and strengthen the public’s support for the EU. With the 
help of our EU membership, we can improve the situation of the 
Hungarians living outside of the Hungarian borders” (MSZP, 
2018)35. 
Several parties have entered the political scene in Hungary since 2010, the year 
Fidesz won the general elections and ended up with a 2/3 majority in parliament. Until 
the last general elections in 2018, its rule has remained unchallenged. However, this has 
not deterred new parties from challenging Fidesz’s rule. One of the most prominent 
parties trying to do so is Democratic Coalition (DK), founded by former MSZP Prime 
Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in 2011. DK is an explicitly Europhile party. In its 2018 
election programme, for instance, it declared that their long-term vision is a United States 
of Europe, with a common European constitution, government, a bicameral parliament, 
and a common foreign, defence, social, economic, fiscal and tax policy (DK, 2017). In 
the introduction of the 2013 programme, the Europhile character was evident as well: 
“We want to live in European Hungary. That is what we are fighting for. We know that 
the only way to get out of Orbán’s Hungary is via Europe.” (DK, 2013:3)  
Párbeszéd36 is also a pro-European party, and the most prominent of its members 
is Mayor of Budapest Gergely Karácsony (since October 2019). The party was founded 
in 2014 by 8 MPs of the LMP (see below). In their “Europe Manifesto” in 2014, they 
criticise the government for its position on the EU: “Instead of a strong European state, 
 
35 Translation from Hungarian by the author. 
36
 In 2014, PárbeszédMagyarországért ran together with Együtt, and formed alliance Együtt-PM. 
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the government started to build a half-Asian dictatorship” (Párbeszéd, 2014). They seek 
a democratic and green Europe where Hungary protects its European rights.  
The newly established Momentum started as a movement in 2017 against 
Hungary’s bid to host the Olympics. It did not win any seats during the 2018 general 
elections, just one year later secured 10% of the votes during the 2019 European 
Parliament elections. Their EP election program started with the statement that Hungary 
has been part of Europe since Saint Stephen37. Momentum has a populist communication 
style and uses the European Parliament as a platform to funnel its discontent towards the 
ruling party and the need for European integration to tackle the democratic backsliding 
of Hungary (Hargitai, 2019).  
Lastly, a party with a less apparent pro-European position is the LMP (Politics 
Can Be Different). According to the LMP, Hungary’s place is inside the EU, but the party 
is critical of the current functioning of the EU. They argue that the EU has a democratic 
deficit, transparency problems, and that it should not be “to increase the central 
bureaucracy, but to ensure the transparent functioning of EU institutions and bodies, and 
strengthen participatory democracy and subsidiarity” (LMP, 2018). Nevertheless, LMP 
is in favour of more cross-border cooperation, a European minimum wage, the CFSP, 
cooperation to deal with migration and cooperation on environmental and energy policy 
and overcoming social differences. The party programme of 2018 also highlighted that 
the party would intend to use the EU as a platform for promoting the Hungarian national 
interest, favouring intergovernmentalism as the way to achieve those national interests 
(Göncz and Lengyel, 2016). Interestingly, the party voted against the Sargentini Report38 
in 2018 on the grounds that issues related to the rule of law should be dealt with 
domestically (Halász-Szabó, 2018). 
After this brief review of the state of the political debate concerning the EU in 
Hungary, the remainder of this chapter looks at party-based Euroscepticism in the 
Hungary and will give more detailed explanations of the attitudes of Eurosceptic parties. 
However, the policy-level Euroscepticism offers a more systemic review of the positions 
of parties on European integration in Hungary. 
 
37
 The first King of Hungary in the year 1000.  
38
  Its official title is the “Report on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) 
of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values 
on which the Union is founded”. The report evaluates the state of the rule of law in Hungary and concludes 




Fidesz (The Hungarian Civic Alliance) was established shortly before the fall of 
communism in 1988, and its current political leader, Viktor Orbán, has been its political 
face for much of that time. Fidesz long held an ambiguous position towards the EU, 
though it flirted with Euroscepticism in the 1990s, when Viktor Orbán argued during the 
1998 general election campaign that “there is life outside of the Union” (Bátory, 2008: 
271). There is a lack of consensus regarding the Euroscepticism of government party 
Fidesz.40 Bátory (2008) classified Fidesz in 2002 as soft Eurosceptic, for it adopted a 
“‘yes, but’ stance … that characterized Fidesz politicians’ statements in the run-up to the 
referendum on EU membership” and positioned Fidesz “between the pronouncedly pro-
EU governing parties and the Justice Party’s41 rejection of European integration” (Idem.: 
272).  
 In the 2006 election programme of Fidesz, the party focused explicitly on 
economic convergence with Western Europe and emphasised the need to strengthen 
security and “the need to strengthen the representation of the interests of the Hungarians 
in all areas” (38). Furthermore, Fidesz emphasised that the “Hungarian people have made 
great sacrifices to become an EU member”, and so it is the government’s task to ensure 
they experience the benefits of membership (37). The party also called for introducing 
the Euro, a position it since then has distanced itself from. There is however no 
unambiguous Eurosceptic position the party took in 2006. Bátory nevertheless observes 
that Fidesz adopted a political strategy where it “made its support for EU-related 
constitutional amendments conditional upon the government’s acceptance of part of its 
own economic programme, which they saw as essential for Hungary’s preparation for 
accession” (2008: 271). This moderate position was also observed by Bíró Nagy et al. 
(2012), which compared the party positions of four parties – Fidesz, MSZP, Jobbik and 
LMP – in Hungary during the period 2010-2012. They observe that there were significant 
differences between the rhetoric these parties used in the media and the language used in 
 
39 This section is in part based on Hargitai, T. (2020) How Eurosceptic is Fidesz actually? Politics in Central 
Europe, 16(1):189-209. 
40
 Fidesz-KDNP is considered to be one party, since the KDNP is in a permanent alliance with Fidesz since 
2006, and KDNP did not make it into parliament the last time they ran on their own, receiving 3.9% of the 




the more technical party manifestos. In the case of Fidesz, the party tends to formulate its 
written statements and positions carefully. 
According to Enyedi (2006, in Várnagy, 2013), Fidesz uses a populist rhetoric 
towards the EU, while the party maintained a relatively pro-European Euromanifesto in 
2004. Várnagy (2013) similarly finds that Fidesz was moderate in its criticism concerning 
the EU during the 2009 EP elections and directed its criticism mostly towards the national 
government, likely in anticipation of an electoral victory in 2010 (187). Similarly, Duró 
(2016) does not consider Fidesz to be Eurosceptic, because it continues to have a “clear 
pro-European policy in practice, i.e.it has always supported the deepening of the 
European integration” (44). He goes on to say that the confrontational rhetoric of Fidesz 
is a consequence of the sizeable share of Eurosceptic voters in Hungary. Lastly, Treib 
(2014) does not add Fidesz to the list of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament 
after the 2014 EP elections. However, in his analysis of Euroscepticism in the 2019 EP 
elections, Treib (2020) categorised Fidesz as a Eurosceptic party belonging to the radical-
right of Europe.  
Looking at Fidesz in office since 2010, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2013) highlight 
that Fidesz continued to be a soft Eurosceptic party, and that its overwhelming electoral 
victory in 2010 made Fidesz immune to criticism on EU policy, although Jobbik was 
considered a competitor on (EU) policy. There has been a marked convergence of policy 
positions between far-right Jobbik and Fidesz, with Jobbik moderating its position on the 
EU since 2014 while Fidesz radicalised its position (Enyedi and Róna, 2018).  
All in all, there is an ambiguity regarding the Euroscepticism of Fidesz. In the 
absence of party manifestos of Fidesz(-KDNP) for the 2014 and 2018 general elections, 
some other sources can provide insights into its position on European integration.  
First, survey data by Göncz and Lengyel (2016) show that Fidesz has become 
more focused on intergovernmentalism between 2007 and 2014. However, already in 
2007, Fidesz was much more inclined towards intergovernmentalism than the average in 
the Hungarian parliament (Ibid.). Furthermore, economic competitiveness is 
progressively considered to be the principal aim of the EU, as compared to the social 
dimension (Ibid.: 114). Despite these changes, the attachment to Europe has remained 
virtually unchanged (116).  
In the beginning of 2019, and in the wake of the European Parliament elections of 
2019, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán highlighted that Fidesz had two goals related to the 
EU. On the one hand, the aim was to make “anti-immigration forces” the biggest in the 
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European Parliament, and through their election in the EP also the biggest in the European 
Commission and then the Council. Furthermore, Fidesz should be the “most successful 
party in Europe; but at all events we want to be the most successful within the European 
People’s Party” (Orbán, 2019, sic). In this statement, Fidesz’s criticism is not directed 
towards the form but the content of the actors of the EU institutions.  
The underlying logic of the Hungarian government’s attitude towards the EU 
becomes more apparent when looking at the national consultation entitled “Let’s Stop 
Brussels” of April 2017. In its English-language explanation, the government motivated 
the need for this national consultation as follows: “The title of the consultation perfectly 
expresses the position we represent: Let’s stop Brussels! Let’s stop the appropriation of 
national powers by Brussels! Let’s stop Brussels’ policy of continually seeking to exceed 
the powers given to it in the Treaties! And let’s stop efforts which – through the promotion 
of migration – seek to change the ethnic composition and cultural foundations of the 
European Union, and Hungary within it!” (Government of Hungary, 2017). Essential here 
is the transfer of competences to the EU, which Fidesz opposes in this case. Specific 
policy areas where the government wishes to prevent or revert competences back to the 
member state are migration policy, employment policy and fiscal policy; plus, the 
government is against the Energy Union.  
However, the document goes on to argue that the Hungarian government is pro-
European, even though the European Commission is accusing it of being anti-European. 
“Hungary is on the side of Europe, it works for a strong Europe, and wishes to reform the 
policies pursued in Brussels so that Europe can remain the best place in the world” (Ibid.). 
The party promotes close cooperation within the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
framework to promote security on the continent.  
 Based on these examples, one can see that Fidesz, as the government party, is in 
favour of a halt to the integration project on several issues. Expert survey data shows that 
the Hungarian government, of all the member states in the EU, is most in favour of a 
purely domestic approach to issues; particularly in the fields of immigration policy, 
energy policy, fiscal policy, social policy, justice and home affairs, and policies towards 
China, the US and Russia (ECFR, 2018).  
In terms of the motivation for being Eurosceptic, Fidesz invokes a rhetoric that 
can be associated with Leconte’s political Euroscepticism (2010), which considers 
European integration a threat to national sovereignty and identity. Furthermore, Fidesz’s 
Euroscepticism is profoundly value-based and cultural, since the party defies the 
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principles of liberal democracy both in word and in deed and claims that Hungary is 
defending Europe’s Christian roots while other governments are working against those 
cultural traditions by allowing refugees into the EU. However, the fourth dimension, 
utilitarian Euroscepticism is absent in Fidesz’s policy towards the EU.  
 All in all, Fidesz, as the only government party in Hungary, challenges the way 
that the majority of parties in the EU member states approach the EU, and its nativist-
conservative ideology is at odds with the values of the EU. The country’s democratic 
backsliding is thus a form of inverted soft Euroscepticism (Hargitai, 2020). When 
applying Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 2002 definition of soft Euroscepticism, which 
includes the ‘current EU trajectory being at odds with the national interest’, Fidesz’s 
overall attitude towards the EU is somewhat at odds with the interests of the majority of 
the member states, which makes for a kind of inverted soft Euroscepticism. That similarly 
holds for the democratic developments in Hungary, to which the overwhelming vote in 
favour of the Sargentini Report would attest42. 
7.2. Jobbik  
Jobbik has been described as a far-right and anti-European party. It historically had a 
xenophobic agenda that led the French far-right party Front National, and Geert Wilders 
of the Dutch PVV go so far as to state that they would never work together with Jobbik 
(Hebel and Schmitz, 2013). Jobbik first entered Hungary’s parliament in 2010 and 
became the second-largest party in the 2018 elections (with 19.06% of the votes, 13.06% 
of seats). In the words of Styczyńska (2018): “Jobbik is anti-European and subscribes to 
an identity- and economy-based Euroscepticism, rejecting the very idea of European 
integration and the European project” (146). Treib (2014) also categorised Jobbik as a 
hard-Eurosceptic party, according to the categorisation of Taggart and Szczerbiak, when 
looking at the 2014 EP elections. When Jobbik first entered parliament, its party 
programme was very critical of the functioning of the EU and emphasised how Hungary’s 
EU membership had detrimental effects on Hungary and Hungarians (Jobbik, 2010).  
 
42 In September 2018, the majority of the European Parliament voted in favour of the Sargentini Report – 
the report evaluates the state of the rule of law in Hungary and concludes that punitive actions are to be 
initiated against Hungary. The Hungarian Government offered a 109-paged rebuttal, where it offers their 
position on the different issues of the report. The report is a European document that focuses on the 
democratic developments in a member state. However, the motivation for the European Parliament to draft 
a report on the developments concerning the rule of law in Hungary was ‘the existence of a clear risk of a 
serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded’ (Sargentini 2018). 
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 The critical position of Jobbik in terms of the EU was expressed symbolically as 
well; in particular on two occasions. In 2010 the party burned an EU flag publicly, and in 
2014, on the eve of the EP elections, a Jobbik MP and a former member of Jobbik threw 
the EU flag out of the windows of their office in Parliament (Nyyssönen, 2019: 117-118). 
These acts of discontent left little to the imagination what the party feels of the EU. 
 However, Jobbik moderated its position on the EU, and in 2014 its party leader 
Vona stated that Jobbik would no longer burn the EU flag or push for a Hungarian exit 
from the EU (Enyedi and Róna, 2018: 264). After the 2014 general elections and EP 
elections, the party has been trying to rebrand itself and has been changing its strategy 
towards European integration. The outright rejection of the EU was replaced with a 
strategy that used the EU as a means to diminish Fidesz’s hold on the domestic arena.  
 Jobbik’s new approach towards the EU is nicely captured in its English-language 
election pamphlet for the EP elections of 2019. The party even recognised the need for a 
common response to immigration. “Jobbik believes that the concept of Hungary and some 
other states protecting the EU’s border on their own is unsustainable - ensuring border 
integrity and setting up a deployable Hungarian border guard force requires contributions 
from all EU member states, while the countries that are unable or unwilling to protect 
their external borders must be helped through Frontex” (Jobbik, 2019). Beyond that, 
Jobbik is suggesting a Wage Union to tackle income inequality between Western and 
Eastern Europe, favours increased accountability of the spending of EU funding, 
Hungary’s voluntary joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, and a common 
environmental policy.  
 In conclusion, Jobbik has developed from a hard Eurosceptic party into a 
Europragmatic party that emphasises the benefits of membership to compete on the 
national arena, particularly against Fidesz. 
7.3. Conclusion 
Before Hungary acceded to the EU, MIÉP was the force behind party-based 
Euroscepticism in the Hungarian parliament. Until 2010, most parties in parliament were 
pro-European, though Fidesz had a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the EU, for 
instance, by emphasising that there is also life outside of the EU. After elected into office, 
the Fidesz government became more critical towards the European Union. Fidesz 
gradually diverged from an approach to the European Union (see ECFR, 2018) and 
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increasingly estranged itself from the fundamental values of the European Union, as 
enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (Kelemen, 2020)43, making it a soft 
Eurosceptic party. At the same time, Jobbik has been moderating its criticism of the EU 
and by 2019, based on their programme for the European Parliament elections, may be 
considered a Europragmatic party. 
 Chapter 8 will discuss the influence that Jobbik had on the EU-related dimensions 
of the migration policy of the Fidesz government. 
  
 
43 Mos (2020) argues that the ambiguity and unenforceability of the fundamental values of the EU, “Any 
assessment of norm (non-)compliance requires a degree of norm clarity as well as the presence of an arbiter 
with the authority to determine whether prescribed and actual behaviour correspond” (14).  
 
122 
8. Case study: Hungary migration policy 2014-
2020 
This chapter will follow the same structure as chapter 6 on the influence of Eurosceptic 
parties on the EU-related dimensions of immigration policy in the Netherlands. Firstly, 
the policy items (the migrant quota system and the Stop Soros Act of 2018) are described 
in detail. Secondly, the degree of policy change is measured. Thirdly, the causal 
mechanisms from the literatures of the contagion effect, coalition bargaining, and 
parliamentary oversight applied to the Hungarian case study. Lastly, section 8.4 
summarises the results of the case study. However, we first need to shortly introduce the 
political context in which the quota system and the Stop Soros Act took place. Therefore, 
the international dimensions of Hungary’s migration policy under the Orbán II, III and 
IV administrations are outlined here.  
 The previous chapter outlined the attitude of government party Fidesz towards the 
EU. While migration policy is mentioned, it might not have been immediately evident 
that migration policy became the most salient issue in Hungarian politics from the 
beginning of 2015. According to Nyyssönen, Fidesz’s migration policy has been defining 
the EU policy of the government from then on (2019). The trigger for Fidesz to start a 
permanent campaign against migration into Hungary came with the terror attack on the 
offices of French magazine Charlie Hebdo on 7 January 2015 (Bíró-Nagy, 2018). In 
connection to the attacks, Prime Minister Orbán stated that under his rule, and that of 
Fidesz, “Hungary will not become a destination for immigrants” (Index.hu, 2015).  
 A contributing factor for Fidesz to politicise migration was a steep drop in public 
support for the party in 2014, following corruption scandals, and the very unpopular 
proposal for an internet tax that mobilised many Hungarians to demonstrate against an 
internet tax (Bíró-Nagy, 2018). European Social Survey data shows that the Hungarian 
government permanent campaign against immigration has borne fruits, for the public’s 
perception towards immigration changed profoundly in Hungary since 2015. In 2016 
45.6% of the Hungarians claimed that they would not accept any immigrant from a 
different ethnic group to the majority population, followed by the Czech Republic with 
36.4% and Israel at 31.2% (Simonovits and Szeitl, 2019: 302)44.  
 
44 The average of the 20 mostly European countries was 10.5% in 2016.  
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In terms of border protection, Hungary’s 2019 strategy on border protection 
captures the general policy of the government: “Hungary will continue to have the safest 
external borders for the internal security of our country and the EU Member States, as 
well as for the sustainability of free movement within the Schengen area. A high level of 
performance is assured by reliable, well-trained professional staff, specialized border 
management organizations, extensive coordination and cooperation, and state-of-the-art 
technologies” (Government of Hungary, 2019: 5). 
This chapter will focus on two policy issues in the area of migration. The first 
policy item is the migrant quota system, which has a distinctly European character, since 
it was a Council decision that obliged Hungary to be part of a European resettlement 
schema. Hungary’s Stop Soros Act of 2018 has a more implicit European dimension, 
since the European Commission considers it to be at odds with EU law.  
8.1. Migrant quota system 
“Economic migrants cross our borders illegally, and while they 
present themselves as asylum-seekers, in fact they are coming to enjoy 
our welfare systems and the employment opportunities our countries 
have to offer. In the last few months alone, in Hungary the number of 
economic migrants has increased approximately twentyfold. This 
represents a new type of threat – a threat which we must stop in its 
tracks. ... As Brussels has failed to address immigration 
appropriately, Hungary must follow its own path. We shall not allow 
economic migrants to jeopardise the jobs and livelihoods of 
Hungarians. ... We must make a decision on how Hungary should 
defend itself against illegal immigrants. We must make a decision on 
how to limit rapidly rising economic immigration” (Orbán, 2015a, 
sic). 
The above quote is from April 2015, from the letter accompanying the national 
consultation on immigration, in reaction to that the European Commission proposed in 
February 2015. It directly links the Hungarian government’s approach to the EU through 
its migration policy for the years after 2015. 
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Meanwhile, the European Commission published the European Agenda on 
Migration in May 2015 in response to the steep increase of migrants entering the 
Schengen Area through Greece, Italy and Hungary. As an immediate response, it called 
for increased capacities of Frontex, and the resettlement of asylum seekers throughout 
Europe, in order to decrease the pressure on the countries that faced the consequences of 
the incoming migrants most directly. Following a meeting of the Council of the European 
Union, the proposal was accepted in June 2015. 
Later that year, the European Commission put forward a follow-up package of 
proposals to address the migrant crisis more systematically. These proposals, published 
on 9 September 2015, focused first and foremost on the relocation of 120,000 refugees: 
“following the sharp increase in illegal border crossings in the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean, but also on the Western Balkans route, over the last few months, urgent 
action is needed”. The Commission proposed to relocate 160,000 people “in clear need 
of international protection from Italy (15,600), Greece (50,400) and Hungary (54,000). 
The relocation would be done according to a mandatory distribution key using objective 
and quantifiable criteria (40% of the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the 
average number of past asylum applications, 10% of the unemployment rate)” (European 
Commission, 2015). Furthermore, a Permanent Relocation Mechanism would be put in 
place, whereby member states would take in migrants “to help any EU-Member State 
experiencing a crisis situation and extreme pressure on its asylum system as a result of a 
large and disproportionate inflow of third country nationals” (Ibid.).  
On 22 September 2015, the Council of the EU voted in favour of the 
Commission’s package (Council Decision 2015/1601), but the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovakia rejected the package. Hungary was requested to take in 1,294 refugees 
from Greece and Italy, based on the May 2015 proposal. Furthermore, the 54,000 asylum 
seekers in Hungary would be spread across other member states. However, during the 
Council meeting, Hungary denounced a classification of being a “frontline Member 
State” and benefiting from relocation (ECJ, 2017a, paragraph 10). Therefore, the 54,000 
refugees in Hungary were no longer part of the relocation deal.  
Several weeks later, during a parliamentary debate on 5 October 2015, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó summarised the government’s position. 
Having a debate about the mandatory quota system was detrimental for Hungary, because 
“[i]t could give the impression that the European Union was doing something while it 
was an entirely useless act. We also consider this debate to be detrimental because it 
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clearly created political tensions between the EU Member States and was interpreted as 
an invitation, not only to immigrants but also to those rogue human smugglers which 
further elevated the immigration pressure on the European Union” (Szijjártó, 2015: 
16715). Prime Minister Orbán spoke of the EU’s migration policy as a “left-wing 
conspiracy against Europe”, whereby the daily inflow of thousands of migrants into 
Europe was a deliberate move that requires the Hungarian government to turn to “the 
people” in order to stop it (Orbán, 2015b). Orbán referred to the Hungarian people, as a 
homogenous group, to legitimise any policies needed to block immigration into Hungary. 
An extensive media campaign followed from late 2015 and into 2016, 
condemning the European Commission’s relocation package. One of the government’s 
advertisements stated that: “The compulsory settlement quota increases the danger of 
terror” (Thorpe, 2015) and “Did you know that since the beginning of the migrant crisis, 
more than 300 people have died in Europe of terror attacks?” (BBJ, 2016). Furthermore, 
in November 2015 the government passed legislation in Parliament that made it possible 
for Hungary to sue the Council of the European Union over the plan to redistribute 
migrants in the EU (DW.com, 2015a). Several weeks after that bill passed, the 
government referred their case to the European Court of Justice (DW.com, 2015b).  
The case brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by Hungary 
declares that Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 on the mandatory resettlement scheme 
for migrants infringes upon the principles of legal certainty and legislative clarity, 
necessity and proportionality45. The main argument was that the Council overstepped its 
competences by adopting a legislative act that bounded Hungary to the mandatory quota 
system. Slovakia and Hungary lost the case in 2017 (Court of Justice of the European 
Union, 2017a). Regarding Hungary’s claim that the Decision should have been treated as 
a legislative procedure, and that the Directive overstepped the competences of the Council 
of the EU concerning the Ordinary Procedure, the Court “notes in this regard that a 
legislative procedure can be followed only where a provision of the Treaties expressly 
refers to it. As Article 78(3) TFEU does not contain any express reference to a legislative 
procedure, the contested decision could be adopted in a non-legislative procedure and is 
consequently a non-legislative act.” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2017b). On 
the matter of proportionality of the Council Decision, the Court goes on to argue that the 
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“mechanism actually contributes to enabling Greece and Italy to deal with the impact of 
the 2015 migration crisis and is proportionate” (Ibid.). 
In a reaction to the court ruling, Prime Minister Orbán said that “We must take 
note of the ruling as we cannot erode the foundation of the EU - and respect of law is the 
foundation of the EU - but at the same time this court ruling is no reason for us to change 
our policy, which rejects migrants” (Than, 2017). Foreign Minister Szijjártó put it more 
bluntly by saying that “[t]his decision jeopardises the security and future of all of Europe. 
Politics has raped European law and values” (Rankins, 2017).  
Subsequently, the European Commission filed a case on 21 December 2017 
against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland for not complying with the above-
mentioned relocation scheme and for failing to fulfil their obligations (Court of Justice of 
the European Union, 2017c). The European Court of Justice published its judgement on 
2 April 2020, declaring that these member states have indeed failed to fulfil their 
obligations, and that: “[t]hose Member States can rely neither on their responsibilities 
concerning the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, 
nor on the alleged malfunctioning of the relocation mechanism to avoid implementing 
that mechanism.” (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020a). This explicit reference 
to responsibilities under EU law was made, because these member states previously 
invoked arguments referring to maintaining law and order and security to justify their 
non-compliance of the Council Decision.  
Prior the September 2017 ruling of the European Court of Justice, the Hungarian 
government also announced a referendum on the quota system in February 2016. On 9 
May 2016, parliament debated the planned referendum. Jobbik voted together with Fidesz 
in favour of the 2016 referendum on the mandatory resettlement schema (NOL.hu, 2016). 
However, Jobbik party leader Gábor Vona told Prime Minister Orbán that Jobbik had 
already proposed a referendum back in 2015, and criticised this referendum for being 
slow, expensive, and risking a negative or invalid outcome (Vona, 2016). The opposition 
parties MSZP and LMP abstained, and five independent MPs voted against initiation of 
the referendum. At the time Jobbik tabled the idea of a referendum on the quota system 
in 2015, Fidesz caucus leader Lajos Kósa rejected this idea, saying that such an issue is 
not suitable for a referendum and that Hungary is bounded by international treaty 
obligations (Mandiner, 2016a).  
To be able to put the government’s position on the quota system and the 
referendum into context, the position of the other parliamentary parties in Hungary on 
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these matters are essential to understand. The radical right-wing (previously) Jobbik 
supported a fierce anti-immigration policy (as shown above) and emphasised that 
Hungary should focus on the protection Hungary’s borders, not on Europe’s borders 
(Jobbik, 2015). While immigration was high on Jobbik’s agenda, the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (MSZP) considered the issue of immigration a “created problem” and that the real 
problem for Hungary is instead emigration (Medvegy, 2015). In terms of the quota system 
and the referendum on the issue, MP Gyula Molnár sees the referendum as a distraction 
away from domestic topics like education, health care and corruption, which are the real 
problems that need to be tackled (Origo.hu, 2016). He called on voters to stay at home 
and boycott the referendum. Democratic Coalition (DK) and Együtt supported the 
European Commission’s resettlement plan to relocate 1,300 migrants to Hungary 
(Mandiner.hu, 2015). These parties decided to collect signatures in order to show their 
support for a common European solution. DK is in favour of a common European border 
protection, the extension of the competences of Frontex and a European approach to 
migration and asylum seekers (DK, 2017). LMP was not principally against the migration 
quota either but did argue that the migration problem and border protection need a 
domestic solution (24.hu, 2016) 
The referendum was eventually held on 2 October 2016, and asked Hungarians 
citizens the following question: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled to 
prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the 
consent of the National Assembly?” (Daily News Hungary, 2016; National Election 
Office, 2016). The overwhelming majority - 98% - of those who voted answered the 
question in the negative, though less than 42% of the people ended up submitting their 
vote. The result was thus officially invalid, since the official threshold for a referendum 
to be valid in Hungary is 50% (National Election Office, 2016). Regardless of whether or 
not the referendum was valid or not, the Fidesz leadership declared the result of the 
referendum to be a victory, stating that it was a success that more people voted on this 
referendum than the one that was held on Hungary’s membership to the EU (SZBF, 
2016). 
In reaction to the quota system, the Hungarian Parliament passed legislation that 
widened the scope of action that the government could/can use to pursue its policy 
preferences. The most important of these changes on 15 September 2015 regarded the 
criminalisation of illegal passage through border barriers, which became punishable by 
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detention or expulsion46 (Legislative Act No. CXL of 2015; Temesi, 2018). Furthermore, 
on the same day, the government issued a decree that declared the state of crisis caused 
by mass migration for six months. The state of crisis has been extended every six months 
since 2015 and was still in force on 31 August 2020 (Vass, 2020). Another modification 
of the law relates to the determination procedure of the refugee status and shortens of 
deadlines for decisions of asylum applications. For the duration of up to 15 calendar days, 
the asylum seeker must stay in a transit zone, and will have three days to appeal the case. 
The asylum seeker must submit their request for asylum in person (Temesi, 2018; Nagy, 
2016).  
Hungary continues its non-compliance of the migrant quota scheme. Another 
policy issue, related to the quota system, the Stop Soros Bills of 2018, is discussed below.  
8.2. Stop Soros Act 
The second issue of the Fidesz government related to migration policy are the Stop Soros 
Package Bills from February 2018. The Stop Soros legislative package is directed at 
persons or organisations that assist refugees in Hungary. The package follows from the 
national consultation entitled Stop Soros47, and criminalises those individuals and 
organisations that provide any form of assistance to undocumented immigrants (Bills-
T19776-T19774-T19775, translated by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee). Fidesz’s 
justification of the legislative bills is that in “order to create common social 
responsibility”, therefore organisations supporting migration are “obliged to pay an 
immigration financing duty if it receives any financial or property benefit either directly 
or indirectly from abroad” (Ibid.).  
This legislative package requires the necessary historical context. Back in 2016, 
Jobbik-backed mayor of Ásotthalom, László Toroczkai, pressed charges against 
organisations aiding migrants illegally, accusing them of human trafficking (Jobbik, 
2016). Toroczkai’s argument is that “[migration] is supported, assisted and organized by 
NGOs operating illegally in Hungary while receiving billions of HUFs from abroad," and 
 
46
 The increased use of criminal law on matters related to immigrants, yet with a non-criminal component 
is known as “crimmigration” (Stumpf, 2006). 
47
 The reasoning for Bill T19776: “During the national consultation related to the Soros Plan, an unmatched 
number of Hungarian citizens, more than 2.3 million expressed their opinion. Based on the results of the 
consultation, the Hungarians want strong border protection and decisive action against those organising and 
facilitating illegal immigration. Hungarian citizens unanimously reject all plans facilitating and 
encouraging immigration. Hungarians do not wish Hungary to become an immigration country” 
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that “these organizations operated with a complete lack of transparency last year, 
deceiving the Hungarian authorities” (Ibid.). He added that the Open Society Foundations 
is one such organisation that supports immigrants illegally (Alfahír, 2016).  
 The legal basis for the legislative bills were the results of the 2017 national 
consultation on the Soros Plan. In the consultation citizens were asked whether they 
supported George Soros’ plans on seven issues, primarily referring to an article that 
George Soros wrote in September 2015 (National Consultation, 2017; Soros, 2015). On 
some items the national consultation refers to an action plan developed by George Soros, 
which the Hungarian government claims to be that of the EU as well. One such example 
by the Hungarian government is that “[t]ogether with officials in Brussels, George Soros 
is planning to dismantle border fences in EU Member States, including in Hungary, to 
open the borders for immigrants”.  
 What ensued were back and forth accusations and rebuttals between George Soros 
and the Hungarian government. Soros reacted to the content of the national consultation 
by saying that the Hungarian government was spreading lies (Soros, 2017). Minister 
Szijjártó shot back that “George Soros’s attack on Hungary has gained new momentum 
with the onset of Hungary’s parliamentary elections” (Szijjártó, 2017).  
 In July 2018, the European Commission started an infringement procedure over 
the Stop Soros legislative packages, over concerns regarding its compatibility with EU 
law (European Commission, 2018). Specifically, the criminalisation of supporting asylum 
seekers violates the Asylum Procedure Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive, 
which safeguard an asylum applicant’s right to communicate with relevant organisations 
that could support them in the application process. The second issue refers to additional 
grounds of non-admissibility, meaning that asylum seekers are only eligible to apply for 
refugee status if they directly arrived in Hungary from a place where their life was at risk. 
The Commission finds the laws to be in violation of the Asylum Procedures Directive, 
the Asylum Qualifications Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. It should remain possible for an asylum seeker to apply for asylum even 
when they arrive from a country which is not deemed a safe third country.  
 Also, the Open Society Foundations decided to sue the Hungarian government 
based on the violation of the “rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly 
that are guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, 




The Hungarian government stated in September 2018 that the European 
Commission’s infringement proceedings are a continuation of the “openly pro-
immigration position” of the Commission, “instead of performing its role as protector of 
the law” (AboutHungary.hu, 2018). Furthermore, the government was critical of the 
Commission acting “in a political way and attacking immigration policy measures that 
facilitate border protection” (AboutHungary.hu, 2018). On those grounds, the Hungarian 
government decided to keep the Stop Soros bills in effect. The government’s position was 
given extra weight on February 2019 by the Constitutional Court rejected the petition of 
Amnesty International to invalidate the Stop Soros legislative package, claiming that the 
new law and the constitution offered enough guarantees for the right interpretation of the 
“new crime”, i.e. the criminalisation of supporting asylum seekers with legal proceedings 
(Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2019a).  
The Constitutional Court of Hungary was also requested by the Minister of Justice 
to interpret whether the “Fundamental Law, as the basis of Hungary's legal system, is at 
the same time the legitimizing source of all sources of law – including the law of the 
European Union,” and how the rights of asylum seekers as in the seventh amendment to 
the Fundamental Law (the Stop Soros legislative package) can be interpreted. On 25 
February 2019, the Court found the Fundamental Law indeed to be “the foundation of the 
legal system of Hungary” and the “Constitutional Court shall be the principal organ for 
the protection of the Fundamental Law”. Therefore, a different interpretation by the 
European Commission would be “deemed to break the Constitutional Court's monopoly 
of interpretation when it examines ... the Fundamental Law in the course of an 
infringement proceeding with regard to its compliance with the secondary Union law” 
(Constitutional Court of Hungary, 2019b). It is in the end up to the Hungarian Parliament 
to decide to grant an asylum seeker asylum or protection, granted that the applicant comes 
from a country where they are not directly threatened with persecution (Ibid.). The 
European Commission’s referral to the European Court of Justice took place after this 
decision by the Constitutional Court.  
The status of the Court proceedings is not public as per early September 2020, and 




After the discussion of the two policy items, the analysis will start with an indication of 
the degree of policy change following the mandatory quota system and the Stop Soros 
legislative package, before discussing the influence of Eurosceptic parties on EU policy 
in Hungary.  
8.3.1. Policy change 
In terms of the policy change following Hungary’s rejection of the migrant quota system 
and the Stop Soros legislative package, the Hungarian government has brought about a 
profoundly different approach toward immigration. Table 15 outlines the degree of policy 
change, according to Peter Hall’s framework.  
 The European Commission’s proposal for a mandatory quota system for the 
resettlement of migrants from member states facing particularly high migratory in order 
to relieve those pressures is considered a second-order policy change, in terms of Hall’s 
1993 categorisation. The goal of the European Commission and the majority of the 
member states is to develop a common migration and asylum policy, in order to better 
deal with immigration. Improving and the harmonisation of legislation is a crucial 
element of this Common European Asylum System (European Commission, n.d.c). With 
the introduction of the mandatory quota system, this goal did not change. However, the 
system became a new instrument in order to achieve better protection of asylum seekers 




However, the Hungarian government rejected the Commission’s proposal and the 
European Council’s decision.48 The move is a third-order policy change, since neither the 
instrument nor the goal of the policy area is preserved. We can actually speak of a 
paradigm shift in that the hierarchy of policy goals changed (Hall, 1993: 280). For the 
policy issue in question, the Hungarian government went from a more European approach 
to migration (i.e. the common asylum policy), towards a strictly national approach. As 
the quote at the beginning of this chapter also shows: “As Brussels has failed to address 
immigration appropriately, Hungary must follow its own path … make a decision on how 
Hungary should defend itself against illegal immigrants” (Orbán, 2015a). The Hungarian 
government thereby changed its goal from tackling immigration together to tackling 
immigration alone. It can be argued that the underlying goal of tackling immigration 
stayed the same and the instrument only changed, but in this case, we do speak of a 
complete overhaul of the previous policy framework, one of the characteristics of third-
order change. 
 
48 The decision of the Hungarian government to reject the mandatory quota system that the European 
Council voted in favour of (Czechia, Romania, Slovakia also voted against), can be seen as a manifestation 
of inverted soft Euroscepticism, whereby a move is aimed to derail or halt European cooperation (Hargitai, 
2020). 
Table 15: Proposed and actual changes of migration policy 





Third-order change: Complete rejection 
of the quota system: “As Brussels has 
failed to address immigration 
appropriately, Hungary must follow its 
own path. We shall not allow economic 
migrants to jeopardise the jobs and 
livelihoods of Hungarians. ... We must 
make a decision on how Hungary should 
defend itself against illegal immigrants. 
We must make a decision on how to limit 
rapidly rising economic immigration.”  
(Orbán, 2015a) 
Second-order change: The goal of 
the European Commission and the 
majority of the member states is to 
develop a common migration and 
asylum policy, in order to better deal 
with immigration. Improving and the 
harmonisation of legislation is an 
important element of this Common 
European Asylum System. With the 
introduction of the mandatory quota 
system, this goal did not change. 
However, the system became a new 
instrument in order to achieve a better 
protection of asylum seekers, the goal 




In “order to create common social 
responsibility” ... organisations 
supporting migrants are “obliged to pay 
an immigration financing duty if it 
receives any financial or property benefit 
either directly or indirectly from abroad.”  
 
Sources: Collection of official documentation. 
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 Regarding the Stop Soros legislative package, which was introduced in 2018, this 
is considered by the European Commission a legislative package that violates the 
fundamental rights of asylum seekers. The bills should be seen in conjuncture with the 
first policy item, i.e. under the umbrella of a national approach to immigration. Therefore, 
it makes sense to bundle the two policy items as a single manifestation of third-policy 
change. If the bills are seen separately as an extra legislative instrument, then it can be 
seen as a second-order change. The goal stays the same, but an additional instrument is 
put in place.  
 Having established the degrees of policy change following the rejection of the 
migrant quota system and the Stop Soros Act, how do the causal mechanisms explain 
Jobbik’s influence on the Hungarian government? 
8.3.2. Contagion effect 
The main policy contender of the Fidesz-KDNP government was far-right party Jobbik. 
The government’s strategy was thus to reposition itself towards the right of the political 
spectrum (Enyedi and Róna, 2018). It did so by adopting some policies of Jobbik, since 
it saw a considerable growth potential for the far-right in Hungary. Therefore, the focus 
of this section will be on the influence of Jobbik on the EU-related dimensions of Fidesz’s 
immigration policy, as outlined in the case study above.  
 Fidesz has been converging its policy positions on numerous issues which Jobbik 
tabled first, such as building the nuclear plant in Paks, the “turn to the East” (Russia) and 
a media act meant to preserve traditional values (Enyedi and Róna, 2018; Buzogány, 
2017). On the issue of European integration, the positions of Fidesz and Jobbik have been 
converging as well. Both favoured a trimming down of the competences of the EU 
institutions and took a particularly restrictive approach to tackle the migration crisis. 
Fidesz has tied the unfolding migration crisis to the incapacity of the EU to deal with the 
crisis, by claiming that “Brussels” wants to allow large numbers of migrants to enter 
Hungary. At the same time, the European Parliament and Commission criticised the 
Hungarian government for breaches of the rule of law (see e.g. Sargentini, 2018). On the 
other hand, Jobbik has moderated its position on the EU, and then party leader Vona 
stated in 2014 that Jobbik would no longer burn the EU flag or push for a Hungarian exit 
from the EU (Enyedi and Róna, 2018).  
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 However, Enyedi and Róna (2018) also propose alternative explanations for the 
policy convergence of Jobbik and Fidesz. Firstly, Fidesz had already planned to use far-
right positions for a short time, as shocks, but these became more permanent in form, 
since their core electorate perceiving this shift favourably. Another explanation is that the 
ideological positions of the parties were close for longer, but Fidesz concealed its actual 
positions until after the 2010 electoral victory; whereby Jobbik’s policy proposals served 
as a testing ground for policies on which Fidesz would then aim to take issue ownership 
of (Ibid.). In the words of Krekó and Enyedi, “Fidesz could consciously use Jobbik as an 
instrument to reach its transformative political goals. Jobbik served Fidesz as a ‘pioneer’ 
to mark out new pathways in the ideological and political sense that Orbán could then 
follow afterwards” (2015: 201). 
 Did similar contagion also take place in the case of the Hungarian government’s 
migration policy since 2015? If Bonnie Meguid’s POS theory accurately explains the 
political strategy of the mainstream party (Fidesz) in the face of a rising niche party 
(Jobbik) which taps into new issues, then against we should expect the following four 
steps to happen. 
1. A policy convergence of Fidesz towards Jobbik on immigration. 
2. An increase in the salience of migration policy in Hungary since 2015. 
3. A transfer of ownership of migration policy from Jobbik to Fidesz. 
4. An electoral loss for Jobbik.  
After the discussion of each of these points, this section will examine the explanatory 
power of the Meguid’s theory. 
Policy convergence 
Regarding the migrant quota scheme, the Hungarian government decided to hold a  
referendum on the mandatory quota scheme that the Council of the European Union 
accepted on 22 September 2015. The referendum eventually took place in September 
2016 and asked Hungarian citizens their opinion on the following the question: “Do you 
want the European Union to be entitled to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-
Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?”. In May 
2015, before the Council decision and a year before the Hungarian parliament (Fidesz-
KDNP had around 2/3 of the seats in parliament) voted in favour of the referendum, 
Jobbik proposed a referendum on the quota system (Vona, 2015a). Later that year, Jobbik 
started a petition against migration and corruption. Their question related to migration 
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was: “Do you agree that foreign nationals should not be resettled in Hungary through 
quotas or repatriation?” (Alfahír, 2015). Jobbik’s proposal for a referendum on the issue 
of a migration quota was rejected by Fidesz caucus leader Lajos Kósa in October 2015, 
by arguing that such a topic is not suitable for a referendum, since Hungary is bound by 
international treaties (Mandiner, 2016a). In reaction to that statement, Jobbik proposed a 
change to the Fundamental Law that would make a referendum on issues to which 
Hungary has international obligations possible (Parlament.hu, 2016). A day later, Prime 
Minister Orbán declared that a referendum would take place (Mandiner, 2016b).  
Jobbik thus played an important role in the government’s decision to organise a 
referendum on the mandatory quota scheme for migrants. Jobbik put the issue on the 
public and political agenda, and Fidesz picked up on it. Fidesz might have initiated a 
referendum on the issue eventually, but it seems that Jobbik’s presence and the threat of 
the petition on migration and corruption might have encouraged Fidesz to take ownership 
of the issue as quickly as possible.  
Regarding the Stop Soros bills, also in this case Jobbik had taken the initiative. 
As section 8.2 shows, in January 2016, Jobbik-backed Mayor László Toroczkai of 
Ásotthalom pressed charges against organisations that are assisting asylum seekers 
“illegally”. A bit more than two years later, the Hungarian government passed the Stop 
Soros bill that does exactly that: criminalise those individuals and organisations that 
provide any assistance to undocumented immigrants. Already in 2016, Toroczkai 
expressly referred to George Soros and the Open Society Foundations, which were the 
main targets of Stop Soros Legislative Bills T19774, T19775 and T19776.  
In both cases, Jobbik proposed policies that were later adopted by Fidesz. Policy 
convergence thus did take place. In sum, Krekó and Enyedi (2015) capture the role of 
Jobbik on Fidesz’s strategy as “as an instrument to reach its transformative political goals. 
Jobbik served Fidesz as a ‘pioneer’ to mark out new pathways in the ideological and 
political sense that Orbán could then follow afterwards” (201). 
Issue salience 
In terms of the issue salience, since 2015, immigration policy has developed into by far 
the most salient issue for the Hungarian government. The 2019 campaign for the 
European Parliament elections was similarly overshadowed by immigration, whereby 
Fidesz dichotomised the EU in groups of pro-immigration and anti-immigration parties 
(Orbán, 2019). In public opinion, the salience of migration also increased, becoming the 
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second most important issue in Hungary in 2015, after unemployment (European 
Commission, n.d.b). However, by 2019 immigration had lost some of its momentum was 
only the third most frequently mentioned item (shared third with pension at 17%) amongst 
what Hungarians considered the most important issues facing Hungary. All in all, and 
despite the relative drop in salience, issue salience of immigration remained high 
compared to most policy areas. 
Issue ownership 
Jobbik took issue ownership of nationalist issues when it entered politics in the late 2000s 
and continued to defend that ownership since then (Pytlas, 2016). Their electoral success 
in 2010, 2014 and 2018 can be partially attributed to that ownership. At the same time, 
Fidesz was highly successful at campaigning with the threat of mass migration into 
Hungary and took at least partial issue ownership. During the 2016 referendum on the 
quota system, Jobbik had to give in and vote for the referendum that Fidesz proposed and 
successfully claimed the referendum as a Fidesz initiative (Bíró-Nagy, 2018). Another 
more indirect manifestation of issue ownership is how government campaigns inspired 
fear among the Hungarian population. 22% of respondents to a survey research –26% 
Fidesz voters and 19% Jobbik voters – expressed very serious fears from the idea that 
more migrants would move to Hungary (Bíró-Nagy, 2018).  
 In the case of the Stop Soros legislative package, no reference was made to the 
earlier policy proposal of Jobbik, and so the government took ownership of this policy 
issue.  
Electoral gains/losses  
Issue salience increased, the issue positions converged, and issue ownership was at least 
partially moved to the Fidesz, while the electoral support for Jobbik continue to remain 
around 20% in both 2014 and 2018. At the same time, the support for Fidesz increased 
from 44% to 49% of the votes from 2014 to 2018. In terms of Fidesz’s and Jobbik’s 
attitude towards European integration between 2015 and 2019, the parties have which 
sides. While Jobbik was a hard Eurosceptic parties in the early 2010, Fidesz is now the 
more Eurosceptic party of the two (see chapter 7). However, it appears that Fidesz’s 
strategic calculations were not to its detriment. One of the explanations for the solid 
electoral support for both parties is that on numerous fronts, they were not directly 
competing with each other. Gessler et al. (2019) found that voting behaviour among ring-
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wing voters was conditional on whether these voters had been exposed to the migration 
crisis of 2015: “[R]ight-wing voters in settlements exposed to the crisis punished the 
ruling party at the polls by voting for an alternative anti-refugee party, while elsewhere 
Fidesz expanded its support” (2019, 17).  
Conclusion 
Do the theoretical expectations of the accommodative strategy of the Policy Ownership 
Salience (POS) match the actual developments in Hungary’s migration policy since 
2015? Differently put, does the Hungarian case study support Hypothesis C1 – 
Mainstream parties will use an accommodative party strategy in reaction to the electoral 
success of Eurosceptic niche parties? 
 As the case study shows, Fidesz’s party strategy was accommodative in that it 
took over the policy positions that Jobbik had put forward earlier. This accommodative 
strategy was largely successful. Table 16 shows that the predictions match the 
developments of all the dimensions. Nonetheless, in terms of the effects on salience, 
ownership and electoral support for the niche party, these effects are modest.  
One of the reasons for the modest impact of Fidesz’s strategy on the electoral 
support for Jobbik could be that Jobbik voters were less fearful of migration than Fidesz 
voters. According to survey data, after the feeling of uncertainty Fidesz voters were most 
fearful of migration, while Jobbik voters were more concerned with an uncertain future, 
their financial situation and diseases, and fear of migration was the fourth most mentioned 
concern (Boros and Laki, 2018). Furthermore, Jobbik actively campaigned against 
Fidesz, attributing massive political corruption to the government party (Szabo, 2015). 
Therefore, those Jobbik voters who hold right-wing views on migration, Russia and the 
plight of the Hungarians living abroad will be deterred from voting on Fidesz, since 
Fidesz is considered corrupt. 
Table 16: POS theory in immigration policy under Orbán III-IV 
Strategies Issue salience Issue position Issue ownership Niche party 
electoral 
support 
Actual  Increased, then 
decreased 
slightly 




Accommodative Increases Converged Transfers to 
mainstream party 
Decreased 
Sources: Meguid, 2008 and own calculations. 
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8.3.3. Coalition bargaining 
Since 2010, the Hungarian government is led by the permanent alliance of Fidesz and 
KDNP. KDNP is a party that is in a permanent alliance with Fidesz since 2006 and is 
therefore not considered a separate political party49. Therefore, Fidesz and KDNP are not 
considered coalition parties, and coalition bargaining would become a manifestation of 
intra-party conflict and not inter-party conflict. However, the Fidesz-KDNP government 
has not been in need to seek coalition partners, since they won the elections in 2010, 2014 
and 2018 receiving more than 60% of the seats in parliament.  
 However, there have been some studies on coalition bargaining in Hungary that 
focus on the pre-2010 period. For instance, Péter Horváth (2015) studied coalition 
formations in Hungary from 1998 to 2006, and finds that campaign pledges, irrespective 
of the party, do not come back in the coalition agreements in Hungary at all, save three 
pledges of 1711 that were made by all the coalitions partners of the three coalitions under 
investigation. Contrasting results are found by Dobos and Gyulai, who conducted a 
content analysis of the party manifestos of major political parties in Hungary for the 1998, 
2002 and 2006 election cycles. According to their data, the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition 
fulfilled fewer pledges than opposition party Fidesz (39% versus 46%) (2015). As for the 
salience of the EU, about 7% of all pledges in 2006 were related to the European Union. 
In 2006 the amount of pledges referring to EU policies, categorised under adaptation, 
amounted to 16% of the total amount of EU pledges among the Fidesz, MSZP and 
SZDSZ.  
 Moury and Timmermans (2013) highlighted the relevance of inter-party conflicts 
as part of the coalition bargaining game. In terms of inter-party conflicts, these have 
occurred in Hungary, with the SZDSZ leaving the government in 2008 over economic 
policy, since then-Prime Minister Gyurcsány did not back economic reforms (Palonen, 
2009: 328; Szakacs and Chance, 2008). However, SZDSZ stated that it would not call for 




 While formally it is a political alliance, with the parties having their own fractions and are just different 
political entities (Ondré, 2012), there is almost a complete overlap in the voting behaviour in parliament 
(Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2018).  
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 Since coalition bargaining did not take place in Hungary between 2015 and 2020, 
the period under investigation in the Hungarian case study, this section is therefore 
concluded, and the below hypotheses remain answered. 
 
Hypothesis B1: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the formation weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition 
bargaining process. 
Hypothesis B2: With a Eurosceptic party in government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the coalition weight of the Eurosceptic party during the coalition 
bargaining process. 
8.3.4. Parliamentary oversight 
In this last section of the analysis of the Hungarian case, we will look at the parliamentary 
oversight activities of the Hungarian parliament on the EU-related dimensions of 
migration policy. The principal-agent theory will be put to the test in the Hungarian case 
study. However, a more extensive overview of parliamentary scrutiny in Hungary in the 
2010s will help to provide the context under which opposition parties can use parliament 
for scrutiny purposes.  
Formal parliamentary oversight tools  
Karlas compared the parliamentary control of EU affairs in Central and Eastern Europe 
in the early 2010s and finds that Hungary had among the strongest parliaments in terms 
of parliamentary power, legislative activities and participation rights, yet notes that 
differences between its institutional strength and the actual practical strength (2011: 268-
269). However, since then, the role of the national parliament decreased, while the 
Hungarian Parliament has seen an increased dedication to the EU (Ilonszki, 2015: 531). 
The national executive has become more centralised, while the Hungarian government 
been making more use of (exceptional) special procedures and omnibus package bills. 
With a 2/3 majority, the Hungarian government party can pass most legislative proposals 
through parliament. This overwhelming power has decreased the grip of parliament on 
Hungarian government activity and significantly diminished parliamentary oversight and 
control. Special procedures shorten the time between proposal and implementation by 
factor 7, while exceptional special procedures speed up the adoption of bills by factor 12 
(Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2018). Despite these limitations, opposition parties have remained 
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active in parliament in terms of proposing legislation and using interpellations, despite 
the (very) limited policy impact the parties formally have in parliament (Idem.: 162-163).  
 In terms of the institutional dimension, EU affairs in the Hungarian parliament are 
by and large conducted by parliamentary committees, particularly in the European Affairs 
Committee (EAC). The EAC scrutinises government activity on EU matters and makes 
procedural decisions. An earlier dual-report system in the EAC, whereby both a 
government and opposition MP were assigned to report on given issues has been reserved 
(Ilonszki, 2015). In terms of the practical oversight activities and strength, whether the 
EAC will receive an explanation of the Hungarian government’s position on draft EU 
legislation will depend on the readiness of the latter to do so (Ibid). In case EAC members 
want to initiate a scrutiny procedure, a 40% threshold needs to be reached; something 
which is a rarity given the 2/3 majority of the government party and the degree of 
polarisation among the opposition parties (Ibid). Summarising, Ilonszki observes that 
while other standing committees are involved in scrutinising the government’s EU 
activities, “the EAC enjoys a particular place in establishing the official standpoint on the 
government’s proposals, and could do so without the opinion of the standing committee 
on the given policy area” (Ibid.: 537); making the EAC the most important platform for 
EU affairs in the Hungarian parliament.  
 A legislative change in November 2019 further consolidated the scrutinising 
capacity of parliament to the EAC. Until then the Prime Minister was obliged to inform 
the Hungarian Parliament of Hungary’s position following a European Council summit. 
When PM Orbán failed to do so in July 2019 (by not showing up) (Kálmán, 2019), 
members of Fidesz-KDNP proposed a legislative change which would oblige the prime 
minister to inform the “standing council of European affairs” instead of the whole 
parliament (Kocsis et al., 2019). This proposal entered into force on 10 December 2019.   
 Three factors have led to an increase in the salience of EU affairs in the Hungarian 
Parliament. Firstly, the economic crisis led to more dialogue at the EU level, which spilled 
over into the domestic arena. Secondly, the changing attitude of the government towards 
the EU made it the EU a more salient issue, since that polarised the EU on the Hungarian 
political scene. Thirdly, the electoral success of (then) hard Eurosceptic Jobbik also 
generated more debate about the EU (Ilonszki, 2015: 542-543).  
However, Ilonszki did not consider the Hungarian Parliament to be a full-fledged 
policy shaper in 2015. Despite the formal institutions in place, these formal structures are 
often subordinated to informal and political practice. “After all, the Hungarian Parliament 
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is not a genuine forum for public scrutiny. Expert orientation and policy-shaping features 
seem still to feature in the scrutiny process. It is arguable that the Hungarian Parliament 
is a truncated policy shaper” (Idem: 545).  
This overview was longer than for the Dutch Parliament because the actual formal 
oversight capabilities of opposition parties in the Hungarian Parliament are very limited. 
Since Fidesz-KDNP has a two-third majority, it can change the Hungarian Fundamental 
Law (Alaptörvény) when it sees fit, let alone pass legislation which requires a simple 
majority. Fidesz MPs failing to submit their vote are punished by the party. When a Fidesz 
MP voted against the party line in 2014 by abstaining on two proposals and voting against 
a third, János Bencsik was fined 1000 euros (Index.hu, 2014). Since then, no MP of the 
party voted against legislative proposals of the party. 
Parliamentary pressure in Hungary 2015-2020 
The one occasion where it is clear that Jobbik used parliament to shape the government’s 
migration policy was when it asked the government to call a referendum on the relocation 
scheme for migrants in September 2015 (Vona, 2015b), to which the government 
responded that such an issue is not referendable, since the Fundamental Law states that 
issues to which Hungary is bound by international treaties cannot be subject to a 
referendum (Mandiner, 2016a). In reaction to the government’s response, Jobbik 
proposed to change the constitution to enable a referendum on issues to which Hungary 
has international obligations on 23 February 2016 (Parlament.hu, 2016). The next day, 
Prime Minister Orbán declared that a referendum would take place on the relocation 
scheme (Mandiner, 2016b). One should take note of the fact that Fidesz had a favourable 
position towards the proposal of Jobbik. Fidesz did not have to give in to any demands or 
pressure of Jobbik to accept the proposal. Its parliamentary mandate allowed it to change 
the constitution when it saw fit. 
Principal-agent theory 
In terms of the principal-agent theory and Smeets and De Ruiter’s scrutiny ladder, it was 
Jobbik as principal that provided instructions to the Fidesz government on how to proceed 
with the migrant relocation scheme. According to Smeets and De Ruiter (2018), providing 
instructions is the most extensive scrutiny step with the highest demands on the MP/party 
in question. The agent, the government, initially dismissed the proposal but then declared 
the proposal as it own, presenting the referendum on a separate occasion, without 
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reference to Jobbik. As mentioned in the previous section, Fidesz adopted Jobbik’s policy 
proposal because it deemed it an appropriate measure, not because it was dependent on 
Jobbik’s support in parliament.  
 All in all, the overwhelming majority of the government party made parliament 
particularly weak in putting pressure on the government. There were instances during the 
rule of the Fidesz that the government decided to drop legislative proposals, though those 
were more the result of Hungarian society taking to the streets. One such instance was the 
proposal to introduce an internet tax in October 2014, where tens of thousands of people 
took to the street after the government proposed this tax on the 21 October. The proposal 
was scrapped ten days later (BBC.com, 2014).  
 Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the influence through parliamentary 
oversight in Hungary is marginal, which does not mean that opposition parties are not 
vocal within parliament (Várnagy and Ilonszki, 2018). In terms of Jobbik’s influence on 
the Hungarian government, this does not appear to be confined to the parliamentary 
setting. The overwhelming dominance of Fidesz in parliament, and the legal changes 
further curbing the parliamentary oversight capabilities (Ilonszki, 2015) makes the 
influence of opposition parties through parliament questionable. Nonetheless, the case 
study addressed Jobbik’s parliamentary questions directed at Hungary regarding its idea 
of holding a referendum on the migrant quota system, and Jobbik did instruct the 
government. The government subsequently took over Jobbik’s position. However, the 
motivation of Fidesz to take over Jobbik’s proposal is instead explained by the contagion 
effect.  
Hypothesis P1: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party asks parliamentary questions 
as a way to modestly shape policy. 
Hypothesis P2: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party takes up an alternative position 
as a way to moderately shape policy. 
Hypothesis P3: To influence policy, the Eurosceptic party provides the government party 
with instructions as a way to significantly shape policy. 
 Therefore, while the Hungarian case study finds support of parties in parliament 
asking parliamentary questions, taking up alternative positions and giving instructions, 
these appear to be motivated of setting the public and not as actually influence the 
Hungarian government, captured well by Várnagy and Ilonski: “After 2010 political 
deliberation lost its importance on the floor. While the new actors struggled to “use” the 
parliamentary floor as a forum for debate, for policy alternatives and/or a space for 
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scrutiny, the predominant government’s main aim, that is, a second regime change via 
fundamental institutional changes, did not allow room for these attempts. After 2010 the 
balance of power was not altered but abolished” (2018: 166). 
8.4. Closing remarks 
Chapter 8 described the second case study, meant to test the explanatory power of the 
three causal mechanisms in answering how Eurosceptic parties influence the EU policies 
of member states. The conditions for influence are rather different in the Hungarian and 
Dutch cases. First of all, the government party in Hungary developed an unambiguously 
Eurosceptic attitude since 2015 and became the most Eurosceptic party in the Hungarian 
parliament in 2018-2019. Jobbik moderated its attitude towards the European Union, 
since then, which became most pronounced during the EP elections of 2019.  
 As for the three causal mechanisms, coalition bargaining was not part of the 
analysis, since Fidesz and KDNP are considered a single party – they have been in a 
permanent coalition since 2006 – they were the only government party in Hungary since 
2010. The accommodative strategy of Bonnie Meguid’s POS theory nicely explains the 
Fidesz’s actual behaviour, though the electoral loss of Jobbik not did happen. Lastly, the 
Hungarian parliament was the political arena through which Jobbik had instructed Fidesz 
to call a referendum, using the most demanding scrutiny tool (providing instructions) for 
that purpose.  
 Important conditions for the success policy influence of the Eurosceptic policy in 
the case of the Hungarian government’s EU policy:  
1. As party with (close to) two-third majority in parliament since 2010, Fidesz was 
not constrained by domestic party competition, as long as the legislation did not 
lead to outrage among the Hungarian public or did not receive too much criticism 
from international actors, mainly the European Commission and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. Even proceedings against the Hungarian 
government did not always deter the government.  
2. The government party had an anti-immigration agenda, therefore making it 
susceptible to the even more restrictive immigration policy of the far-right niche 
party. This offered Jobbik the opportunity to shape government policy, as Jobbik’s 
proposals could be seen as a kind of testing ground (Enyedi and Róna, 2018). 
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3. Like in the Dutch case, the most salient policy issue for this Eurosceptic party, 
immigration policy, was a relatively salient issue among the public, making it a 
policy area to invest in. Immigration policy is an omnibus issue for the European 
far-right which has a strong European dimension to it, and it often coupled with 






9. Conclusions and conditions for successful 
influence 
What is the influence of Eurosceptic parties on the EU policies of member states? That is 
the question this dissertation started with, and it will end with an answer to this question. 
For the purpose, three policy items were analysed and discussed in the case of the 
Netherlands – the Dublin Agreement, and the Qualification and Family Reunification 
Directives – and two in the case of Hungary – the rejection of the migration quota system 
and the Stop Soros legislative bills. Table 17 summarises the support of the hypotheses 
for the Dutch and Hungarian case studies, as a measurement of how well the three 
theoretical frameworks explain the influence of the Eurosceptic parties on EU policies of 
Hungary and the Netherlands.    
 In the Netherlands, the government parties VVD and CDA used accommodative 
party strategies to counter the influence of the PVV, meaning these party converged their 
migration policies towards that of the more restrictive PVV. As for the success of the 
accommodative strategy, that success is more modest. Concretely, while the policy 
convergence took place, the VVD and CDA were not able to increase the issue salience 
of migration and did not transfer issue ownership over migration away from the PVV. 
Table 17: Hypothesis testing 
 Case studies Netherlands Hungary 
Contagion 
effect 
Hypothesis C1: Mainstream parties will use 
an accommodative party strategy in reaction 
to the electoral success of Eurosceptic niche 
parties. 




Hypothesis B1: With a Eurosceptic party in 
government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the formation weight of 







Hypothesis B2: With a Eurosceptic party in 
government, the influence of the party on 
policy is a product of the coalition weight of 









Hypothesis P1: To influence policy, the 
Eurosceptic party asks parliamentary 
questions as a way to modestly shape policy. 
Supported Not supported 
Hypothesis P2: To influence policy, the 
Eurosceptic party takes up an alternative 
position as a way to moderately shape policy. 
Supported Not supported 
Hypothesis P3: To influence policy, the 
Eurosceptic party provides the government 
party with instructions as a way to 
significantly shape policy. 
Supported Not supported 
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The latter maintained the overwhelming ownership over migration policy. While the PVV 
did experience a decrease in electoral support, this is more likely to have been a 
consequence of the fact that most parliamentary parties boycotted the PVV during the 
2012 elections over the fall of the Rutte I cabinet.  
 As for Hungary, the Fidesz government similarly used an accommodative 
strategy, thereby taking over some of Jobbik’s policy proposals and increase the salience 
of immigration. At the same time, Fidesz was able to take ownership of the referendum 
on the migrant quota system and the criminalisation of supporting asylum seekers (the 
Stop Soros legislative bills). One of the reasons why Fidesz could claim ownership over 
these issues is the pro-government domination of the media landscape (Bátorfy and 
Urbán, 2020). However, in terms of the electoral losses expected for Jobbik, these did not 
materialise. It is likely that much of Jobbik’s constituency supports Jobbik and not Fidesz, 
because these voters consider Fidesz corrupt (Szabo, 2015).  
 Regarding the support for the formation and coalition weight in coalition 
bargaining, the Dutch case study offered mostly indirect evidence of the PVV shaping the 
coalition agreement of the Rutte I government. Regarding the formation phase, the 
proposals in the coalition agreement that focused on halting or strongly curbing the inflow 
of migrants and asylum seekers was much encouraged by the PVV. Also, the indirect 
influence of the PVV on the coalition agreement is the fact that 16% of the coalition 
agreement discusses migration policy, that is even 43% for the support agreement. As for 
the coalition phase, evidence was found for the influence of the SGP on the government’s 
policies, specifically regarding conditioning family reunification on being married or 
having a registered partnership. That ended up as a negotiated policy item, though it was 
not part of the programmes of either VVD, CDA or PVV, but only of the SGP. The SGP 
became the government’s silent supporter, after the government lost its majority in the 
Eerste Kamer (Senate) in March 2011. 
 As mentioned earlier, the Fidesz-KDNP is considered to be a single party and 
therefore not a coalition.   
 Lastly, the support of the hypotheses of parliamentary oversight is conditional in 
the case of the Netherlands and virtually absent in the case of Hungary. The PVV was in 
a unique arrangement as parliamentary supporter, which allowed it to take part in the 
weekly ministerial meetings with the prime minister without having ministerial 
responsibilities. This way, the PVV had disproportionately more information than the 
other parliamentary parties, allowing it to instruct the government on a course of action, 
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in line with the agreements between the itself and the government. On the other hand, in 
Hungary the opposition’s parliamentary oversight tools have been marginalised, and the 
overwhelming (super)majority of Fidesz in parliament incapacitates the opposition in 
parliament.  
 In terms of the causal mechanisms, these should be considered as complementary 
to one another, helping to explain the ways in which Eurosceptic parties can shape the 
EU policies of member states. 
 Table 18 summarises the main results of the empirical case studies, in terms of 
the policy changes that occurred and the strength and conditions of the value of the 
theories used. In several cases, there are conditions to the success policy influence of the 
Eurosceptic party on the EU policies in the Netherlands and Hungary. The main points 
are reproduced here. 
In the case of the Netherlands, the coalition structure of the Rutte I government was 
particularly favourable for the Eurosceptic party influence on EU policies, for the 
following reasons: 
Table 18: Policy change and explanatory power of theories in the case studies 
 Netherlands Hungary 
Policy change Second-order change: For all three 
policy items, the instruments change, 
while the goals remained the same. 
Third-order policy: since the goals 
and instruments changed. A 
paradigm shift from a common 
European approach to a national 
one. 
POS theory  
(contagion effect) 
Partial: Theoretical expectations of 
accommodative strategy do not 
explain actual developments. 
- Issue salience ↓ instead of ↑ 
- No effect on issue ownership 
- But electoral outcome correct, ↓ 
Strong: Mainstream party used 
accommodative strategy to transfer 
issue ownership from niche party 
and marginal niche party 
electorally.  
Formation and 
coalition weight  
(coalition 
bargaining) 
Strong, but indirect: Many 
immigration items of parliamentary 
supporters ended up as policy output. 
PVV held a very strong bargaining 
position towards Rutte I, SGP after 
March 2011 also had influence. 






Strong, but conditional: For the 
parliamentary supporters, as 
principals, the delegation was 
successful and provided instructions 
to the agent.  
The disproportionate influence of the 
PVV as principal was conditioned on 
the limited information asymmetry, 
since it took part in weekly cabinet 
meetings.   
Hardly: Two-third majority 
government, power in parliament 
practically unchallenged. Only in 
the case of widespread 
demonstrations was the principal 




1. The hard Eurosceptic PVV became a parliamentary supporter of the government, 
with a prominent political position and in close contact with the government 
parties – participating in the weekly meeting of the ministers and prime ministers 
– but without ministerial responsibilities and accountability. 
2. Under Rutte I, and due to the role of the hard Eurosceptic PVV, one of the most 
salient policy issues for the PVV – immigration policy – was also relatively salient 
for the public. Therefore, immigration policy became a policy area to invest in. 
For the PVV immigration policy is often seen directly linked to the negative 
aspects of the EU, as it is an omnibus issue for the European far-right, and it often 
coupled with European integration (see Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Fennema, 
1997).  
3. The CDA and the VDD had been moving towards a more restrictive immigration 
policy during the early 2000s as well (Akkerman, 2018). Therefore, these 
mainstream parties were susceptible to the more restrictive immigration policy 
proposals of the PVV as well.  
4. Earlier research found that immigration flows are positively correlated with the 
electoral support of the PVV (Dennison et al., 2017). Therefore, the PVV’s 
participation in the Rutte I cabinet also allowed parties like the VVD and CDA to 
experiment with stricter immigration policies, that would have been considered 
controversial otherwise. 
These conditions and consequences created a more favourable climate for the hard 
Eurosceptic PVV to influence or shape the EU policies of the Netherlands regarding 
immigration. It is less likely that other salient EU policy dimensions, like the 
environmental policy of the EU, the PVV would become a major influence. The PVV 
lacks the issue ownership is that case. On the other hand, on based this research, it is 
likely that a Eurosceptic left-wing party like the SP, might be able to shape government 
policy on financial matters, conditioned it is somehow embedded into government. The 
PVV’s one foot in and one foot out of the government appeared to be a defining factor in 
its propensity to shape the government’s EU-related migration policy. 
 In the case of Hungary, important conditions and consequences for the success 
policy influence of Eurosceptic Jobbik on the Fidesz government were the following:  
1. With a supermajority (most of the time) in parliament since 2010, Fidesz was 
weakly constrained by domestic party competition, conditioned that policies were 
not too controversial for too much of the Hungarian public. In the case of the 
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migrant quota system, the Hungarian government remained undeterred by the 
ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union that Hungary violated EU 
law by not participating in the migrant quota system (Kormany.hu, 2020).  
2. The Fidesz-KDNP government had an anti-immigration agenda, therefore making 
it susceptible to the even more restrictive immigration policy of the far-right niche 
party. This offered Jobbik the opportunity to shape government policy, as Jobbik’s 
proposals could be seen as a kind of testing ground (Enyedi and Róna, 2018). 
3. Similar to the Dutch case study, immigration policy was a very salient for the 
Eurosceptic parties but also among the public. However, contrary to the Dutch 
case, Fidesz increased the salience of immigration (Bíró-Nagy, 2018). 
Jobbik may be considered the only political competitor for voters on the right side of the 
political spectrum in Hungary under the period of investigation (Várnagy and Ilonszki, 
2018). This potential competitor might have encouraged the Fidesz government to adopt 
an accommodative strategy to Jobbik’s immigration proposals, in to mitigate the risk of 
Jobbik’s electoral growth.  
9.1. Generalisability 
In terms of the generalisability of the results to order policy areas and member states, 
some considerations are in place. First, the fact that both case studies focused on 
immigration policy is not a coincidence. Immigration has been among the most salient 
issues in EU member states over the last decade or so (European Commission, n.d.b). 
Second, party competition on European integration manifests itself along GAL-TAN50 
lines, where TAN parties cherish anti-immigration sentiments and are Eurosceptic on the 
grounds of national and cultural identity (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). Especially the most 
Eurosceptic parties tend to be on TAN parties. Third, on the EU level, numerous dossiers 
related to immigration policy are specific enough for tracing policy changes, while 
remaining a part of high politics. These factors have made immigration policy the obvious 
candidate for investigation. 
 Another policy issue that is starting to become salient in the EU is climate change. 
It also fits the GAL-TAN party competition and has the balance between high politics 
 
50 GAL stands for Green/ alternative/libertarian and “combines ecology (or Greenness), alternative politics 
(including participatory democracy), and libertarianism”, while its opposite is TAN 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalism) and “combines support for traditional values, opposition to 
immigration, and defense of the national community” (Hooghe et al., 2008: 976).  
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and detail and has a clear European dimension which can be both Eurosceptic and 
Europhile. Again a Dutch example, the two hard Eurosceptic parties (FvD and PVV) in 
the Netherlands deny climate change, while the “greenest” Dutch party GroenLinks has 
a Europhile agenda. Therefore, migration policy is not per se sui generis, though few issue 
areas are salient enough for parties to invest significant resources.  
 A second dimension to consider when looking at the generalisability of the results 
pertain to the conditions described in the Dutch and Hungarian cases above. In the 
Netherlands, the arrangement for the hard Eurosceptic PVV as parliamentary supporter 
of the Rutte I government allowed it to benefit from (1) less information asymmetry than 
the other opposition parties and (2) the precarious situation of the government parties, 
where the PVV had the bargaining card of threatening to let the government fall, which 
it eventually did over disagreements in April 2012 (Van Keken, 2011b; Parlement.com, 
2012c).  
 A similar coalition structure can be found in Denmark, where the Eurosceptic and 
far-right Danish People’s Party served as parliamentary supporter of three governments 
in Denmark, in 2001, 2011 and 2015 (Christiansen, 2016). Christiansen similarly stated 
that: “From that position [the DF] could seek policy influence through bargaining, 
perhaps from a strengthened position in number of seats and on more policy issues” (94). 
Therefore, Eurosceptic parties that are able to serve as parliamentary supporter are likely 
to play a larger role in influencing the EU policies of their respective governments.  
 The Hungarian case study shows that the overwhelming representation of one 
government party, and changes to the Constitution and of the electoral districts, and 
curbing the political opposition’s opportunities to represent themselves adequately in 
public – through the media – and in parliament, allows the government to maintain 
dominance in Hungary, thereby marginalising the possibilities of the opposition to 
influence the government’s EU policies. Nevertheless, the electoral successes of Jobbik 
in 2014 and 2018 are likely to have played a role in the government’s shift to the right. 
As Enyedi and Róna (2018) argue, Fidesz is likely to have used Jobbik’s policy proposals 
also as a way of experimenting with more radical nativist positions, which turned out to 
have been successful.  
 In no other country in the European Union have strong nationalist parties won 
with which a majority (68% of the votes) (BBC, 2019). However, the Law and Justice 
Party in Poland is a party that also challenges the interpretation of the EU’s values of the 
rule of law and departs from liberal democracy like the Fidesz government in Hungary 
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does (see e.g. Halmai, 2019). That might increase the likelihood of other Eurosceptic 
parties in Poland to shape the EU policies of Poland, in case the Law and Justice Party 
finds sees potentially electoral gains from doing so, and is thereby able to marginalise the 
opposition party. 
 Beyond these more specific considerations, two further distinctions should be 
made between the generalisability of the Dutch and Hungarian case studies across other 
cases. Firstly, the distinction between majoritarian and consensus systems of government 
is likely to have an important on the effects of opposition parties on government. 
Consensus systems facilitate coordination amongst parliamentary stakeholders while 
majoritarian systems facilitate a confrontational attitude between parliament and 
government (Gallagher et al., 2006: 62). 
 A final consideration for the generalisability of the results of this research relates 
to how party competition is played out differently in Western Europe and Central and 
Eastern European countries. The historical trajectory of the countries in CEE, the post-
Communist era started a process of economic modernisation and democratisation, 
coupled with a parallel socio-cultural process that introduced a plurality of value-systems 
in society (Pytlas, 2016: 4-5). These processes led to much weaker party bonds and 
societal attachment in CEE, which “has forced parties to compete over a much bigger 
cohort of voters than would be the case with strong, traditionally separate loyalties” (Ibid.: 
6).  
9.2. European policies without Eurosceptic politics? 
In this study, the focus has been on the policy implications of the presence of Eurosceptic 
parties in the domestic political arena. With the use of theories of party competition, 
coalition politics and parliamentary oversight to analyse the case studies, it has become 
clear that the policy impact of Eurosceptic parties is only possible when policy areas are 
politicised, and so when politics enters the equation (De Wilde, 2011). In the absence of 
high politics, the political benefits into an issue will not be able to outweigh the costs, as 
the interconnected nature of the vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking 





I. Policy-level Euroscepticism in 2019 in the Netherlands and 
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Developme
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1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 0 
Sum 5 -1 1 7 8 -9 7 7 -1 -9 1 1 




Table A.1 lists the attitudes of political parties in 2019 towards ten specific salient policy 
issues related to the European Union. In terms of general trends, the Europhile parties 
(D66, GL and the PvdA) do support most of the issues for deeper and broader European 
integration, as expected from the classification by Vollaard and Voerman. Unexpectedly, 
the new party DENK has the most Europhile positions compared to the others. D66 is not 
in favour of a Wage Union, while GroenLinks and PvdA do not favour an EU army. On 
the other side of the spectrum, the hard Eurosceptic PVV and FvD positioning themselves 
against cooperation on all policy areas. The CDA, SP and VVD do not have an outspoken 
pro- or anti-European attitude but have more specific objections. The biggest government 
party is, and historically has been, against an EU army, is against a Wage Union and does 
not want an EU-level coordination of development aid. 
 Regarding further enlargement and the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, it has not developed a clear position. CDA has similar positions as 
the VVD but is against enlargement and the EPPO. The SP, with its social democratic 
character, does want a Wage Union, but is against the continued sanctions on Russia. 
PvdD, the Animal Rights Party, is critical of the proportional distribution of asylum 
seekers, and does not want further enlargement of the EU, is against an EU army and the 
EPPO, and prefers a national approach to development aid. Lastly, the senior party 50+ 
is only against an EU army and further enlargement.  
 All in all, the positioning of parties towards the EU is mostly in line with the 
expectations, though the categorisation of Europragmatism and soft Euroscepticism does 
not necessarily match in several policy areas. For instance, the SP scores higher than the 
CDA in terms of support for European integration on policy areas, but the CDA is 
categorised as a Europragmatic party, while the SP is categorised as a soft Eurosceptic 
party. However, the categorisations were not initially developed for that aim, the 
underlying logic of the Taggart and Szczerbiak categorisation, extended by Vollaard and 
Voerman, is the overall attitude towards the EU, whereas looking at the support for policy 
areas captures the concrete positions of parties towards those policy areas.  
Hungary 
Table A.2 shows the scores of the political parties competing during the 2019 EP elections 
on ten salient policy issues. First, it can be seen that the Europhile parties (MSZP, DK 
and Momentum) are in favour of cooperation and European integration on all the items  
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in the list. Note that Párbeszéd is not added to the table, since Volkskabin excluded the 
party from its analysis. However, the party would likely have a score similar to those of 
the other Europhile parties. Secondly, also as expected, LMP holds a slightly more critical 
view of European integration. It is against a European coordination of development aid, 
and they do not wish to introduce the Euro in the next ten years. Thirdly, Jobbik clearly 
did not pursue a hard Eurosceptic agenda in 2019, as opposed to the early 2010s. It 
Table 20: Policy-level Euroscepticism 2019 in Hungary* 
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favours common approaches to climate change, development aid, social policy, setting a 
minimum wage, introducing the Euro within ten years, and joining the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. However, they are against EU enlargement with the West Balkans 
by 2025, oppose the sanctions on Russia and finds that Hungary’s sovereignty has been 
compromised too much. Fourthly, Mi-Hazánk is a truly hard Eurosceptic party, but 
favours the introduction of a country-specific minimum wage and supports that the EU 
should set stricter targets to reduce CO2 emissions. Lastly, the government party Fidesz 
has the most deviating positions on EU-related matters. It does not support the EU setting 
stricter targets for CO2 emission reductions and does not support the introduction of the 
Euro by 2029. It wants an enlargement of the Balkans by 2025 but is against the Russian 
sanctions. Fidesz favours a strengthening of the CFSP and supports a European army.  
 All in all, none of the results are particularly surprising, although the change in 
the attitude of Jobbik towards the EU is pronounced. The sections 7.2 and 7.3 will review 
the Euroscepticism of Jobbik and Fidesz, since Jobbik started as a hard-Eurosceptic party 
in the late 2000s. Mi-Hazánk is a party that was established in 2018 by former Jobbik 
politician László Toroczkai. Since it does not have any parliamentary representation and 
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